The U.S. Submarine Force dominates the sea through superior technology, personnel, and tactics. Other countries invest incredible amounts of money and resources into their submarine forces to combat U.S. superiority at sea. The desire to outmaneuver the United States in the landscape of submerged warfare will continue to grow. The highest threat to the the U.S. Navy’s ability to conduct submarine operations, however, is not the new variety of submarine technologies the enemy may employ, but an older and simpler concept—mine warfare. The abundance, relatively small cost, and overall effectiveness of underwater mines for naval warfare will ultimately cripple the U.S. Submarine Force if new technology is not developed to generate more effective countermine measures.
The main advantage of a U.S. submarine is its ability to use stealth to avoid detection in enemy waters. If a submarine is detected by an enemy, it becomes a much easier target while creating a new range of issues for its crew. If a submarine is detected by enemy forces, the submarine must cease the stealth-dependent mission it was undergoing. This would be considered a mission failure for the submarine. The continuous threat of mission failures would drastically decrease the country’s ability to conduct submarine operations safely and successfully in foreign waters. A submerged minefield also could completely deny submarines access to the theater of operations. Due to the threat to the most basic mission and purpose of the submarine force, the Navy must seriously address the issue of submerged mines.
If a country was to place enough mines off its coasts in a strategic manner, it could completely deny a submarine access to its offshore territory. This course of action also would prevent that country from sending any of its ships or submarines into the naval theater. Therefore, this option is not feasible for a country that has a fleet of submarines and ships it would like to use to protect its shores. Conversely, for smaller countries like Iran, which has a small sea area to protect, this is a viable option to deter U.S. submarine presence off their coasts. The strategy of area denial through mine warfare already is prevalent within the current warfare landscape. In 2011, Iran’s Vice President, Mohammad Reza Rahimi, made threats to the world that “not a drop of oil will pass through the Strait of Hormuz” if his demands to stop the sanctions being placed on Iran were not met. [1] An act such as this would stop almost 40 percent of the world’s oil exportation which could effectively ruin the world economy. The Navy Chief of Iran, Admiral Habibollah Sayari, evaluated the difficulty of Iran accomplishing this feat being “easier than drinking a glass of water.” [2] Admiral Sayari’s comments were based from the fact that the estimate of Iran’s mine stockpile has been cited as around 20,000 sea mines in total. Effectively, this means Iran could saturate the Strait of Hormuz with a mine on average about every 550 feet. [3] It is unlikely even the best navigation team on any naval vessel could navigate through those waters, and most would not take the risk. Area denial via mine warfare is a strategy the Navy cannot afford to overlook lest the United States be held hostage to the demands politically extreme countries such as Iran.
Large stockpiles of sea mines as a strategy of area denial are not limited to small countries. China, a larger nation, has been cited s having an arsenal of over 100,000 sea mines ready for use.[4] In addition, the manufacturing capabilities of a country like China imply that mine warfare for area denial could be a choice strategy for the Chinese if they choose to focus on mine manufacturing. China could lay these mines in areas where it want to deny U.S. submarines access, but with the size of the sea around China, this is unlikely. What is more likely is that China will place mines in an arrangement to shrink the area in which U.S. submarines would choose to operate. This shrinks the overall area for search and detection of enemy submarines ergo increasing the probability of detection. The consequences of U.S. detection in the China Sea would certainly alter the current geopolitical landscape. This could give the Chinese an upper hand should open conflict become a reality.
A successful enemy mine attack would be catastrophic for any naval vessel. For example, in 1991 an Iranian mine struck the USS Princeton (CG-59), a Navy guided missile cruiser, and completely took the ship out of action.[5] Iran used an Italian Manta multiple-influence bottom mine which cost approximately $25,000. If a submarine were to be struck by a mine, the effect would only be exponentially worse as the boat will be hit while under the water in a pressurized environment. The entire crew and the boat itself are at a higher risk of becoming a complete casualty where the entire ship and crew would be lost. This does not even include the financial impact of the mine attack. The $25,000 mine used on the USS Princeton caused a $96 million repair bill in 1993.[6] The cost for a submarine casualty could top $1.76 billion.[7]
In order to explore mine countermeasure strategies, the capabilities of modern mines in addition to how they are placed must be explored. Modern mines are broken down into four main categories: bottom mines, moored mines, floating mines, and limpet mines.[8] Bottom mines lay on the seabed and can sometimes be buried in sediment. These types of mines target shallow water vessels, although they can have devastating effects on submarines at much deeper depths. Moored mines are buoyant mines attached to an anchor. The design, which allows them to be buoyant, also gives less space for explosive material making them approximately half as effective as bottom mines.[9] Floating mines also are buoyant and float near the surface. However, they can be set to oscillate at different depths and can be released to drift to different areas.[10] This makes them versatile in terms of mine placement for area denial. Limpet mines are specifically targeted mines which are placed by divers or suicide bombers directly to their target. These types of bombs can be set to go off after a certain amount of time, a certain amount of distance, or simply as soon as they are placed.[11] They require direct human involvement in order to be effective. These are the four main categories of mines which gives a general outline of what is available for use by the enemy.
All types of mines are triggered by the three separate methods: contact, influence, and command-detonated mines.[12] Contact mines must have a vessel strike them in order to detonate. These are the oldest and simplest form of mine, which also makes them the least expensive and easiest to counter. Influence mines are more expansive and dangerous in terms of their method of employment. These mines do not need direct contact but instead use “combinations of magnetic, acoustic, seismic, underwater-electrical potential, pressure, and video sensors” to know when to detonate.[13] Influence mines can be set to detonate after a series of positive trigger notifications. A submarine could travel past a mine hundreds of times before it reaches the magic number of times it has been set to be triggered. A previously safe area suddenly will become active again. Command-detonated mines are actively triggered by the enemy when they know that vessels are within the area of the mine. They require direct human involvement to be effective. Regardless, all three of these methods are deadly when employed. Mines have become more and more sophisticated in their employment by the enemy. This will require further research to successfully defeat this threat.
The most effective way to counter a mine is to prevent the mine from being laid in the first place. One proposal would be that U.S. intelligence agencies prevent the laying of mines throughout the world. This proposal is based in the idea that the United States could survey the entire sea at all times, with enough scrutiny to detect when mines are going to be laid and then stop them from being laid. This is an unrealistic proposal. The United States would struggle to enforce strategy even on one rival power in China. The Chinese have developed an array of options for mine delivery to the waters near their shore. One mine warfare specific platform for delivery would be the Wolei-class ship which can carry over 200 mines. The quantity of this platform is limited to only a few ships.[14] They have a fleet of submarines that can lay anywhere from 20-30 apiece. This seems like a manageable number of enemy vessels to track and deny mine operation capability. If China were to conduct nontraditional military operations for mine laying, they could exploit the use of their civilian fleet of 30,000 trawlers and 50,000 sailboats able to carry on average 10 mines and two mines respectively.[15] The sheer number of mine-capable ships could provide cover for the ships carrying the mines. This force would be nigh unstoppable in their objective of filling the seas with mines. The United States would be hard pressed to stop these efforts, let alone the efforts of every nation that roams the high seas. In order to better understand how the United States is addressing this issue we will look at its current plan of attack.
The United States has put a large focus on the littoral combat ship (LCS) as its number one approach to stopping mine warfare. The LCS is a new platform for the Navy that is still untested. The program was touted as the answer to the future of Navy ships by making the ships modular to include mission packages such as the mine countermeasures modulation. The entire program has essentially failed, forcing a recall of the ships in 2016 for retesting for engineering and safety problems. The entire crews of these new ships had to be retrained. [16]Meanwhile, the mine countermeasure portion of this mission has been left to the wayside, unable to be deployed and used should it be called upon. When the mission sets were tested, the technology for detecting mines performed very well, sometimes even exceeding expectations. The issue came with the delivery system of the technology to the waters. One example of this is the Lockheed Martin remote multimission vehicle (RMMV), which was an unmanned system to take the equipment into the minefield and deliver it. This vehicle was so unreliable that the Navy had to cancel the program that used it.[17] Overall, the push to fix the lack of a mine warfare countermeasures has been unsuccessful and needs additional focus.
The threat of mine warfare by enemy nations is too terrible to ignore. The United States has recognized the threat and has failed to address it. The technology produced to counter this threat is dependent on the failed LCS program and the failed RMMV program. The technology cannot be employed or tested for operational capacity. The U.S. Submarine Force has been left completely exposed to this threat. The Navy must invest in counter-mine warfare measures or they risk losing the extraordinary capabilities the submarine force has to offer.
Endnotes
[1]”Iran threatens to block Strait of Hormuz oil route.” BBC News, 28 December 2011, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16344102.
[2] Sydney J. Freedberg Jr,”Sowing The Sea With Fire: The Threat Of Sea Mines.” Breaking Defense, http://breakingdefense.com/2015/03/sowing-the-sea-with-fire-how-russia-china-iran-lay-mines-and-how-to-stop-them/.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid
[5] John Pike,”Military.” CG 59 Princeton. Accessed April 14, 2017. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/navy/cg-59.htm.[6] Scott C. Truver, “Taking Mines Seriously.”
[7] Robert Farley, “US Navy Orders 10 Virginia-class Submarines at a Record Cost of $17.6 Billion.” The Diplomat. May 07, 2014. Accessed April 14, 2017. http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/us-navy-orders-10-virginia-class-submarines-at-a-record-cost-of-17-6-billion/.
[8] Scott C. Truver, “Taking Mines Seriously.” Accessed April 14, 2017. https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/19669a3b-6795-406c-8924-106d7a5adb93/Taking-Mines-Seriously–Mine-Warfare-in-China-s-Ne
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] William S. Murray, Andrew S. Erickson, and Lyle J. Goldstein, “Chinese Mine Warfare.” April 14, 2017. http://www.gryphonlc.com/images/Mine-Warfare-in-Chinas-Near-Seas.pdf
[15] Freedberg. “Sowing The Sea With Fire: The Threat Of Sea Mines.”
[16] David B. Larter, “Navy orders big changes for littoral combat ships after engineering problems.” Navy Times, 5 September 2016, www.navytimes.com/articles/navy-orders-big-lcs-changes-after-engineering-problems.
[17] Eckstein, Megan, “LCS Mine Countermeasures Package May Be Headed For Single IOT&E For All 4 Increments,” USNI News. 5 May 2016, https://news.usni.org/2016/05/05/lcs-mine-countermeasures-package-may-be-headed-for-single-iote-for-all-4-increments.
