If you told someone in 1985 that we would have the challenge below in 2018 without firing a shot, they would have thought you a bit touched in the head. It’s a good challenge to have considering where we once were.
Since the end of the Cold War, Western Europe (NATO) gained roughly 1,000 kilometers of defense in depth if you use the distance from the Fulda Gap to the Suwalki Gap as your two points.
What is the Suwalki Gap you say? Over at FT, Michael Peel and Michael Acton provide a good primer;
The frontier runs for 104 km (65 miles) through farmland, woods and low hills, in an area known as the Suwalki Gap. If seized by Russia, it would cut off Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
Over two days, U.S. helicopters and British aircraft took part in exercises that also involved troops from Poland, Lithuania and Croatia in a simulated defense of the potential flashpoint.
“The gap is vulnerable because of the geography. It’s not inevitable that there’s going to be an attack, of course, but … if that was closed, then you have three allies that are north that are potentially isolated from the rest of the alliance”, U.S. Lieutenant General Ben Hodges told Reuters.
Regular readers here know this fact; at least in the natsec world, increased concerns about Russia’s new aggression pre-date the 2016 election,
Russia’s 2014 annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula in the Black Sea has changed NATO’s calculations, seeing Russia increasingly as an adversary. Before then, no forces from other alliance members were stationed in the Baltic states; now four battlegroups totaling just over 4,500 troops have been deployed in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.
The Poles have been pushing other NATO allies to use some of these troops to secure the vulnerable Suwalki corridor and deter potential Russian aggression. But while 1,500 troops took part in this weekend’s exercises, a Lithuanian commander cautioned that it would take more to defend the gap in the event of a genuine conflict.
…
“I think it’s important for the soldiers to train on land that they may have to defend some day,” said Major General John Gronski, deputy commander, U.S. Army Europe, observing the exercise in Lithuania.
Andrius Sytas reports at Reuters, along the same lines;
The gap is vulnerable because of the geography. It’s not inevitable that there’s going to be an attack, of course, but … if that was closed, then you have three allies that are north that are potentially isolated from the rest of the alliance”, U.S. Lieutenant General Ben Hodges told Reuters.
Russia denies any plans to invade the Baltics, and says it is NATO that is threatening stability in Eastern Europe by building up its military presence there and staging such war games.
…
The Poles have been pushing other NATO allies to use some of these troops to secure the vulnerable Suwalki corridor and deter potential Russian aggression. But while 1,500 troops took part in this weekend’s exercises, a Lithuanian commander cautioned that it would take more to defend the gap in the event of a genuine conflict.
…
“I think it’s important for the soldiers to train on land that they may have to defend some day,” said Major General John Gronski, deputy commander, U.S. Army Europe, observing the exercise in Lithuania.
Smart.
The ground and air forces have moved their lines east, but what are we doing on the maritime side of the house to buy space and time against a re-invigorated Russia looking west again?
In the last few years, many have realized that our Cold War barricade to the Atlantic at the GIUK Gap was gone. Jerry Hendrix, as one would expect, in May of last year was at the front re-starting this conversation outside the conference rooms. Jerry is also starting to think beyond what was ours but lost, and moving our mindset about maritime defensive lines east. In this case, discussing what was once a Warsaw Pact asset, Gdansk.
Moves in the right direction have already started. USA is planning to refurbish and return to Keflavik. The Royal Air Force is getting back in to the air-ASW fight again. These are good, but it is just scratching back to a shadow of our old defensive lines. We need to think like our ground and air counterparts.
When you look at the Baltic – not an easy place for any maritime asset in war – work needs to be done. The most effective Baltic maritime capability for NATO in the Baltic – IMAO the small conventional submarine is not in good shape. The Danes no longer have submarines. The German U-boat force – when it can get underway – is in caretaker status. The Poles (now on our team) have the desire, but their submarine force is ancient. Sweden, though not an ally, is struggling like the UK just to defend their home waters. Fast attack craft can be useful, but are very vulnerable if you try to use them in sustained time at sea. Air assets have a lot of utility as well – but good chance they will have their hands full. Most likely Blue COA: submarines. As for USA and UK SSNs … they will be needed elsewhere and much of the Baltic is not suitable for the big girls.
So, at sea it will take awhile to rebuild old defenses – to keep the Russians in port and vulnerable in the Baltic, and out of the Atlantic. While we are doing that, we need to push the frontier forward.
If during the Cold War we wanted to keep them out of the Skagerrak, should we look instead as the line from Gdansk to Gotland? Once you neutralize Kaliningrad, Tallinn to Helsinki? What do we need to do that? Who needs to do that?
In the Atlantic, are we happy holding the old GIUK line, or do we need to move it forward? From Hammerfest to Bear Island? We know those waters. For the old Cold Warriors, we know that story and those east.
Time to get to work.
