We know from our years of watching Sesame Street with our kids, grandkids, or when we were kids that the letter “D” stands duck, dog, doctor, etc. I can still see mental images of the playful dog wagging its tail with the letter “D” dancing around the Sesame Street screen! As discussed below, the letter “D” seems integral to naval operations, at least at the tactical level, and it may serve a useful and facile guide in understanding fundamental expectations in today’s complex warfighting environment.
Harkening back to John Boyd’s OODA loop, Captain Wayne Hughes parses naval warfare into the following steps or functions: “Scouting,” finding and identifying targets (ISR); “Deciding,” prioritizing targets, pairing and scheduling weapons and platforms to targets (C2); “Engaging,” delivering effects to the targets; and “Assessing,” conducting battle damage assessment.[i] Then the cycle repeats itself.[ii]
Of course, Captain Hughes would add his dictum about the criticality of “attacking effectively first”![iii] He says one way to shoot first is to interfere with and slow down the enemy’s OODA loop. Below are references to how the combat D’s do just that.
Arguably, at the tactical or combat level of war it is the engage function, i.e., delivery of effects to the enemy, that defines the essence of what one expects our Navy to be able to do. So, what are the “effects”? Here we find the letter “D” repeatedly.
Distract/Deceive (TACSIT Management, i.e., denying the enemy targeting information on own forces[iv])
Degrade (interfere with the enemy’s tracking and targeting capability)
Destroy (eliminating the enemy’s warfighting capability)
Defend (AAW, ASW, ASUW) (preventing/limiting the enemy’s ability to degrade/destroy own force capability)
At the operational level of war (as opposed to the tactical level), one might add another couple of “D’s”: Deter and Deny. Influence, Compel, and Punish also fit at the operational level except that those three do not begin with the letter “D”!
And, before progressing to the “effects” decisions, one must “Decide or Determine” whether the objective is sea control or sea denial.[v]
But wait. We’re well into the 21st century. My friend and colleague retired Navy Captain Robert “Barney” Rubel asks, “Shouldn’t artificial intelligence (AI) be factored into the combat ‘Ds’?” The inherent combat D functions probably remain, but the way humans relate to them could change in an AI-enabled era. For instance, consider the addition of AI into an antiship Tomahawk that possesses sufficient sophistication to meet the legal requirements of discrimination, i.e., determining that the target is an enemy. Ah, there we two additional “Ds.” A commander might launch AI-enhanced Tomahawks to patrol an area either to cleanse it of enemy units or achieve other purposes not yet envisioned. Ditto for other weapons and technologies in other domains. AI could function as a hyper-effective intel officer. AI could enhance ISR making it possible to discern targets whereas today we see only static. There are other functions that will not be imagined until AI is fielded more robustly than today.
Another friend and colleague, Retired Navy Captain David Prothero, points out that there is a temporal dimension to the combat D effects. Namely, some of the effects may be temporary while others may be permanent. The “destroy” effect would be permanent in most cases. On the other hand, the “distract, deceive, and degrade” effects could be temporary.
Another friend and colleague, Professor Dr. William Bundy at the Naval War College suggests that the combat “Ds” may not apply at the operational level of war. Drawing on a 2008 paper by General Gary Luck at Joint Forces Command, Dr. Bundy opines that at the operational level the following steps or functions apply: (1) The Commander “assesses the environment”; (2) then he/she “prepares a plan” based on the assessment; (3) then he/she “directs subordinate commanders”; (4) then he/she “monitors” the environment and the cycle repeats itself.[vi] But, isn’t what the Commander does at the operational level much like Captain Hughes’ paradigm (scouting, deciding, engaging, and assessing) only at a different level?
Much of what we expect Navy officers to do today is complex, highly technical, and mentally demanding. Perhaps by focusing on fundamentals, i.e., successfully delivering desired combat effects (the D’s) on the enemy, the expectations can be met more easily and successfully.[vii]
Endnotes
[i] Robert Coran, BOYD: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, pp 334-339, Back Bay Books, Little Brown and Co. 1976.
[ii] Captain Wayne Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, Second Edition, pp, 11-13.
[iii] Ibid., p. 17.
[iv] R. Robinson Harris and Andrew Kerr, “Manage TACSIT to Prevail” USNI Proceedings, May, 2018.
[v] Milan N. Vego, Joint Operational Warfare, Theory and Practice, Newport, RI; The U.S. Naval War College Press, 2007, II-45. Vego suggests that the principal strategic or operational objective of the stronger side is to obtain sea control while the weaker side tries to obtain sea denial.
[vi] Dr. Bundy draws his insights from Gen (ret) Gary Luck, “Joint Operations: Insights and Best Practices” July 2008, U. S. Joint Forces Command, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jfcom/joint_ops_insights_july_2008.pdf
[vii] Thanks to Capt Robert Rubel, Capt David Prothero, Dr. William Bundy, Capt Glen Sears, Capt Wayne Hughes, and Dr. Steve Wills for their comments on this piece.
