The U.S. Navy has a long history of providing assistance to both foreign and domestic civil authorities during time of disaster. In 2004, the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) immediately departed Hong Kong as part of Operation Unified Assistance, the United States’ response to the 2004 Indian Ocean gsunami. Six years later, the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) battle group, six amphibious vessels, and more than a dozen escorts responded to the 2010 Haitian earthquake that largely destroyed the capital of Port-au-Prince. A little more than a year later, the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) provided rapid assistance to Japanese authorities after the March 2011 Tohoku disaster. Domestically, Hurricanes Katrina (2005) and 2017’s Harvey, Irma, and Maria all have highlighted the Navy’s continued commitment to Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations in support of U.S. Northern Command (NorthCom). The USS Kearsarge (LDH-3) and Wasp (LHD-1), with their unique capabilities, were an especially welcome addition to the federal government’s response in Puerto Rico.[1]
A Flawed Model for A Recurring Mission
These examples demonstrate the recurring nature of the DSCA and humanitarian assistance (HA) missions. A study of likely disasters in the next 20 years seems to indicate that this situation is unlikely to change. The persistent thread between FEMA and NorthCom’s most commonly referenced scenarios of a future strong Atlantic hurricane, a devastating West Coast earthquake, or a mass casualty event in a coastal city is that local authorities will likely require federal assistance. Under the provisions of the Stafford Act, this federal response will almost certainly involve the Department of Defense.[2] The U.S. Navy, because of its ability to rapidly mobilize assets and the ocean’s proximity, likely would be among the first participants in such a domestic incident. Similarly, due to its worldwide global presence and flexibility, the Navy similarly should expect to be amongst the first U.S. agencies to assist in a HA scenario overseas.
The Navy’s prominence in disaster relief planning is unsurprising because of the high percentage of the world’s population that lives within 100 miles of a coastline. What remains astonishing, however, is the the service’s repeated resistance to properly equip the fleet for this role. For almost thirty years, the Navy’s solution to DSCA/HA has been to immediately dispatch either a carrier strike group (CSG), amphibious readiness group (ARG), command vessel, or all three to the affected area. These vessels’ arrival is often followed by the deployment of the hospital ships USNS Comfort (T-AH-20) or Mercy (T-AH-19) to provide medical and logistical support. Barely sufficient when first employed, this model of disaster response is inherently flawed due to its inherent opportunity costs and improper allocation of resources.
To some, discussing opportunity costs with regards to disaster may seem macabre. However, since 2004, the Navy has spent more than 400 CSG/ARG sailing days supporting DSCA or HA operations. Put another way, this amounts to more than a year’s worth of operational training opportunities that have been lost due to disaster relief. The growing threat of peer adversaries employing antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) technologies makes every training day lost a dangerously squandered resource. The spate of Seventh Fleet mishaps in 2017 also would seem to emphasize the need to eliminate any additional operations that detract from time spent training on seakeeping or basic maneuvers within the surface warfare community.[3] Objectively, the Navy’s primary purpose is to execute sea control, and its current doctrine for executing disaster relief detracts from that mission. Recent historical precedent, plus the sheer breadth and depth of the armed forces’ capabilities, indicate that this situation is unlikely to change.
What exacerbates this loss of training days is that current Navy hulls are woefully inefficient in providing the resources actually needed. In a given carrier air group, only the helicopter sea combat (HSC) and helicopter maritime strike (HSM) squadrons are capable of providing immediate, effective support to humanitarian efforts ashore. The carrier itself, because of its need to remain under way, relatively limited (fewer than 30 beds) medical facilities on board, and large complement adds several thousand personnel to a contingency whose purpose is to support less than 25 usable aircraft. The carrier’s escorts cannot even provide power, water, or other basic needs to facilities ashore due to construction of modern propulsion systems.[4] Although amphibious vessels’ small craft, attached Marine personnel, and attached rotary-wing capabilities make the use of a LPD/LPH slightly less wasteful, this is still analogous to using a rifle’s buttstock to hammer nails.
Acquiring The Proper Tool
Rather than continuing to use improper tools in this inefficient manner, it is time for the Navy to apply a material solution to fill this gap. An immediate option would be to seek dual use capability from an existing hull. One possible solution would be to modify one or more of the Montford Point/Lewis B. Puller-class expeditionary vessels to primarily execute DSCA/HA operations. This, unfortunately, would decrease the Navy’s ability to support both low-intensity operations or force generation in a major conflict. This would be counterproductive to the primary impetus for acquisition, i.e., increasing warfighting readiness.
A second course of action would be to purchase additional Montford Point/Lewis B. Puller vessels. This would minimize construction costs, employ parts already in the Navy’s inventory, and minimize the need for additional training. As shown by the evolution from the Montford Point to the Lewis B. Puller, the Montford Point-class’s large displacement and internal volume facilitate rapid modifications to meet the Navy’s needs. Using the Lewis B. Puller as a model, the Navy could produce a DSCA variant that emphasizes medical facilities, has a modest aviation capability to accommodate a detachment of heavy lift helicopters, and maintains the Lewis B. Puller’s command and control functions. Finally, by using an existent hull, the Navy would likely be able to purchase three to four vessels, thus increasing its ability to respond to disasters across a wider area.
Unfortunately, this route also has its drawbacks. At a minimum, any new vessels should be capable of replacing the Mercy class’s capability in addition to providing the functions listed above. At 80,000 tons to the Mercy’s 69,000 tons, it is unlikely that a variant of the Montford Point class could do so with the remaining displacement. Furthermore, as with modern destroyers and cruisers, the Montford Point class’s power plant would not be able to provide effective electricity output to support DSCA/HA operations ashore. Attempting to place additional generating capacity aboard the vessel would further erode the vessel’s ability to operate aircraft, serve as a federal command post, or carry humanitarian aid to an affected area. Finally, with a maximum speed of fifteen knots, Montford Point class is a full two knots slower than the Mercy and far slower than several commercially available options. Although slow help is still better than no help, in a major disaster lives are measured in hours.
The Soteria Class
A third option would be for the Navy to commission an entirely new class of vessels. Notionally named the Soteria class (for the Roman goddess of salvation), these new ships would be completely designed to meet DSCA/HA needs. As with the Montford Point class, the basic hull would be based on a civilian design. To initiate the process, the Navy and Coast Guard would evaluate container ships, very large ore carriers, or other vessels more than 100,000 tons. The ideal hull would be PANAMAX-sized, have the ability to accept a modified conventional or nuclear power plant, and possess a hull form that would allow a sustained cruising speed of 20–25 knots. It would not be built to warship standard of subdivision, but would be double-hulled to reduce susceptibility to accidental grounding or possible terrorist incidents.
Once the Soteria class’s hull was determined, the Navy and Coast Guard would cooperate to establish minimal, operational, and maximum manning requirements. The former should be under one hundred personnel in order to minimize impact upon both sea services’ when the vessels are in port. This crew could be either active duty or civilian contractors operating under the auspices of the Military Sealift Command (MSC). Operationally, if the vessels were to replace the Comfort’s and Mercy’s medical capabilities and provide limited aerial support, an additional 300 active duty, reserve, and contractor personnel would be a reasonable expectation. At maximum operational capability, i.e., in the aftermath of a major disaster precluding establishment of federal command posts ashore, a crew including up to 1,000 additional personnel would be a prudent design expectation.
A large portion of this expanded crew would consist of medical personnel and patients received from the disaster area. The Soteria class would replace the Mercy and Comfort.[5] Therefore, any vessels purchased would have to provide an analogous medical capacity. In addition, the Soteria class would be expected to provide additional humanitarian functions due to the evolving federal role in disaster relief. Under the Stafford Act, the Navy (in conjunction with other DoD services) would be expected to conduct tasks ranging from providing water purification to conducting mortuary affairs. This would be in addition to aiding other Federal agencies’ resource allocation and distribution plans. Lastly, the Soteria class should include the ability to generate electrical power at pierside and pass current through surviving local electrical lines. Although these needs are quite disparate, with careful planning it would be possible to encapsulate all of these within a single large hull.
In addition to the above vital capabilities, the Navy should ensure the Soteria class can provide vital command and control capabilities during a disaster’s initial stages. At a minimum, the Soteria class should have the ability to offer secure communications though satellite, telecommunications, or other methods for both civilian and military agencies. Optimally, the vessels also would have the facilities necessary for limited air-traffic control operations either in support or lieu of damaged local facilities. In this manner a Soteria-class vessel also would aid the influx of U.S. Air Force, United Nations, and nongovernmental organizations’ aid flights into a devastated area.
To eliminate the need for Navy carriers to be dispatched to a disaster, the Soteria class would be capable of accommodating five to six rotary-wing aircraft for up to a week. This would include a partial flight deck, fuel storage space, and personnel accommodations. The Lewis B. Puller’s aviation facilities provide a model for how this could be accomplished with minimal disruption to other shipboard functions. In light of recent aviation trends and the various Navy leaders’ stated objectives for aviation, the capability to maintain unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on board should also be considered. Finally, the flight decks should be arranged in such a manner that they allow the use of GPS-guided parachute delivery by both Navy and Air Force cargo aircraft without fouling the vessel’s communications’ antennae or masts.
The Soteria class’s ability to employ small boats would be as important as its flight facilities. This would need not be as extravagant as those on board a LPD or LPH, but should include the capacity to take aboard existent or planned Navy landing craft. As with the flight facilities, this should include the ability to receive, operate, and repair unmanned vehicles. In addition, the Soteria class would need to be able to facilitate other federal agencies use of watercraft, especially with regard to harbor assessment and repair in the aftermath of earthquakes or tsunamis.
Compared to all of the other requirements necessary to support disaster relief, the Soteria class’s weapon requirements would be simple. As the vessels would replace the Mercy class, they would have to be armed in accordance with the Geneva Convention as hospital ships. As their primary purpose likely would require them to enter other nations’ sovereign waters, this is hardly a shortcoming. Although stations allowing the addition of heavier weapons for transit through pirate-infested waters should be included, the need to place anything larger than machine guns or automatic grenade launchers aboard is questionable. Unlike other auxiliaries, the Soteria class would not be expected to go into harm’s way.
A Necessary Choice
Humanitarian missions and defense support to civil authorities are two missions that are not going away. Congress has dictated that DoD will assist in case of domestic disaster and the last four presidents have all used Navy forces to assist international partners when misfortune occurs. These facts strongly suggest that the time has come for the Navy to give DSCA/HA the same attention it gives surface warfare, antisubmarine efforts, amphibious operations, and the ability for fixed-wing aircraft to strike hostile targets. Moreover, doing so will help Sailors and Marines focus on all four of these missions. Although off-the-shelf solutions exist, it is time for the sea services to be bold and develop a vessel specifically to meet this need. Whether the Soteria class or a different concept, the Navy must act before it loses more time to Mother Nature’s capriciousness.
Endnote
[1] Ben Werner, “Kearsage Returns to Norfolk After Two Months of Hurricane Relief Operations off Puerto Rico,” USNI News (https://news.usni.org/2017/11/06/kearsarge-returns-norfolk-two-months-hurricane-relief-operations-off-puerto-rico) and U.S. Northern Command’s website (http://www.northcom.mil/Newsroom/Press-Releases/Article/1323710/update-us-northern-command-continues-humanitarian-aid-to-puerto-rico-and-the-us/ ).
[2] The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Public Law 93-288) provides the statutory authority for the Federal government’s response to most disasters, both natural and man-made. More information on the Stafford Act can be found on the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s web page (https://www.fema.gov/robert-t-stafford-disaster-relief-and-emergency-assistance-act-public-law-93-288-amended).
[3] For discussion on the apparent lack of basic seamanship training and the 7th Fleet’s mishaps, please see USA Today’s “Spate of Mishaps, Deadly Accidents Prompts Navy to Examine Training, Leadership” (https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/08/23/spate-mishaps-deadly-accidents-prompts-navy-examine-training-leadership/595345001/) and the USNI News report on the USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain collisions (https://news.usni.org/2017/11/01/uss-fitzgerald-uss-john-s-mccain-collision-report).
[4] George Stewart, “Going Ashore: Naval Ship to Shore Power for Humanitarian Services,” Naval Historical Foundation blog (http://www.navyhistory.org/2014/03/going-ashore-naval-ship-to-shore-power-for-humanitarian-services/).
[5] Both the Mercy (1975) and Comfort (1976) are over forty years old.