In The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, Edwark Luttwak described the Roman perspective on military force during the imperial period as an instrument of state power which is essentially limited, costly, and brittle—three words that can be applied to the current state of the U.S. Navy. He describes military power as something that is to be conserved and use indirectly as an instrument of political coercion, a recommendation that has long been ignored by leadership in the United States, as the military has been used as an effective tool for direct political coercion, influencing other nations, promoting U.S. interests, and driving foreign policy. However, the expanding use of the military as a solution to diplomatic problems seemingly has confused “National Security Strategy” and maritime strategy into one and the same and driven its essentially limited and brittle resources to the brink of failure. Recent events in Seventh Fleet, including the collisions, groundings, and aviation mishaps in part are the result of the strain created by the unsustainable demands placed on limited naval assets. Incidents where sailors lose their lives highlight the impacts of overtasking and a lack of operational and strategic direction.
The focus is on how to fix the problems. In the rush find a solution, what if the Navy has overlooked a major root cause—a failed maritime strategy, and by extension a failed National Security Strategy? The lack of strategic focus means that tasking often is haphazard, unfocused, and last minute. The Navy, as a highly mobile force, often bears the burden of policy changes and shifting priorities. Naval resources are treated as inexhaustible rather than as a force to be conserved, a fact recognized by Navy leadership. Appearing before the House Armed Services Committee as part of an investigation into the series of fatal crashes and collisions at sea, Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William Moran said the Navy is trying to do too much with too little, “We continue to have a supply-and-demand problem which is placing a heavy strain on the force.”
Given the evidence that failing to recognize the limited nature, cost, and brittleness of the Navy places lives at risk, now is the time to rethink Maritime Strategy, how it will align with our “National Security Strategy,”and what its role should be as an instrument of national power. With the United States seeming to turn inward, is this the moment to consider national priorities and accept that the United States cannot continue to be strong everywhere and it must decide where it need to be strongest.
Rethinking Maritime Strategy
Developing a maritime strategy is critical to the successful employment of limited naval resources. Alfred Thayer Mahan, the grandfather of maritime strategy, announced to the Naval War College class of 1892, “that we are building a new Navy . . . . Well, when we get our navy, what are we going to do with it?” Maritime strategy reaching back to Mahan has centered on the assumption that great powers require a great Navy. Mahan reached the heart of what was—and is—the question: What is the Navy’s purpose? According to the current version of the U.S. Navy’s maritime strategy, “Naval Forces must advance U.S. interests in a global security environment characterized by volatility, instability, complexity, and interdependencies. This environment includes geopolitical changes and growing military challenges which profoundly influence this strategy.” The strategy gives the Navy a responsibility to advance U.S. interests, but makes no statement about its primary role in doing so; it answers the what, but not the how.
The question of how to utilize military force has dogged leaders and policy makers since the end of the Cold War ushered in eras of shifting strategic priorities. In the 1980s, “The Maritime Strategy” was largely devoted to deterring, and if necessary, fighting and beating an adversary. By the 1990s the Navy had adopted “From the Sea,” to describe its support of national interests, reflecting the need in different circumstances to project power from the sea to land to exert influence for peacekeeping or other purposes and signaling a return to an era of gunboat diplomacy: the use or threat of use, of limited naval force intended to secure an advantage in resolving international disputes. While the term gunboat diplomacy has fallen out of favor because of the negative connotations associated with it, the concept is very much alive; the practice was used with some success last year when USS PORTER and USS ROSS fired tomahawk cruise missiles into Syria in an attempt to influence that country’s use of chemical weapons. However, the effectiveness of gunboat diplomacy depends on the credibility of the state using it to follow through on the threat of further force.
In the current environment, the U.S. military is stretched too thin and lacks the strategic purpose and resources to effectively employ this strategy. There is no guiding principle for the employment of naval force and yet the Navy continues to be used as an active tool of diplomacy in an era without strategic priorities. As globalization continues to take hold but the U.S. begins to focus inward, the role of the Navy must be better defined. In April of 1991, as the U.S. faced a period of unchallenged superiority with the demise of the Soviet Union, then CNO Admiral Frank Kelso made the following statement in Proceedings:
We must shift the objective of our “National Security Strategy” from containing the Soviet Union to maintaining global stability. Our evolving strategy must focus on regional contingencies in trouble spots wherever our national interests are involved.
The Navy is driven to meet the first half of this imperative; responding to regional contingencies in trouble spots on a moment’s notice. In places like Iraq and Syria, the Navy has been the service of choice to respond first to crises with strikes from the sea that set the tone for further engagement. In Seventh Fleet, the Navy is called upon to challenge excessive claims, posture and defend against potential adversaries, and conduct extensive patrols throughout a widely dispersed region. These missions, all deemed vital, have stretched the Navy’s resources as missions expand in a constrained resource environment. The result has been unrecognized and untenable brittleness in the force, unable to meet the second half of Kelso’s imperative—the ability to respond to contingencies. Put another way, the recently released comprehensive review conducted by the Navy following the incidents in Seventh Fleet found “The risks that were taken in the Western Pacific accumulated over time, and did so insidiously.” “The dynamic environment normalized to the point where individuals and groups of individuals could no longer recognize that the processes in place to identify and assess readiness were no longer working at the ship and headquarters level,” the report said.
Aligning with the National Security Strategy
A new maritime strategy must be derived from and support the “National Security Strategy,”but the Navy can help define its role by acknowledging the limited nature of our naval forces. In 1999, the Navy had 330 ships and sustained 100 deployed of forward deployed; today it has 276 ships and sustains the same number. The Navy’s December 2016 new force structure assessment calls for a fleet of 355 ships to meet current and expected demands. Even the most optimistic estimates doubt the Navy will reach this goal, as the build rates are too low, the current fleet is too old, and all program proposals are too costly. A recent Congressional Budget Office report indicates the 355-ship fleet will cost $6.7 billion more than current expectations. Yet in the face of the reality of a limited force that would be too costly to build to meet the demand, the Navy continues to receive increasing mission tasking from the National Command Authority as a result of efforts to exert influence diplomatically and politically around the globe without a focus. The recently released “National Security Strategy” demonstrates that substantial change to the use of the military for diplomatic purposes is unlikley, but it is imperative for Navy leadership to be upfront about the ability to meet the demand for its resources. For example, in Seventh fleet alone the Navy conducted over 160 exercises this year; while these exercises promote alliances and warfighting readiness, they come at a cost to the remaining essential components to a ready force: training on the basics such as ship handling, maintenance of an aging fleet, and the care of the crews who make our naval force strong. In his testimony, Admiral Moran further commented, “all of these things culminated with this notion we aren’t big enough to do everything we’re being tasked to do.”
The problem is that the list of potential threats remains long and is growing. As the new “National Security Strategy” looks to the military to counter the expanding influence of China, a resurgent Russia, and the other longstanding U.S. interests across the globe such as those in the Middle East, the demands on the shrinking fleet will continue to stretch its resources to the point it can no longer safely execute its missions. The new “National Security Strategy” failed to prioritize the threats we face and the resources we have to allow not just for a quick response to any challenge, but the ability to be truly strong when and where it is necessary to do so. To put it in the terms of Admiral Kelso, the “National Security Strategy” must define our national interests, but the most recent document fails to do so.
The new “National Security Strategy” did not acknowledge the policies of the past that have created limitations on our ability to dramatically change our strategic direction. The Trump Administration’s “National Security Strategy” did not recognize that National Security Strategies going back to before the Reagan administration have reaffirmed U.S. leadership of a liberal international order, knowing that it would facilitate the rise of other states while eroding U.S. dominance. Instead, the strategy points to an assertion that the U.S. allowed this to occur. Either way, the consequences of these policies is incompatible with the current drive to maintain an overwhelming military superiority, or without a clear guiding strategy this creates liabilities that could lead to real world dangers and the erosion of operational effectiveness. In the new “National Security Strategy” we see the opposite as there continues to be an emphasis on the military solution to diplomatic problems. Recently, President Trump even proposed a military solution to dealing with the crisis in Venezuela.
Navy as an Instrument of National Power
A rethinking of the maritime strategy and a debate on the proper use of our limited naval force in a multipolar world is needed. What would a new strategy look like in the emerging new world order and what role would the Navy play? As to strategy, there is little to be gained from a move towards retrenchment, as our presence provides guarantees to our friends and allies of our commitments. Despite a seeming withdrawal from the world stage, despite the direction in the “National Security Strategy,” we will remain the largest economy for years to come and we will still play a role, however diminished, in the international order. However, challenging near-peer competitors at every turn may do more harm than good. If the Navy runs its forces aground, literally and figuratively, will the force be credible when it is needed?
The Navy must recognize the limited, costly, and brittle nature of the force and apply resources to the missions that support national interests and warrant risking the force; any other application is limited in its effectiveness and its costs are too high. In a world where we the United States is engaged with near-peer competitors and narrowing economic gaps it is nott rational to push to meet an artificial requirement for the size and operations requirements. Missions must be prioritized to reflect the real-world limitations of the fleet to avoid placing Sailors at risk. Without a single guiding principle there is a real, tangible risk that Navy readiness will slip further. The new “National Security Strategy” did not establish a clear strategic direction and prioritize national interests in order so they can be effectively and appropriately met with the resources of today’s military. The Navy must provide that focus and a realistic expectation regarding its capacity.
