In the latest issue of U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings is an interesting piece by Commander Henry J. Hendrix, U.S. Navy. The article is “Buy Ford, Not Ferrari” and suggests a lower cost fleet to affect international maritime security on a budget. CDR Hendrix puts that budget at 3/4 of the current budget.
In his proposal, Hendrix offers up this guiding premise:
What is needed is a Navy cheap enough to be built in large numbers while remaining sufficiently effective to defend American interests on the high seas. We need Fords, not Ferraris. In keeping with the new maritime strategy, the force should be designed with enough inherent flexibility to respond across the expanse of engagement, from humanitarian assistance missions to long-range precision strike. The Navy’s force structure should be organized to maximize the potential of its assets during peacetime, including steady state operations, while also providing a means for swift concentration of credible combat power to meet any emergent major combat operation. It’s a pretty tall order, but there is a way.
Step one is to abandon the idea of a Navy built around 11 or 12 carrier strike groups. These have become too expensive to operate, and too vulnerable to be risked in anything other than an unhostile environment. This is not to say that the carrier strike groups must be done away with, however, but the discussion of how many and where they fit in a new strategy comes later. Suffice it to say, dollars and billets recouped from a lower number of carrier strike groups should be invested in ships that are well suited for low to medium engagement.
***
The next step on the Navy’s path to a new future should be the creation of “Influence Squadrons” composed of an amphibious mother ship (an LPD-17 or a cheaper commercial ship with similar capabilities), a destroyer to provide air, surface, and subsurface defensive capabilties, a Littoral Combat Ship to extend a squadron’s reach into the green-water environment and provide some mine warfare capabilities, a Joint High Speed Vessel to increase lift, a Coastal Patrol ship to operate close in, and an M80 Stiletto to provide speed and versatility.
The Influence Squadron should also heavily employ unmanned technologies to further expand the squadron’s reach. Unmanned air, surface, and subsurface platforms could be deployed and monitored by the various vessels, extending American awareness, if not American presence.
Hendrix suggests 16 such squadrons for employment. I have some questions about logistics and whether the LCS is really meant to be just a high speed mine countermeasures craft (where will the other modules be carried to be loaded if needed?) . . . but the proposal is worth reading and discussion.
