Navy

Time to Discontinue the Senior Enlisted Continuation Board

NAVADMIN 233/19 was recently released and announced the Fiscal Year (FY) 20 Senior Enlisted Continuation Board (SECB). The first SECB was convened in 2009 under the shepherding of then Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy (MCPON) Rick West. According to West, the Navy was, “looking for folks who want to serve our Navy every day in a capacity which honors honor, courage and commitment—our core values of who we are . . . I think the continuation board will also reinvigorate the Chiefs’ Mess and just make us much stronger. It will help us accomplish what we need to accomplish as we move forward. This is a performance-based board. There are no numbers associated with it. It is about performance.”1 Apparently, there was a perceived threat to the Navy’s organizational reputation because of broad CPO mess behavior which compelled it conduct the SECB. The board has convened consistently for the past ten years, however, considering shortfalls in fleet manning and the subsequent attempts to hedge fleet gaps with policies that incentivize CPO management and leadership at sea, is this policy still in the best interest of the fleet?

In a resource constrained Navy struggling to fulfill warfighting readiness needs, does the Navy have the luxury to support the cost of travel for several dozen senior enlisted to convene for up to two weeks to review several thousand records only to identify a small percentage of senior enlisted deemed no longer worthy of continued naval service? For example, the first board reviewed 5,686 records only to identify 158 for non-continuation.2 It is interesting that the results of the board were portrayed as 5,528 were selected for continuation rather than represent the small number selected to leave. In some cases, administrative factors such as gaps in enlisted fitness report continuity were the only factor that led to a decision to separate. Results from the successive continuation boards yielded similar results. So how does the removal of an average .005 percent of the approximately 30,000 strong Navy-wide CPO mess make the mess stronger as was stated? And how is that increase “strength” measured and validated? If measure at all, is it by measured increased fleet readiness and lethality or just anecdotally? And what could Naval Personnel Command and fleet leaders who manage this process be doing with the time saved from not convening this board?

The process also introduces unneeded anxiety and distraction into a fleet that is already pressurized. Senior enlisted leaders up for advancement already deal with the uncertainty and administrative preparation for those selection boards which could yield promotion, increased responsibility, and increased pay—all good outcomes. A board which could potentially end your career and introduce financial uncertainty only add unneeded pressure.

The tools to identify and separate poor performing senior enlisted leaders are already available. Areas that the board considers such as declining or stagnant professional performance, failure to meet physical readiness standards, or military or civil convictions all have associated policies to recommend removal from positions of responsibility, reduction in paygrade, or separation from naval service. There are already many unit-level leaders in positions to influence poor performance (CPO mess peers, department heads, command master chiefs, and commanding officers). So why does the Navy need an administratively cumbersome and costly process to fulfill an obligation fleet leaders have the authority and tools to achieve? Considering that the Navy is increasingly shifting advancement power (a form of reward power) to fleet leaders with increased Meritorious Advancement Program (MAP) quotas, why shouldn’t we expect those same leaders to harness coercive-based leadership tools to identify and reassign or remove those senior enlisted leaders not fulfilling their responsibilities? Are they unaware of, unexperienced with, or unwilling to use the tools of this power available to them? Or from their perspective, do they feel they can manage with an underachieving CPO instead of suffer from yet another gapped billet? Could this be why senior Navy leaders felt compelled to usurp and fulfill this responsibility?

Who is critically evaluating the process from a perspective of “return on investment”? The context and conditions the Navy is operating in today are significantly different that those of 2009, so it is time to take a fix and question whether the SECB is still aligned to the original intent and something affordable to do. Does this board still happen because it has actual merit? Is it affecting broader CPO mess behavior in a way that was desired and how is that being measured? Or, does it continue because no one has stopped to question its legitimacy? Unless the return can be argued heavily in favor of benefit to the fleet, then it is time for the Navy to stop cutting its nose to spite its face and shift this responsibility back to fleet leaders who have the authority to fulfill it.

 

  1. Maria Yager, “Navy Convenes Senior Enlisted Continuation Board, MCPON on Hand,” Navy Personnel Command Public Affairs (2009) https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=48471
  2. Maria Yager, “Navy Convenes Senior Enlisted Continuation Board, MCPON on Hand.”

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