It is always a good time to back up and review where we are with the LCS. Now that we have doubled down on both hulls with their transmogrification in to a FF, it is especially important to see if we are reinforcing success or reinforcing failure.

Before we do that, let’s look at what was done with the last class of sub-DD/DDG sized ships. Let us look back at what previous generations brought to the fleet prior to the computer systems and superior technology of today.

Let’s keep it focused on one area in particular; just the timeline, milestones, and performance. For our benchmark, let’s look at the FFG-7 class, the OLIVER HAZARD PERRY (OHP), a run of 51 ships, compared to where we are with LCS, a planned run of 52 ships (32 LCS and 20 FF).

OHP Hull-1 was commissioned in 1977.
LCS Hull-1 was commissioned in 2008.

Roll the clock forward roughly six years.
OHP by year six, through the end of 1983: 37 ships commissioned, 34 for the USN, 3 for the RAN.
LCS by year six, through the end of 2014: 4 ships commissioned.

We should note as well the operational history of the OHPs by 1983. FMC in all mission areas, full deployments with all Fleets. By the end of 2014, LCS is little more than creeping through further developmental testing … yet, we are committed to seeing the class through to whatever end it will have.

Why the optimism that this is the ship we want to send our Sailors to war in? Let’s jump to page 195 of the Pentagon’s Director, Operational Test & Evaluation 2014 Annual Report.

Further commentary on my part is not necessary. Some very cold, quiet, and self-reflective moments are needed by all to ponder why we are still here going there. For those responsible for this decision, perhaps ask yourself this; is there really anything wrong with others who measure your decisions and to still find them wanting?

What is there to gain by critics in to continuing to beat the undead?

Perhaps, if nothing else, to keep reminding future leaders that when it is their turn, that they can do better. Other generations have, so can theirs.

Below are just a few of the, ahem, highlights. There are many more.

BEHOLD!

The 2014 operational testing identified shortcomings in air defense, reliability, and endurance, and significant vulnerabilities in cybersecurity. When equipped with the Increment 2 SUW Mission Package, LCS 3 was able to defeat a small number of Fast Inshore Attack Craft under the particular conditions specified by the Navy’s reduced incremental requirement and after extensive crew training and tailoring of the tactics described in Navy doctrine; however, testing conducted to date has not been sufficient to demonstrate LCS capabilities in more stressing scenarios consistent with existing threats.

The core combat capabilities of the Independence class variant seaframe remain largely untested.
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The MCM Mission Package has not yet demonstrated sufficient performance to achieve the Navy’s minimal Increment 1 requirements.
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… end-to-end mine clearance operations have been limited by low operator proficiency, software immaturity, system integration problems, and poor Remote Minehunting System (RMS)/RMMV reliability.
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… the Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) did not meet the Navy’s requirement for mine neutralization success. Failures of the host MH-60 aircraft’s systems and its associated Airborne MCM kit severely limited AMNS availability.
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LCS is not expected to be survivable in high-intensity combat because its design requirements accept the risk that the ship must be abandoned under circumstances that would not require such an action on other surface combatants.
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While both seaframe variants are fast and highly maneuverable, they are lightly armed and possess no significant offensive capability without the planned SUW Increment 4 Mission Package or Increment 2 Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Mission Package.
… (LCS-3) Based on fuel consumption data collected during the test, the ship’s operating range at 14.4 knots is estimated to be approximately 1,961 nautical miles (Navy requirement: 3,500 nautical miles at 14 knots) and the operating range at 43.6 knots is approximately 855 nautical miles (Navy requirement: 1,000 nautical miles at 40 knots).
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The ship’s Mk 110 57 mm gun system performed reliably during operational testing, and the ship was able to demonstrate the core capability for self-defense against a small boat in two valid trials. The Navy attempted to collect additional data from swarm presentations, but the data were invalid. The 57 mm gun failed to achieve a mission kill during one swarm presentation, and the target killed by the 57 mm gun during a second swarm presentation had previously been engaged by 30 mm guns.
…The LCS 3 anchoring system could not securely anchor the ship in an area with a bottom composed of sand and shells. Despite repeated efforts, the ship was unable to set the anchor. It appears that the anchor and chain are too light and there are too many friction points along the anchor chain’s internal path from the chain locker to the hawse pipe to allow the anchor and chain to pay out smoothly.
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DOT&E still has no data to assess the core mission capabilities of the Independence class variant seaframe.
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LCS reliability problems also forced the ship to remain in port for repairs instead of conducting at-sea RMS testing as planned. … the Navy had not yet demonstrated that it could sustain operations of more than one 14-hour RMMV sortie per week (i.e., 10 to 12 hours of RMS minehunting per week). Unless greater minehunting operating tempo is achieved, the Navy will not meet its interim area clearance rate requirements.

So much personal and professional capital has been invested in this ship – and in this timeframe, what utility does this have for the Fleet commander? Even more importantly, what are we putting our Sailors in and deploying forward?

Yes, it is always a good time to look at LCS/FF and ask, “What hath we wrought?”