The year 2016 will certainly be remembered for many unpredictable events throughout the world. For the U.S. Navy, 2016 will go down as the year information warfare took its rightful place as a warfare discipline among the surface, subsurface, air, and special operations communities. In 2016, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Jonathan Richardson and the U.S. Navy took three distinct actions to elevate information warfare to a serious war fighting discipline to be used to combat enemy aggression.
Information warfare is vital to maritime superiority. The CNO’s strategic document “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority” was released on 5 January 2016. In it, the CNO outlined his strategic vision and plan for how the Navy will adapt to changes in the security environment and continue to fulfill its mission.[1] If you search the ten-page document for the term information warfare, you might be disappointed to find the words only used once. But make no mistake; information warfare is described as a fundamental component for the U.S. Navy in maintaining maritime superiority.
On the cover page of the manuscript is the standard Navy photo we are used to seeing: an aircraft carrier and other ships sailing full speed ahead, meant to project maritime power. That picture landing on the front page of a Navy strategic document should surprise no one, but this standard photo was different than others used in years past. In the background of the document is a streaming set of ones and zeroes that we are accustomed to seeing on advertisements for The Matrix movies, hacker conferences, and cybersecurity advertisements. These ones and zeroes were placed on the front page with U.S. Navy ships to send a message that cyber and information warfare are being taken seriously in warfare doctrine.
Moving on to page one of the document, right after the introduction, there is a picture of five images combined into one. The five images are a set of Navy fighter jets, a Navy special operator in cold weather gear, a U.S. Navy surface ship, a submarine on the surface, and finally, another picture with a streaming set of green ones and zeroes—showing that information warfare is now one of the five warfare disciplines to be used by the U.S. Navy.
In the document, the CNO describes three global forces in which the Navy must compete. First, is the maritime arena—which is no surprise coming from the leader of the U.S. Navy. The second force the CNO described was quite different—the global information system. The CNO states that the information system is defined as the information that rides on servers, undersea cables, satellites, and wireless networks that increasingly envelop and connect the globe. He describes the information system as newer and more pervasive than the maritime environment. Admiral Richardson goes on to say, “Literally an individual with a single computer is a powerful actor in within this system!” By naming the global information system as the second global force in the strategic environment for the U.S. Navy, the CNO was sending a clear message – the information environment is an arena where the U.S. Navy must fight and win.
Finally, the CNO stated that for the first time in 25 years the United States is facing two great powers seeking global power—Russia and China. Admiral Richardson states both are gaining capabilities designed to exploit our vulnerabilities in the maritime, technological, and information systems environments. He stated, “Russia and China are developing and fielding information-enabled weapons, both kinetic and non-kinetic, with increasing range, precision and destructive capacity.” The CNO goes on to say, “Russia and China as engaging in coercion below traditional thresholds of high end conflict—exploiting the weakness of accepted norms in space, cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum.” Without knowing it, the CNO may have been warning of the Russian information warfare campaign that would take place in the 2016 Presidential election. The Navy was now recognizing that Russia and China prefer to play in an information environment, also known as the gray zone[2], where they at least are on a level playing field with the U.S.
From dominance to warfare. Words have meaning and that is exactly why on 8 January 2016, then-Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Naval Information Dominance and Director of Naval Intelligence Vice Admiral Ted Branch published an email in CHIPS magazine to all Information Dominance Corps (IDC) leaders that from now on the IDC would be referred to as the Information Warfare Community (IWC).[3] Vice Admiral Branch stated that Admiral Richardson held an all-hands call with OPNAV N2N6 and stressed that he was “double dog doubling down” on information warfare. Vice Admiral Branch stated, “The CNO’s emphasis on information IN warfare and information AS warfare is critical for the Navy’s success.” Although only a name change, this was an important step in realizing that our enemies are not viewing information the same as the United States. Instead they were focused on weaponizing information to be used against the United States and its allies. The U.S. Navy needed to adapt quickly and start fundamentally thinking of information not as something that can be dominated or used to support other warfare areas like in the past, but that the U.S. Navy needs to think and act with information as a weapon that must be projected and protected.
IWC at sea. Stating that information warfare is important and changing the name from dominance to warfare was a start in recognizing the importance of information warfare, but action was needed. That is why on 15 August 2016, Vice Admiral Jan Tighe, now serving as the IWC community leader and Director of Naval Intelligence, announced that the IWC would conduct a screening to fill the role of information warfare commander at sea on carrier strike group (CSG) staffs. This new position would be designated a composite warfare commander (CWC) like the other traditional warfare commanders—antiair warfare commander, strike warfare commander, anti-surface warfare commander, and undersea warfare commander. This was a major shift for how the navy prepares and fights at sea. The Navy was sending a clear signal—information warfare was not going to just be conducted from shore sites, information warfare is going to be used from ships at sea.
Establishing the IW commander position on a CSG staff was a dramatic shift for the U.S. Navy, where changes in how war is fought at sea are not taken lightly. The IW commander would be a role with delegated tactical authority to use assigned forces to respond to threats. This would mean an IW commander has a seat at the CWC table that can advise the CSG commander to conduct cyber strikes and use the electromagnetic spectrum as a weapon to jam and distort enemy communications. The IW commander would also have a role to ensure C2 is assured and defended against enemy attacks as well to maintain battlespace awareness.
Why the Change and Why Now?
It would be a great accomplishment if the U.S. Navy could claim to be first to embrace information warfare, but that would be wrong. Russia and China have been using information as a part of their overall warfare strategy for the better part of the last decade. The U.S. Navy and U.S. national security structure had to recognize the importance of information warfare. The U.S. Navy had no choice because countries hostile to the United States prefer to use information warfare to attack and achieve their foreign policy objectives, as opposed to using conventional military tactics where they are at a disadvantage. The truth is the United States is behind Russia and China in perceiving, developing, and using information warfare.
Vladimir Putin: The Pioneer of Information Warfare
Information warfare can be conducted through cyberattacks, distorting the electromagnetic spectrum, and by controlling the information narrative—also known as fake news or psychological operations. In certain scenarios, these attacks can be more effective than conventional warfare. No one has realized this more than the Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has ordered cyber warfare attacks, shutdown other countries’ communication paths, and ordered massive disinformation campaigns to advance Russian objectives and to weaken its opponents around the world. These attacks are usually directed at a NATO country or the United States.
Russia is experienced in information warfare. In 2007, they conducted the first country-wide cyberattack against Estonia for wanting to move a Soviet Red Army statue, shutting down the internet, banks, and media outlets. In 2008, Russia was the first country to combine information warfare with conventional military attacks as they invaded eastern Georgia for openly working with NATO. In 2014, Russia conducted a massive information campaign against Ukraine with Russian Special Forces to illegally annex the region of Crimea from Ukraine.[4] Now Russia has installed equipment on Crimea to spy on and jam the communications of U.S. Navy destroyers operating in the Black Sea.[5]
In 2016, Putin did what many thought would be impossible—jeopardize the validity of the U.S. election process.[6] By authorizing Russian cyberattacks against a U.S. presidential candidate and launching a disinformation campaign through social media, Russia was making U.S. citizens question the results of the election of the leader of the free world. Without firing a single weapon, Russia had undermined the United States most sacred process—free and fair elections.
Recent actions by Russia have shown that they prefer information warfare to conventional warfare, and for good reasons. Russia’s information warfare attacks have been more effective that conventional warfare attacks, with little risk offering high rewards. Their attacks over the past decade hardly have generated a response from NATO or the United States, which makes it even more enticing for them to continue their campaigns. When Russia is suspected of conducted such attacks, the government can deny any responsibility by claiming rogue actors for conducting the attacks.[7]
Shortly after successfully interfering in the U.S. Presidential election of 2016, Russia announced in February 2017 that is was creating a new branch of their military solely dedicated to information warfare.[8] While there are few details on this information warfare branch, it will likely continue to advance Russia’s strategy of using information warfare to attack and spread disinformation in countries it believes are against its agenda. The establishment of this military branch should surprise no one. Russian conventional military forces are wholly inadequate when compared to the United States. There is only one warfare arena where Russia is comparable, if not better, then the United States and its NATO allies—information warfare.
China: Master of Soft Warfare
Before the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, China was been considered the primary culprit against the United States in cyberspace and the information warfare arena, and for good reason. The Chinese were so enamored with the effectiveness of cyberattacks that they hacked into practically everything that was connected to the Internet. All countries conduct espionage, but the Chinese were using cyberattacks against private U.S. corporations as well as U.S. government networks.[9] Chinese hacking has been so egregious that the U.S. Department of Justice had to take the unprecedented action of indicting five Chinese military hackers for hacking into U.S. nuclear power, metals, and solar products industries.[10]
Chinese cyberattacks usually get the most attention, but to solely focus on cyberattacks would be a mistake. In 2003 the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and Central Military Commission approved the concept of the Three Warfares—psychological, media, and legal warfare. This document would serve as a guide for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) concerning information warfare concepts aimed at preconditioning key areas of competition in its favor.[11] The three warfares may be more effective in expanding Chine’s maritime and territorial boundaries than any weapon system.
In building and militarizing artificial islands in the South China Sea and claiming the nine-dash line, China has relied on information warfare. China views legal warfare as “arguing that one’s own side is obeying the law, criticizing the other side for violating the law and making arguments for one’s own side in cases where there are also violations of the law.”[12] This is on full display as Southeast Asian nations lay claim to the South China Sea and China’s view of an illegitimate ruling by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 2016. [13]
In the Three Warfares document states psychological warfare is intended to “to undermine the enemy’s ability to conduct combat operations aimed at deterring, shocking and demoralizing enemy military personnel and civilian populations.” This can be seen in China deployment different strategic and diplomatic efforts, looking to gain a popular national image while increasing foreign sympathy and support for their goals and policies. At the same time, these efforts seek to isolate opponents (Japan, Philippines, Vietnam, etc.), undermine their positions, and force them to react to charges to disperse their concentration and dilute their response. Through 100 case studies, a group of PLA analysts claim that China uses four different types of psychological warfare: coercive, deceptive, alienating, and defensive.[14]
The Three Warfares document states media warfare is aimed at influencing domestic and international public opinion to build support for China’s military actions and dissuade an adversary from pursuing actions contrary to China’s interest. China, like Russia, is well versed in media warfare as both countries have a tight control over media access and the media within the country are majority state controlled. [15] [16] China has even used media warfare to smear PACOM Commander Admiral Harris for his Japanese heritage and his willingness to call out China for building “great walls of sand” in the South China Sea. Reports suggest China tried to get Zcmifzl Harris fired in exchange for China’s help deescalating North Korea’s nuclear program.[17]
The Navy’s War
Whether the U.S. Navy is ready or not, it will be called upon to answer almost every global conflict in the future. While the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan rage on with no end in sight, the U.S. population and its politicians have no stomach for “boots on the ground” or nation building. The staggering cost of both wars with little or nothing to show and the amount of American blood that has been shed will give rightful pause to ever again putting massive amounts of U.S. ground troops in a foreign country.[18]
Enter the U.S. Navy. The Navy gives the United States and its leadership the ability to conduct strikes from a multitude of platforms from the relative safety of ocean waters. This was on full display during the recent Tomahawk airstrikes conducted by the USS Porter (DDG-78) and USS Ross (DDG-71) from the Mediterranean Sea into Shayrat airfield in Syria. Although U.S. Special Operations troops were in the area, that option was likely thought of as too risky. An Army or Marine invasion would only escalate a disastrous civil war that the U.S. and every other nation seem unwilling to enter. Antiaircraft weapons throughout Syria made using U.S. Air Force assets too risky. The U.S. Navy was the perfect solution to respond appropriately, which they did brilliantly by launching 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles into the airfield destroying aircraft, hardened hangars, ammunition supply bunkers, air defense systems, and radar.[19]
The U.S. Navy is building and launching ships that are more technologically advanced than ever before. Electrical systems and cyber networks are being used to control weapon systems for better efficiency.[20] These same ships will be called upon to check Chinese and Russian aggression along the coast of Crimea and in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. These technological advances come with inherent risk due to their ability to be hacked and attacked. The Chinese and Russians are no doubt working on how to get inside these shipboard systems to control them, manipulate them, and possibly shut them down all together. Good thing the U.S. Navy is now starting to take information warfare seriously.
ENDNOTES
[1] Admiral John Richardson, U.S. Navy, “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority,” 5 January 2016.
[2] Barno, David, and Nora Bensahel. “Fighting and Winning in the “Gray Zone”.” War on the Rocks. 19 May 2015. Web. 10 May 2017
[3] “The “Information Dominance Corps” Is Now the “Information Warfare Community”.” CHIPS – The Department of the Navy’s Information Technology Magazine. DON CIO, Jan. 2016. Web. 25 Apr. 2017.
[4] Windrem, Robert. “Timeline: Ten Years of Russian Cyber Attacks on Other Countries.” NBCNews.com. NBCUniversal News Group, 18 Dec. 2016. Web. 14 Mar. 2017.
[5] LaGrone, Sam. “U.S. Official: Russia Installed System in Crimea to Snoop on U.S. Destroyers, Jam Communications.” USNI News. N.p., 01 May 2017. Web. 02 May 2017.
[6] Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Council, 2017. Print.
[7] Stupples, David. “How Computer Hacking Is Becoming Russia’s Weapon of Choice.” The Conversation. 16 Mar. 2017. Web. 18 Mar. 2017.
[8] Isachenkov, Vladimir. “Russia Announces New Branch of Military to Focus on Information Warfare amid Hacking Allegations.” Independent. 22 Feb. 2017. Web. 17 Apr. 2017.
[9] Zetter, Kim. “Chinese Military Group Linked to Hacks of More Than 100 Companies.” Wired. 19 Feb. 2013. Web. 04 Feb. 2017
[10] “U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial Advantage.” Justice.gov. U.S. Justice Department, 19 May 2014. Web. 12 May 2017.
[11] Raska, Michael. “China and the ‘Three Warfares’.” The Diplomat. 18 Dec. 2015. Web. 28 Apr. 2017.
[12] Han Yanrong, “Legal Warfare: Military Legal Work’s High Ground: An Interview with Chinese Politics and Law University Military Legal Research Center Special Researcher Xun Dandong,” Legal Daily (PRC), February 12, 2006.
[13] Graham, Euan. “The Hague Tribunal’s South China Sea Ruling: Empty Provocation or Slow-Burning Influence?” Council of Councils. 18 Aug. 2016. Web. 12 May 2017.
[14] Chang, Dean. “Winning Without Fighting: The Chinese Psychological Warfare Challenge.” Heritage. 12 July 2013. Web. 15 May 2016.
[15] “China’s Great Media Wall: A Report on Press Freedom and Challenges for Journalists.” IFEX. 3 Feb. 2016. Web. 15 May 2017.
[16] Benyumov, Konstantin. “How Russia’s Independent Media Was Dismantled Piece by Piece.” The Guardian. 25 May 2016. Web. 15 May 2017.
[17] Rogin, Josh. “China’s Smear Campaign against a U.S. Admiral Backfires.” The Washington Post. 8 May 2017. Web. 15 May 2017.
[18] Economic Costs.” Economic Costs | Costs of War. Watson Institute Brown University, Sept. 2016. Web. 03 June 2017.
[19] Brook, Tom Vanden, and Gregory Korte. “U.S. Launches Cruise Missile Strike on Syria after Chemical Weapons Attack.” USA Today. Gannett Satellite Information Network, 08 Apr. 2017. Web. 03 June 2017.
[20] Fabey, Mike, and 2. “What Makes America’s New Ford-Class Aircraft Carrier Truly Dangerous.” The National Interest. The Center for the National Interest, 2 Mar. 2017. Web. 03 June 2017.