The goal of the United States Military is to win wars, to succeed when it matters: on the battlefield. Everything in between is preparation for war. Failure is a natural part of the training process. Without failure, there is no value in training. To succeed, leaders must let their staff fail so they understand what failure looks like and how to avoid it. To the military strategist John Boyd this meant adding a filter to their ability to orient. His argument was that one must gain as much real experience as possible to better orient and make more effective and efficient decisions. Let your staff fail to understand failure, how to avoid it, and that forward progress is true success.
Inspection Uniform
Uniform inspections are synonymous to the military. If you ask a first sergeant, they will likely inform you that strict uniform inspections maintain discipline within a unit. So why do the same leaders who believe in the discipline of uniform inspections also teach their followers to maintain inspection uniforms. If the uniform inspection is the simplest form of judging and instilling unit discipline, then leaders should inspect the uniform worn daily, not the uniform prepared for artificial success. The consequence of a uniform inspection failure is negligible, so what is the motivation to “cheat” this simple task. If the intent is to ensure professionalism and discipline within the force, identify the true issues and make meaningful progress toward correcting them. Not only does this show that leadership throughout the ranks care about the individual, but that the smallest forward progress is just that: forward progress.
Preparing for Inspection
Just as the individual is taught to prepare an inspection uniform, units are taught to prepare for inspection. Many units prepare a letter of instruction and put inspection preparation on their training schedule. If a unit is upholding the mantra of “train like you fight,” then inspection preparation would not be required; units would pass based on their real merit, not the artificial environment they create in the weeks prior. In preparing for an inspection, the unit is putting a metaphorical band-aid on their broken processes. Alternatively, not preparing will identify true shortfalls and provide an outside recommendation on process improvement. In the latter case, the unit would make sustainable forward progress as opposed to a one-time cleanup.
Pit Love
Tactical training, too, is affected by this mindset. Every time an individual receives some “pit love,” they are experiencing success in an artificial environment; this success is putting the lives of other individuals at risk. If uniform inspections are the most basic garrison requirement, then surely employing one’s weapon is the most basic tactical requirement. Willful ignorance of the practice of “pit love” is not dissimilar to encouraging inspection uniforms. Without correcting this issue, and in some cases the actively encouraging it, teaches individuals that success in appearance is more important than practical success. If the individual learns this at the most basic level, they will apply the same mindset to training in large-scale environments.
After-Action Report
This tactical artificial success is demonstrated at the unit level in the highest levels of leadership. This is evident in every after-action review that touts the successes and censors the failures. The decision is usually justified with the statement “let’s not air our dirty laundry” or “these are internal issues, let’s keep these in house.” This removes the usefulness of the after-action report, voids any lessons learned by the unit, and prevents other units the opportunity to learn from such failures. Without honest self-reflection and acknowledgement of what took place, forward progress is stifled and errors persist. To those hoping to develop another filter—as Boyd puts it—or to learn from the warriors of the past—as Mattis says— they are left wanting. [1]
Artificial Success
Leaders demand integrity from their subordinates, they preach discipline within the ranks, and they ask for open feedback. Perhaps the reason most do not get what they ask for is because their actions and lessons teach the opposite. They breed artificial success by demanding perfection at the cost of true success. The problem with perfection is that it is unattainable in an organization as large as the Department of Defense. The health care industry addressed the same issue decades ago through the often cited study To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System.[2] Humans make mistakes, and the only way to limit these mistakes is to encourage their identification to fix the root problem instead of treating the symptom.
Another critical component of a comprehensive strategy to improve patient safety is to create an environment that encourages organizations to identify errors, evaluate causes and take appropriate actions to improve performance in the future.[3]
For the U.S. military, this starts with commanding officers allowing failure within their staff. The idea that commanders must demand success at all cost may seem sacrosanct to most, but this is the root problem. If commanders expect success, the staff will give them success … at all cost. This mindset is so ingrained that failures, unless guaranteed to be noticed, will not be reported. Instead, temporary fixes will be applied without permanent solutions to garner the appearance of success rather than achieving success.
Recognizing this problem is difficult because the unit typically achieves mission success. The staff avoids saying “no” and the commander sees the end state is reached. Unfortunately, through a hardline position on failure, the commander is blind to the process. Instead of training to the established processes—the standard operating procedures—the staff starts calling audibles from the planning stages. They refuse to say “no” and find a way to get to yes. This constant creative problem solving is great for exercising the human mind but is a poor substitute for exercising the processes used in warfare. Through this type of training, a unit will achieve “success” in training, but will assuredly fail in war.
To identify the leaders who are truly proficient and who accept failure, ask them where they are failing. These leaders will not only be able to identify these areas, but they will openly admit to them without hesitation. Their concern is not with projecting success but achieving it, and they are not afraid to “air their dirty laundry.” Counter to this type of leader is the one who constantly identifies their successes. Asked to identify where THEY fail will produce a short list, if any. Not only will they be hesitant to communicate their failures, but they may not even recognize them. Focused solely on success, they have missed the gaps in their processes and in turn, they have bred the same mindset within their subordinates: success at all cost, failure is not acceptable.
Isn’t Failure, Failure?
Failure to achieve the mission is failure, not success. Commanding officers should not reward it, should not entertain it, and should actively punish it. Ensuring your subordinates understand that failing is not acceptable will motivate them to work harder to achieve success. If they are constantly taught to achieve success at all cost they will perform the same on the battlefield. This is what many believe, and it is evident in their relentless pursuit of perfection. However, these leaders are ignorant to the value of experiencing failure and communicating its lessons.
I challenge you to perform a few simple tasks. First, hold an unannounced uniform inspection and be just as thorough as if you had announced it. Second, direct your unit to NOT prepare for your next readiness inspection, but to simply continue business as usual. Third, walk the pits on your unit’s next range. Fourth, after you receive the after-action report from your subordinate leaders, receive a separate after-action report from the most junior personnel, but ask only for the failures and see if any of those made it into the after-action report from your subordinate leaders. If your unit performs markedly worse than previously reported, then your unit is operating in an environment of artificial success and you have stifled forward progress. Let your staff fail in training so they do not fail in war.
Endnotes
[1] John Boyd, “Discourse on Winning and Losing.” Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, 25 April 1989, Marine Corps University, Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA. Guest Lecture, transcribed by Ian Brown, 19.
[2] Linda T Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan, and Molla S. Donaldson, Editors, To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System (National Academy Press: Washington D.C., 2000), 8.
[3] Linda T Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan, and Molla S. Donaldson, Editors, To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System (National Academy Press: Washington D.C., 2000), 8.
