The U.S. Marine Corps currently is developing an operating concept that would enable it to get back to its traditional role of “. . . service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.” The concept, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), is designed to turn an adversary’s antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) strategy back onto itself.
EABs will deliberately operate within the arc of the adversary’s precision long-range fires and its appropriate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. EABO is conducted to control key maritime terrain and chokepoints, deny adjacent waters to an adversary, exploit and enhance the natural barriers of island chains, extend the reach of sea-based aircraft, as well as support and sustain fleet units. EABs will be austere, small and numerous, mobile and displaceable, operationally relevant (strong enough to provide an operational “punch”), and they may host credible antiair and antisurface capabilities to complicate enemy planning. EABO air operations will be conducted in the face of enemy A2/AD complexes, where it is envisioned that U.S. forces will not have air superiority, and that the opponent will have an integrated air defense (IAD) system.
Fixed-wing tactical aircraft are envisaged to operate from EABs, and the USMC’s two current vertical short take-off and landing (VSTOL) jets—the AV-8B Harrier and its slated replacement within the next decade, the F-35B Lightning II—would be key parts of EABO planning and execution. Besides being VSTOL capable, both aircraft also carry the same array of ordnance. While there are other similarities between the two, the debate of which one is preferred for EABO comes down to, as it almost always does, the differences between the two, and the weight of those differences in the minds of military planners.
Some argue it does not make sense to have an expensive platform like the F-35B to support the austere, forward-deployed, inside-the-A2/AD-threat ring EABs. What is needed, however, is a relatively low-cost, yet reasonably capable, platform to hold the enemy at risk. Indeed, according to manufacturer Lockheed Martin, an F-35B costs more than $120 million. Contrast it to the $20+ million unit cost of the AV-8B. Destroying a single F-35B is therefore equivalent to the downing of a few Harriers in terms of the U.S. national ledger.
Closely related to the cost issue would be that of reliability. Being a much more complex platform, the F-35B would face greater maintenance issues. As a matter of fact, the aircraft is reportedly suffering from readiness rates of only 50 percent, and these under ideal conditions of having access to spare parts as well as skilled service personnel. On the other hand, the Harrier has scored much better in this aspect: witness its 90 percent mission-capable rate during Operations Desert Shield and Storm.
An F-35B Lightning II with Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 121 “Green Knights.” (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Lillian Stephens/Released)
What is more, the F-35B needs to land on a specially paved runway because the immense heat from its exhaust could burn the tarmac of regular airstrip. The combination of the F-35B’s single exhaust (Harrier has dual exhausts) and its weight (about twice as much as the Harrier) took about four years of testing and shipboard modifications to overcome before a historic first-time deployment of an F-35B squadron aboard the USS Wasp (LHD-1) on 5 March 2018. When the F-35B program was first drawn up, it was assumed that the plane could land where the AV-8B could, but it has taken much longer than expected to land on the easier surface of amphibious ships. Many are rightfully concerned about the F-35B landing on less-than-pristine air strips.
Hence, there is a big question mark over whether the F-35B can operate out of the austere conditions found at EABs. The Harrier, on the other hand, has proven its worth in using forward arming and refuelling points (FARPs), which are essentially expeditionary air pads or strips created to support take-offs and landings. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, for instance, AV-8Bs sortied from a FARP about 150 kilometers south of Baghdad.
Two other planning and executing challenges with the F-35B in an EABO environment deal with logistics and security. The F-35B uses much more fuel than the Harrier (about twice as much), which is likely to add to the already huge logistical challenges inherent in EABO. In addition, the F-35B’s advanced avionics and communications systems are mostly classified. Should an F-35B be forced to remain at an EAB site beyond the time it takes to rearm and refuel, or should it need repair, the combined logistics and security requirements of that site will dramatically increase, which will certainly detract from other EAB activities. With the weight of the plane (especially its engine) and the classified security requirements, a single damaged F-35B instantly turns a mobile, temporary, displaceable EAB into a static and potentially lucrative target.
On the other hand, given the expected adversary ISR and IAD capabilities, the anticipated lack of U.S. air superiority, the Harrier would need additional fighter (e.g., F-15s, F-22s) and jammer support (e.g., EA-18Gs, F-35s) in order to fight and have a chance to survive. The F-35B’s fifth-generation capabilities (e.g., advanced stealth, integrated advanced avionics, sensor fusion), and its superior multirole functions and capabilities (e.g., strike, fighter, ISR, jamming) enables it to penetrate enemy airspace or launch its missiles and bombs at ranges the comparatively limited role Harrier can only dream about. With the recent historic deployment of F-35Bs on the Wasp, there is renewed optimism that the F-35B will be able to eventually meet its expeditionary requirements. Indeed, a compelling argument can be made that planners and commanders can do way more with a dedicated force of F-35Bs than with an equal number of Harriers in the A2/AD-EABO environment, now and into the future.
If you understand the threats posed by an adversary’s A2/AD strategy, and you understand what EABO can do to help defeat that strategy, you can have meaningful discussions about what platforms, systems, tactics, and capabilities are best suited to support EABO. Effective air support is a critical piece of the complex EABO puzzle. This article is not necessarily designed to get you to pick one aircraft over another, as much as it is designed to stimulate the kinds of professional discussion that will be vital to transform the draft EABO concept into a tested, viable force development blueprint for victory.
