If you don’t have a reliable nuclear deterrence, then you aren’t deterring anyone.

In a complicated but important commentary over at DefenseNews, John R. Harvey and Franklin C. Miller are putting down a marker that everyone needs to pay attention to. Problems like this rarely happen overnight, and we have plenty of warning here that people have made short-term decisions that are about to have dire long term consequences for our nuclear deterrent.

You should probably read it in full a few times, but here is the core;

Tritium, an isotope of hydrogen, is an essential component in all U.S. nuclear weapons and bombs. It is radioactive with a decay half-life of 12 years and, thus, must be replenished in U.S. warheads every few years. Absent timely replenishment, our warheads become duds.

The United States, however, will be unable to produce enough tritium in coming years to support the nuclear stockpile. How did this dire prospect come about?

Today, the U.S. produces tritium by irradiating special rods in a single light water reactor run by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). This reactor burns low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel …
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Unfortunately, the U.S. does not now have a domestic source to produce that fuel. In 2013, its one remaining uranium enrichment plant, the aging and costly-to-operate gaseous diffusion plant in Paducah, Kentucky, was shutdown. Moreover, funding to support a U.S. company seeking to build a centrifuge enrichment plant in Piketon, Ohio, was terminated.

Existing U.S.-origin LEU will run out by mid next decade …
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Failure to restore domestic enrichment by the early 2030s leaves only one alternative: use of foreign-origin LEU. But there are many drawbacks. Some exporting countries will not sell LEU for tritium production because agreements in place limit use solely for peaceful purposes.
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Restoring domestic enrichment capacity offers security benefits beyond a viable nuclear deterrent. HEU reserves to fuel nuclear-powered ships will run out in about 40 years; capability for high enrichment assures the long-term viability of the nuclear Navy. While it may not, in itself, restore U.S. global leadership in shaping the future of nuclear power, building and operating a modern enrichment plant would help reverse declining U.S. technical capabilities in the commercial nuclear arena.

What is left mostly unsaid is that this was a deliberate decision to hobble our nuclear forces in the future and to make it very expensive and difficult for others to fix. It only becomes more expensive and more difficult with each passing year, so hopefully more mature and responsible minds with the long view will get to work this year to give the future options and not problems.