In memory of Captain Terry Mosher, USN (ret).
As a member of the graybeard society of retired SWO’s that have weighed in on recent events, I would like to tilt at one windmill—at the risk of being blogged to death—that some of my peers who have not stayed as close to the SWO community as I have, or others with limited military experience, may be missing. Yes, there were decisions made a decade ago, from the cancellation of SWOSDOC to Optimal Manning to Top Six rolldown, that have ripple effects even today, and the light of day needs to be shined on them; but in many cases, corrective actions were implemented by dedicated and innovative leaders over the ensuring years, but what is done over a decade cannot be undone in six months. After reading and seeing a great deal of discussion, here is an attempt to set the record straight on a few items:
- SWOS in a Box is over. In 2013, Surface Warfare Indoc was reinstated, and then expanded every year since. Now every new Surface Warfare Officer attends BDOC in Norfolk or San Diego. While not as long as the original SWOS School, the curriculum is both robust and broad, with extensive seamanship, navigation, and shiphandling training. Several senior mentor sessions and ship visits round out many of the lectures and demonstrations. SWOS is led at all levels by officers who have excelled at sea and are handpicked for professionalism and leadership, and it shows. Thinking back to my SWOS class in Coronado, I can more readily recite the menu for appetizers at the various Officer Clubs in San Diego than I can the topics taught in class. More on that later!
- Realistic ship handling and seamanship training is in place. When I attended SWOS in 1986, I recall driving little remote control ships and trainers where the ship simulations were two-colored lights on a string moving through a dark room. Modern COVE and full mission bridge simulations at every level from division officer to major command provide detailed, realistic simulations with virtual reality-like sound and feel, virtual ships that respond like the real ones, and rules of the road taught by experienced professional mariners. It has been this way for several years. Every class since the year after the USS Porter (DDG-78) collided has relived that event in detail in a realistic simulation—I have seen Department Heads yelling at the screens “slow downturn left” in the moments before the collision and felt my skin crawl at the realistic playback—synchronized to the tape recording—and the consequences of not following the rules of the road and not listening to junior officers are made clear by the sickening sound of the collision to every student at each level.
- Afloat Training Group is training on the deck plates. Under the leadership of some very successful post-major command officers, ATG PAC and LANT revised the Basic Phase to include building block phased training over a 21 week period, with seasoned teams on all warfare areas, including exit criteria and detailed feedback sessions. There is no menu to choose from; ships get it all and it hurts a little. A very recently deceased classmate of mine, Terry Mosher, did so much for the Navy in this arena.
- The days of CBT and “Stress Cards” at “A” School are over. During a visit a few years ago, I saw how sailors leverage both a computer diagram of a 9mm, complete with 3D video and “exploding” parts that could be separated and labeled, then stepped into a room to work with a real 9mm under the eyes of an instructor. Perhaps it is not perfect, and many of the actual “systems” were either mockups or older versions of modern equipment, but their hands were on and they were learning. Not perfect, but not what it was a few years ago, and getting better. If you don’t believe me, get on a plane and use your retired ID card to get a tour.
- Sailors are back in Regional Maintenance Centers (RMC)—learning to fix things. Code 900 in each RMC is a robust organization and growing, with hundreds of Sailors actively engaged in honing their repair skills on shore duty, gaining formal maintenance qualifications, and returning to ships as better technicians. I recently sat next to an EN2 at a meeting who was finishing up his tour in the air conditioning shop at MARMC and returning to a ship as the Leading Petty Officer for A-Division…I would have loved to see him walk aboard my ship!
- The Sailors and Officers in today’s fleet are professionals. I have spent 16 hours of contact time with large groups of Division Officers, Department Heads, PXO/PCO, and Major Command Classes every few months for three years. My impression has been overwhelmingly positive – they are engaged, involved and they want to learn. I do not see apathy or malfeasance – I see smart, professional officers who want to go to the fleet and excel. I am also on ships about twice a month and interact with Sailors nearly every day, and they continue to impress.
Some recent changes have yet to be evaluated, but may have lasting effects. The Operational Fleet Response Plan (OFRP) extended the deployment cycle to 36 months and was designed to add “stability,” but with it came 7+ month deployments followed by a “sustainment” phase that could mean significant underway time, and the new maintenance contracting strategy brought back the “Coast Wide Bid” process that has already taken one ship out of its home port for the better part of a year after returning from deployment. It adds a bit of stress for those who might be subject to this process and won’t know until 60 days out. Forward deployed ships in Rota and Japan are not subject to these schedules, but have unique challenges of their own. It may be a full OFRP cycle, about 3 years, before the secondary effects are fully realized, for better or for worse.
But back to the Sailors and Officers in the Fleet today . . . I was complaining recently to my boss that despite my best efforts to keep my particular topic—maintenance—interesting (a challenge in any circumstances!), and he challenged me to close my eyes and think back to my SWOS class and Department Head School class—there were some knuckleheads in there (I know – I was one!). Those who malign the training programs may forget that they too sat in classrooms, working on or reading something else besides the course work, daydreaming, or outright sleeping, while a highly qualified instructor droned on about a particular topic. I have had young ensigns write on critiques in class, “I don’t see how this topic pertains to my new job” only to e-mail me six months later to say “I was wrong – I spend half my time on maintenance – wish I had listened more!” The point is, students are human, and a percentage of even the best training either falls on deaf ears or the knowledge atrophies over the course of a long school. You can only pour so much water on a sponge before it is saturated! That doesn’t mean that improvements in training are not warranted, but that alone is not the silver bullet that will solve all problems.
I hear many peers discuss how “Navy culture has deteriorated.” I say “Not so fast.,” In 1987, my first chief showed me how to wrap the mechanical seal on a pump with cling wrap from the galley to stop a leak on a mechanical seal; a Department Head shared his technique for gluing bolt heads onto a manhole cover the night before INSURV, and I could site myriad other examples of behavior that should never be condoned, but was—back in the “good old days”. It worked, but would not have been approved as a Departure From Specification! My point is that anyone who thinks the Navy used to do everything right and has now lost the edge suffers, in my opinion, from selective memory. As my father, a 30-year mustang used to say, “These ensigns get younger and dumber every day.” That was 1970.
So how did recent events happen? I don’t know, and as Alan Eschbach noted in a recent editorial, the need to know is not mine. A holistic and open-minded look, as directed by the CNO, should help get to these answers. I am not a fan of many past policies, and in some cases went on record—via the chain of command and, if that didn’t work, via Proceedings articles—quite strongly against them, and some current policies may require a thorough review. But we must avoid the knee-jerk reactions that got us here. The Navy is a big ship with a small rudder and a large turning radius. The aforementioned policy changes, many made by well-intentioned leaders, who found them either necessary or smart in the context of their environment at the time, are manifesting themselves today. They are generational in nature, and their pernicious effects may not be fully known for years. By the same token, changes made today will reach far into the future and should—no, MUST—be based on robust, open, and, above all, well-informed discussions. One specific caveat: in looking back at these recent gains, Sailor 2025 comes to mind. Much of the public documentation related to this initiative focuses on cost savings and efficiencies, which is eerily reminiscent of programs like “Optimal Manning” and “Revolution in Training.” If the primary goal of Sailor 2025 is “better trained Sailors”, that is great. If not, its architects would be well served to revisit the lessons of history to avoid a repeat of the early 2000’s.
Recently a colleague opined that the root cause of these collisions would prove to be “pure negligence.” Perhaps. But I would submit that in some ways we are all negligent in various aspects of our life and job every day. Yesterday I texted at a red light – I could have caused an accident. The day before I went home without completing a task that was due that day, pushing it to tomorrow because I knew my boss would not be in until next week. When speaking with Junior Officers, I caution them to look in the mirror and ask “What did I not do today before taking the watch? Did I skip part of a prewatch tour? Did I decide not to review a rule of the road that I know I am weak on?” In the light of recent catastrophic events, it would be a disservice to those who died and to our Sailors not to examine every facet of the Navy community, deep and wide, in all the areas discussed in this and other forums. Those found to be truly negligent should be held accountable. But it is also a disservice to those giving their blood and sweat in the arena today to paint them with the brush of malfeasance as they work to improve the process.
