塵も積もれば、山となる
“Even Dust, When Piled up, Will Become a Mountain” – Japanese Proverb
On a humid September morning in 2008, nuclear aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN-73), hereon referred to as GW, sailed up Tokyo Bay to its new homeport in Yokosuka, Japan. On that day, Chief Petty Officer Cleo Bowie sensed the importance, “I think this is beautiful … a lot of people maybe haven’t really taken it in yet, but once all the dust has cleared, then they’ll start to really see—it’s history.”[1] Events in the intervening decade prove the chief correct, and $67 million dollars to upgrade Yokosuka facilities was money well spent.[2] Also on the pier that day were leaders instrumental in GW’s arrival, Yokosuka Mayor Ryoichi Kabaya and Rear Admiral James Kelly. This is the story of how a shared sense of community in Yokosuka overcame challenges, divergent conventional wisdom, and sharp political sensitivities to station the first nuclear aircraft carrier in Japan.
The first U.S. carrier based in Japan was the conventionally powered USS Midway (CV-41). Its arrival 1973 was overshadowed by summits and public protests (like the 20 December 1970 Koza Riot) over reverting Okinawa from U.S. possession to Japan.[3] In 1973 as well as in 2008, the arrival of a U.S. carrier occurred at a time of heightened regional tensions amid great-power competition, bringing significantly increased military capability and maturation in the U.S.-Japan defense relationship. The framework for this relationship is formalized in the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines. Signed the height of the Cold War in 1978, it solidified the presence of an aircraft carrier in Japan as an essential element of extended deterrence and rapid crisis response.[4] Despite precedence, GW’s arrival would defy decades of conventional wisdom both in Washington and Tokyo. Japan’s public, having suffered the horrors of two nuclear bombings, would not sanction hosting anything with the word “nuclear” in it. Bridging countervailing conventional wisdom would require sustained effort on the part of both nations’ leadership while building public consensus in Yokosuka.
Occasionally unfortunate incidents risked the alliance and imperiled GW’s arrival. Yet, personal bonds and trust between the Yokosuka communities has proven vital in navigating tough times. In his book Friendship Across the Seas Professor Naoyuki Agawa asserts that safeguarding the bonds built upon decades of exchanges and living as neighbors has been paramount in securing the alliance.[5] Children of U.S. service members and Japanese, who oftentimes stay in Japan to raise their own families, act as informal cultural ambassadors. With base housing limited, U.S. military families often lived in Japanese communities. The bonds from these experiences build an affinity among Japanese and Americans and have given rise to groups dedicated to bilateral bonds, such as the Japan America Navy Friendship Association and the $38 million trust fund that the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission founded with money paid by the government of Japan for the 1972 reversion of U.S. facilities in Okinawa.[6]
A Game Plan for Public Support
In May 1998 the Navy conducted an internal study and responded to the General Accounting Office’s (now the Government Accountability Office) findings, determining the most effective approach to its next generation CVX carrier would be to design it as nuclear propelled.[7] This decision killed any lingering hope for a new conventional aircraft carrier, making it unavoidable that U.S. policy leaders would need to find a solution acceptable to Japan that retained a carrier in Yokosuka.[8] Conventional wisdom in Washington was solidly against Japan accepting a nuclear-powered warship. For several years, policy leaders and U.S. Navy planners searched for solutions to keep a conventional carrier presence in Japan; however, this would have only forestalled the inevitable by a year or two.
With no viable solutions, some senior leaders began socializing a way to gain Japanese public support. One approach attempted by the Commander of Seventh Fleet was to desensitize the public by routinizing the presence of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in Japan. In this sense, the May 2003 visit by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) to Yokosuka was timely.[9] While helping to routinize the presence of a nuclear-powered carrier, this visit provided invaluable knowledge regarding needed pier modifications and facility modernizations required for the larger nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. Lastly, these visits made clear the larger crews and new maintenance needs would necessitate expanding base and local community capacity to house a larger population of U.S. families and attract more Japanese employees to the base.
A key step in the effort to base a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in Japan was Rear Admiral Kelly’s assuming command in September 2005 of U.S. Naval Forces Japan (CNFJ). The choice of Rear Admiral Kelly was prescient; he had commanded the carrier strike group led by the conventional aircraft carrier the USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63) in Yokosuka. He understood the operational imperatives and had the needed personal connections in Yokosuka. For the next few years as CNFJ, he made GW’s arrival a central focus as he partnered with the local Japan Maritime Self Defense (JMSDF) Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Koda, whose enduring support would be important.
It’s hard to overstate the necessity for a Japan-based carrier to secure U.S. Indo-Asia-Pacific interests. The cost of maintaining a persistent forward presence in Asia of one carrier would be fiscally unacceptable. The 2003 decision by the CNO to decommission the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) saved several billion dollars and made maintaining a nuclear-powered carrier in Japan essential.[10] Another benefit of basing a carrier in Yokosuka is the proximity to Asian flash-points: it would take only days to arrive at a hotspot versus more than a week for a West Coast–based carrier more than 5,000 miles away. But most important was the permanence of U.S. power and commitment to the U.S.-Japan alliance that a carrier with thousands of service members and their families symbolizes. Such “skin in the game” has at times helped steady anxious allies.
On the day of assuming command of CNFJ, conversations with then Commander of Pacific Fleet, Admiral Roughead, it was clear Admiral Kelly’s top priority would be GW’s arrival. Before his Senate confirmation, Ambassador Tom Schieffer, a confidant of then–President Bush, was briefed on the strategic importance of basing a carrier in Japan. It would be one of the biggest challenges of his ambassadorship.[11] Shortly after arriving in Tokyo in April of 2005, he knew this would be a nation-to-nation issue and wanted to ensure highest levels of visibility in both Tokyo and D.C. A day after the change of command, a joint press conference held by Ambassador Schieffer with Admiral Kelly at the embassy, showcased the CNFJ and embassy partnership while demonstrating the high priority the United States was placing on this effort.
On the Japanese side, national politics were such that agreeing to host a nuclear warship would have been tantamount to political suicide. Moving the Japanese public to accept the GW would require support of politicians in the Diet, and getting their support required the Mayor in Yokosuka being onboard. An outdated remedy would have seen Japanese leaders explain the GW as being foisted on them per terms of the security treaty. Thankfully this was not done. As Admiral Kelly and Ambassador Schieffer worked out their approach, it was clear the only way to persuade the Japanese public was to be upfront and honest. It was an approach based on a mutually held belief that the collective security of the alliance was the best hope for peace and prosperity in the region.[12]
A first step was a months-long effort in concert with Naval Reactors to produce a publicly releasable nuclear-power warship safety fact sheet.[13] This fact sheet provided an unclassified overview of the design and training of Navy’s nuclear-power program, which has ensured for over 50 years no nuclear accidents or harmful release of radioactivity. But more would be needed to get the mayor’s public support. Political sensitivities necessitated discretion, and the mayor’s connections to Prime Minister Koizumi, also born in Yokosuka and representing the district at Japan’s national legislature the Diet, ensured national leadership attention. Taken together, galvanizing support for GW among the public and national leadership in Tokyo would require a public statement of support from Mayor Kabaya.
To gain the mayor’s support, CNFJ organized two trips to San Diego, home to nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines, in May and in August 2006. The first trip was with Yokosuka civic and business leaders, who upon return petitioned for the mayor’s support. In August, Mayor Kabaya traveled and spoke with local San Diego civic and government leaders regarding relations and concerns with nearby nuclear warships. Upon his return, encouraged by Yokosuka chamber of commerce and industry leaders, the mayor for the first time publicly supported hosting GW.[14]
The mayor’s trust was further solidified in November 2007 when the U.S. military participated for the first time in a Yokosuka City disaster reaction drill. Since 2002 the city had conducted annual radiological disaster drills in light of visiting U.S. nuclear powered warships. However, CNFJ had resisted participation for fear of divulging sensitive operational information.[15] Conducting the drill was on the personal request of Mayor Kabaya, and U.S. participation greatly enhanced the mayor’s reputation and bolstered local support for GW’s arrival.[16] Having demonstrated U.S. preparedness and transparency to protect both U.S. and Japanese citizens against a nuclear incident, the mayor’s and public’s support for GW’s arrival was at a high point.
Support for GW seemed cinched, until two horrific crimes committed by U.S service members and a significant fire on GW. The 2006 murder of Ms. Yoshie Sato (56 years old) and the 2008 murder of Japanese taxi driver Mr. Masaaki Takahashi (61 years old) by U.S. sailors, inflamed national anti U.S. base sentiment.[17] Then a 2008 fire on GW caused several million dollars of damage and delayed GW’s planned arrival by almost six months.[18] It was only with the direct intervention of the senior naval officer in Japan, Vice Admiral Crowder, Commander Seventh Fleet, and Ambassador Schieffer that the negative sentiments building from these incidents abated.
Had GW not have arrived in September 2008 it is unlikely that the alliance and goodwill alone could have overcome the political changes soon to rock Tokyo. A year later, following historic national elections on 16 September 2009, left-leaning Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Yukio Hatoyama became Prime Minister. He won on a platform re-examining ties with the United States and a move to a more Asia centric foreign policy.[19] Most troubling during his tenure was the abrupt abrogation of the 2006 agreement to relocate Marine Corps forces in Okinawa. Had GW’s arrival in Yokosuka remained unsettled, it is not unreasonable to expect that a Hatoyama government, or its immediate DPJ successor, would have been able to support GW’s arrival.
Right Place, Right Time
GW’s arrival also proved advantageous in ways not expected in 2008. Since the mid-2000s, Chinese intrusions into Japanese waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands increased and the steadfastness of U.S. presence at this time provided a stabilizing force as tensions over maritime intrusions persisted, sometimes resulting in casualties.[20] But the most visible benefit was U.S. support in Operation Tomodachi (friendship in Japanese) following the March 2011 Great Tohoku earthquake and ensuing Fukushima nuclear disaster, which galvanized public support in the alliance. The presence of GW, and later the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76), in Yokosuka provided a ready cadre of equipped and practiced personnel to assist in 2011. Their efforts contributed to the assessment and containment measures early during the Fukushima nuclear crisis. Additionally, while many foreign nationals fled Tokyo, the U.S. military stayed and assisted. Following Tomodachi, Japanese Self Defense Forces and U.S. military received overwhelming public support; while military favorability in Japan is historically low, after Tomodachi it remained above 85 percent.[21]
As we confront a dangerous new era, Japan will remain a steadfast ally with shared interests in a rules-based international order. This partnership will be critical as we confront a revanchist Russia and an aggressive China. The arrival of GW was a test of our alliance and the Yokosuka community, an outcome predicated on the decades of goodwill, trusted personal relationships, and tireless dedication of community leaders. That the USS Ronald Reagan replaced GW in 2015 with little fanfare is a testament to those close and enduring relationships; which will be critical overcoming future “bumps in the road.” As we look around the world for new partners in today’s great-power competition, the noteworthy shared experiences in Yokosuka should inform our approach. Per the proverb at the beginning, long-term, sustained commitments among leaders, outreach between communities, and physical military presence will be vital to building new partnerships across the Indo-Asia-Pacific.
Endnotes
[1] Teri Weaver, “USS George Washington Makes Historic Arrival in Japan,” Stars & Stripes, 27 September 2008.
[2] Weaver, “USS George Washington Makes Historic Arrival in Japan.”
[3] Kazuhiko Togo, Japan’s Foreign Policy 1945-2003 (Leiden: Koninklijke brill, 2005), 64–70.
[4] Kotani Tetsuo, “Presence and Credibility: Homeporting the USS Midway at Yokosuka,” Journal of American-East Asian Relations 15, issue 1-2 (January 2008), 51–76.
[5] Naoyuki Agawa, Friendship Across the Seas (Tokyo: Japan Publishing Industry Foundation for Culture, 2019), 253–257 and 283–295.
[6] Japan–U.S. Friendship Commission, “About Japan–U.S. Friendship Commission,” https://www.jusfc.gov/about/.
[7] U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Report to Congressional Requesters: Navy Aircraft Carrier Cost Effectiveness of Conventionally and Nuclear-Powered Carriers (Washington, D.C. August 1998), 147–148.
[8] Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy CVN-77 and CVX Aircraft Carrier Programs: Background and issues for Congress,” (Congressional Research Service, July 1998).
[9] Yokosuka City, “Nuclear Powered Warship Visits,” https://www.city.yokosuka.kanagawa.jp/2220/kithitai/06/documents/0606.pdf.
[10] Senate Appropriations Subcommittee for Defense, Statement of Admiral Vern Clark, U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations, 108th Congress, 2 April 2004.
[11] Ambassador Tom Schieffer, e-mail message to author, 26 April 2019.
[12] Ambassador Tom Schieffer, e-mail message to author, 26 April 2019.
[13] Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fact Sheet on U.S. Nuclear Powered Warship Safety (Tokyo, Japan, April 2006).
[14] Allison Batdorff and Hana Kusumoto, “San Diego Visit Eases Concerns of Yokosuka Officials,” Stars & Stripes, 11 May 2006.
[15] “Yokosuka Base Holds Joint Nuclear Leak Drill,” The Japan Times, 9 November 2007.
[16] Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Record of Discussion on the Replacement of USS Kitty Hawk (Tokyo, Japan, June 2006).
[17] Tomoko Otake, “Family’s pain over 2006 Yokosuka murder reflects desire for SOFA rethink,” The Japan Times, 23 June 2016; and “U.S. Sailor Gets Life in Japan Murder,” CBS News, 30 July 2009.
[18] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Announcement by the U.S. Government on the USS George Washington Fire,” (Tokyo, 31 July 2008), https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2008/7/1182359_1030.html.
[19] Jeffrey W. Hornung, “Japan Chair Platform: Assessing the DPJ’s Stewardship of the Alliance,” (Center for Strategic & International Studies,15 March 2013).
[20] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Trends in Chinese Government and Other Vessels in the Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and Japan’s Response,” (Tokyo, Japan, 5 April 2019), https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html.
[21] Bryce Wakefield, “Japan and the United States after the Great East Japan Earthquake,” in Report of the 3rd Japan-U.S. Joint Public Policy Forum, (The Sasakawa Peace Foundation and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 27 October 2011), 9 and 13.
