If Congress will not move forward to replace the Cold War Era Goldwater-Nichols framework our national defense structures are constrained by, then we can try to tweak here and there where we can. One of the most potentially fruitful reforms would be a reimagining of the Combatant Commanders (COCOMS).
COCOMS, proconsul like, have the world divided amongst themselves. Instead of supporting national defense efforts, they often behave like competing regional managers of a large conglomerate, fighting between each other for attention and resources from a detached and remote corporate headquarters. Yes, they wear the same name-tag, but they are only rewarded for their specific sector, not the success of the whole.
Effective response to our mid-21st Century national security challenges are stuck in a briar patch of late 20th Century structures and habits designed for an environment that is on its third change since its birth.
Our structures and habits have become a justification to themselves as opposed to being a mechanism directing the world’s largest military power in the most effective, mutually supporting manner.
This week, we have a perfect display of this disfunction in play.
First, I will take second fiddle to no one when it comes to promoting the utility of sea power for the maritime mercantile republic we are (or should be), and the importance of the presence mission. That argument, and proposals for it, needs to be able to answer the simple follow-on questions in order to have credibility … and the effectiveness that comes with it.
Before we get to the example, let me put forth a few questions:
1. Do you remember the original justification for why we have USN destroyers based out of Rota, Spain?
2. How far is Rota from the nearest Russian port compared to the nearest naval port of our NATO allies?
3. Between Rota and the nearest Russian ports, how many NATO naval ships are there?
4. What would present a greater challenge to Russian military planners at sea; two more American warships posted on a European Atlantic port, or stronger and larger NATO allied naval forces scattered in the source nations’ home waters?
5. What is of greater concern to Russian military planners; nuclear weapons, mechanized armies, air power, or naval surface ships?
Well, nothing personal, but here’s a standard issue parochial sales pitch from a COCOM, tailor made for this post;
The head of U.S. European Command said he has put in a request to host two additional U.S. Navy guided missile destroyers (DDGs) in the European theater that would be “critical” to improving the U.S.’s ongoing campaign to deter Russian forces.
Of course, I could argue both sides of this issue if I wanted, but when you review 1-5 above, does The above make sense?
I don’t know, but the signaled reform that may be coming may help;
(SECDEF Esper’s) upcoming reviews of the regional and functional combatant commands presage an assault on a problem that many have long perceived but none have tackled: an imbalance in the requirements-generation process and Pentagon resourcing decisions that insulate and favor combatant commanders over service chiefs. This imbalance has led to some of the problems the defense strategy tries to redress, such as making the Middle East an “economy of force” region where missions are done more efficiently—or not at all.
As a sidenote, in line with point 5 above, this message is encouraging to our NATO allies that they should start to build their own as opposed to just assuming Uncle Sam will keep paying all their bills,
Secretary of Defense says he’s been telling allies they’re going to have to step up their own production of munitions instead of relying on the United States going forward. “It’s just not gonna be available to them.”
— Mackenzie Eaglen (@MEaglen) February 26, 2020
While everyone likes to look at budgets and systems, at the highest levels, process is absolutely critical, and the structure everything else is build around.
A larger Congressional effort to bring on a replacement for Goldwater-Nichols, or a SECDEF effort to modernize the COCOMS, both are arguably more important than how many elevators on FORD are operating in 4QFY20 vs 2QFY20.
We need more effort, thinking, reporting, and action here. Watch how this plays out.
