As an alliance, are the actions of NATO members in sync with its priorities?
While the expansion of NATO members at or approaching the 2% GDP minimum is improving, as important is what they are investing, or planning to invest, their money in.
As Russia has regained her military footing and in the last few years has enjoyed pantsing Britain and others with the occasional submarine deployment, we have rightfully seen an increase in the attention to ASW.
Britain, Norway and others are recapitalizing their air-ASW forces. Surface ASW is getting renewed investment, but what is happening on the submarine side of the house?
In what will clearly be seen as the wrong fork to take, in the immediate post-Cold War era, Denmark divested itself of its 6 conventional submarines – not a small contribution for a nation of only 5 million souls. With Germany, they were the first line of defense to keep the Soviet/Russian Baltic Fleet occupied if they decided to leave port headed west.
Submarines are not a warfare area that is easy to get in and out of. Even if they had a budget to do so, there are no indications that regardless of what Russia may do, Denmark will reconstitute its submarine force. What are the rest of NATO’s front-line nations doing?
Well, Germany now only has six submarines and is having trouble keeping them seaworthy. They are partnered for now with Norway, and her six, for some new submarines next decade.
The Netherlands has four that they may replace with DEU and NOR. Poland may join the party as well to replace her three.
For simplicity’s sake, let’s stick with the benchmark that it takes three in inventory to make one deployable. That means – assuming 1-for-1 replacement, going forward for the Baltic and North Sea approached to the GIUK gap, NATO can deploy six submarines from the 19 on paper. In a surge for a short period of time, if you are lucky 8 or 9 for the first 90-days from these front line nations.
Moving west, what about Britain’s Royal Navy? Like the USN, they are all nuclear now and she as six. Yes, six. Three Trafalgar and three Astute. That is it.
So, put 2-3 RN SSN in the first 90-day surge.
As the French and other NATO submarine powers will most likely concern themselves with things other than the North Atlantic, before the USA gets in the game, what can NATO put in to the Baltic, North Sea and the North Atlantic? Let’s round that to 10 submarines for 90-days, then decreasing from there, rather quickly.
What are they facing? If you are optimistic, you can do the 1-to-get-3 ratio on the Russian North Sea + Baltic Fleet 8-SSK, 13 SSN & 3 SSGN +/- = 24 total; 8 deployed on quick notice.
8 Russians vs 10 non-USA NATO (NB: the Russian number would be less if for no other reason than keeping a few to protect their SSBN bastions)
Wait, you say, what about Canada and her four UPHOLDER?
Well, they seem to be going Danish.
New submarines won’t be part of the future mix for the Royal Canadian Navy, at least in the foreseeable future.
Several years ago there were some suggestions that a possible replacement for the Victoria-class submarines might be in the works. In 2017 a Senate defence committee recommended the subs be replaced.
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But the Liberal government has rejected that recommendation. The recommendation was the only one of the 27 made by the Commons defence committee that was rejected outright in a response delivered to the committee last month.
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in the midst of the most intensive and comprehensive fleet modernization and renewal in the peacetime history of the Royal Canadian Navy. Canada is recapitalizing and increasing the size of its surface fleet through investments in 15 Canadian Surface Combatants, two Joint Support Ships, and five to six Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships, it added. “The government has also committed to modernizing the four Victoria-class submarines to include weapons and sensor upgrades that will enhance the ability of the submarines to conduct Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and deliver necessary improvements of platform and combat systems to extend operational capability to the mid-2030’s,” the government response noted.
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Without upgrades, the first of the submarines will reach the end of its life in 2022, according to documents obtained last year through Access to Information by the Canadian Press. The last of the boats would be retired in 2027.
If, as expected, in the next 36 months North America falls in to an economic softening, will the money show up?
Tough bet, but the safe money would be that Canadian defense spending remains will not improve to a significant degree in present circumstances. Once they lose their subsurface experience in the next decade, it will not be easy to get back.
No under-ice capability? For a nation such as Canada, that is interesting if that is where they wind up.
If Canada divests itself of its subsurface capability, how does that impact not just her national needs, but that of the alliance? Not marginal. No one else seems to be able to make up these numbers.
For the expected modernization in front line nations outlined above, can we assume that these new submarines will be purchased 1-for-1? Is 8-RUS vs 10-non-USA-NATO an acceptable ratio?
Does this leave ASW in the Atlantic once RUS outchops the GIUK gap strictly a USA affair with minor assists from FRA, ESP, & POR in the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean approaches?
Nations signal their priorities by where they spend their money.
Is ASW a priority? Is the Russian submarine threat really a concern to the alliance? Is there any chance for overmatch if USA SSN are occupied elsewhere (WESTPAC call your office)?
Watch two things: the Canadian UPHOLDER replacement churn and the NOR/DEU/NLD/POL/ITA submarine replacement program.
The math is ugly.
NB: all numbers above are rough approximations based on varied open source references. Actual numbers are different, but you can assume with a short notice to crisis initiation, actual numbers will be less WRT FMC in ASW.
