Last year’s Navy ship collisions in the Western Pacific have spotlighted the state of surface force readiness and training, primarily surface warfare officers (SWO). In addition to reports on specific incidents, there have been high level reports to Navy officials, that have identified some of the underlying root causes. What I have not seen is an evaluation of how the current practice of having surface ship executive officers (XOx) “fleet-up” to commanding officers (COs) on the same ship affects SWO readiness and professional underpinning to be a CO.
The graphic below depicts the SWO pipeline in 1985 and 2017. The XO/CO fleet-up practice began in the mid-2000s, replicating the practices in the naval aviation community, as a cost reduction measure. However, using this system for the surface forces does not consider the culture differences between surface and naval aviation communities, e.g., career paths, professional progression, command organization, and traditions.
Nominal Career Paths for Surface Warfare Officer Community
Although outwardly attractive, XO/CO fleet-up ignores both past U.S. and British experience, best summarized in a 2009 Proceedings article, “A Rude Awakening.”[1] The author, a U.S. Navy SWO lieutenant assigned to the Royal Navy as ships navigator, found himself deficient compared with his peers in knowledge of rules of the road and navigational practices. He outlined a number of “What can we learn?” topics, including the following concerning attrition:
Accept Attrition as a Reality. At every turn in the Royal Navy training pipeline, attrition is a reality. From Britannia Royal Naval College to the Frigate Navigator’s Course, the prospect of attrition serves as a natural motivator, and success translates to a real sense of accomplishment. In today’s surface community attrition is not an option, and the only individuals who understand the concept are those who come to surface warfare after washing out of flight school, SEAL training, or nuclear-power school. When the reality of attrition is introduced into any environment, the quality of officers produced will increase.
As will become evident, the previous tradition (e.g., 1985) included attrition at the XO level, but current practice does not. Interestingly, the submarine force has continued to use the surface navy’s former practice[2].
Nominal Career Paths for Submarine Officer Community
As the graphic shows, the earlier practice assigned XOs—normally in the grade of lieutenant commander—18 month tours, and COs—normally commanders—to 24 month tours. A quick analysis will show that over a two-year period, for three ships, four XOs and three COs would be required[3]. Attrition was a reality: only three XOs out of four would select for commanding officer commands. There is no similar planned nor expected attrition in the XO/CO Fleet-up.
The earlier practice had two boards, each comprised of senior captains and flag officers; one that selected post department head (DH) officers for XO, and a second which screened post XOs for CO. The key criteria for selecting officers for command afloat was an observed, knowledgeable CO’s determination on the officer’s readiness to be a successful commanding officer. In the latter case this was a narrative line in the XOs fitness report by his CO recommending him. This recommendation was a private matter between the XO and CO; normally its absence in an XOs detaching fitness report was not known to anyone else, allowing the officer to quietly plan for his future. The two boards’ timing allowed a second look at an officer after serving in a challenging XO tour and before selection to be CO. By comparison, current practice essentially selects officers after they complete their department head tour, during which they are neither evaluated as a possible CO nor tested in a command environment. Following selection, they go on an average five-year shore tour before XO/CO assignment. This five-year hiatus from sea duty cannot help but reduce their professional knowledge of basic seamanship practices.
With the current XO/CO fleet-up procedure, there are several downsides. First, there are additional personnel management constraints. The process has less choices for a CO replacement if an XO falls short; there are now only three XOs for three COs; the 18 month CO tour is shorter than before.
Second, if an XO fails to perform in a manner which would qualify him to become a CO, his/her current CO must go on record with that determination, not only by a fitness report non-recommendation, but by publicly removal from follow-on progression to CO as is the norm. Given that some failures are not culpable, but rather personality or performance related, this seems harder on the XO and more demanding of the CO. The bar for removing an XO from progression to CO now likely is higher—to the long-term detriment of ensuring our commanding officers are the very best of the best.
Third, the fact that the XO and CO are more nearly professional contemporaries (rather than an 0-4 XO working for an 0-5 CO with several years lineal number separation) may further dilute their roles and responsibilities. In fact, since the CO was previously XO, the new CO will know more about the ship’s administration than an incoming XO. Also, the ship’s crew must now rapidly adopt to the former “bad cop” XO becoming the “good cop” CO.
Finally, notwithstanding the immense cultural issues alluded to above, the aviation community organizational structure allows for closer mentoring of 0-5 COs than is possible in ship/submarine communities, since an 0-6 CAG or wing commander can normally monitor and oversee squadron XO/COs.
Given the unintended negative consequences which have flowed from the XO/CO fleet-up the surface navy should discontinue this model in the immediate future. Remembering the prescient words of then Lieutenant McGuffie, we must once again reintroduce the “reality of attrition” to CO selection after XO tours, and go back to our earlier practice, still in use by the submarine forces.
Endnotes
[1] “A Rude Awakening,” Lieutenant Mitch McGuffie, USNI Proceedings, January 2009
[2] SECNAV Strategic Readiness Review, M. Bayer and G. Roughead, 3 December 2917, graphic, pg. 40
[3] 4 X 18 = 3 X 24 = 72 officer months
