In February, the Marine Corps published a new doctrinal publication—the first in nineteen years. The Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 7 (MCDP 7) explicitly identifies learning as an institutional priority and explains why learning is important to the profession of arms, maintaining an intellectual edge, exercising intelligent initiative, and conducting maneuver warfare. In doing so, MCDP 7 serves as a useful conversation starter for those seeking to combat some of the anti-intellectualism in the Marine Corps’ ranks.
However, as others have recently pointed out, there are some fundamental, foundational pieces missing in MCPD 7 that need to be included for it to be useful as a guide for Marines and sailors interested in improving their capabilities for learning and thinking. Starting from a firm foundation is necessary given some of the barriers that undoubtedly will be encountered along the way. Here, we suggest a metaphor/concept that might be useful as we begin to elaborate on some of the foundations for learning: thinking of the process of ongoing learning as a kind of “maneuver warfare of the mind.” As in the original conception of maneuver warfare, we think of maneuver warfare of the mind as a continuous, never-ending cognitive process—a way of thinking. We hope the following observations help continue the conversation and sharpen some of the ideas behind MCDP 7.
The Art of Learning and Developing Military Judgment
The Marine Corps published FMFM 1 Warfighting in 1989 to describe maneuver warfare as the service’s philosophy on warfighting and thinking. In discussing the art and science of war, FMFM 1 notes, “the conduct of war is ultimately an art, an activity of human creativity and intuition powered by the strength of the human will. The art of war requires the intuitive ability to grasp the essence of a unique battlefield situation, the creative ability to devise a practical solution, and the strength of purpose to execute the act.”[1] As such, military judgment is essential to the art of war, but unfortunately, MCDP 7 makes little effort to explain how to develop it. MCDP 7 simply notes, “Learning enables Marines to think critically, develop judgment, and cultivate a bias for action without waiting to be told.”[2]
MCDP 7 includes a section specifically titled “The Human Dimension and the Science of Learning,” but there is no corresponding section on the art of learning and, as a result, surprisingly little on the human dimension of learning. Learning encompasses behavior that helps learners go from not knowing, to acquiring experience, knowledge, and skills and, ultimately, developing judgment. It is a process that builds on and is driven by curiosity, imagination, commitment, thinking critically and differently, and passion. However, instead of delving into how we cultivate such attitudes and traits, MCDP 7 settles for reminding the reader that the science of learning must be combined with the art of learning—whatever that may mean.
Furthermore, other than passing references to active learning and the Socratic method, MCDP 7 also never specifies what types of learning methodologies are most conducive to developing judgment and overcoming biases inherent in decision-making.[3] Instead, the publication overwhelmingly relies on phrases such as “deliberate practice,” “learn[ing] how to learn,” and “studying how to think better” without providing any further explanation of what this actually means.[4] When MCDP 7 does mention tactical decision games, war games, and case studies as particularly effective learning methods for Marines, it does so in the context of building knowledge rather than judgment, suggesting a lack of understanding of the differences between knowledge and its actual application thereof.[5] Later, in discussing the importance of a growth mindset, MCDP 7 again asserts that knowledge and skills (and not their application) are the goals of learning.[6] As a result, the publication’s discussion of self-directed learning also is rather incomplete since it never explains how individual Marines might be prepared (or prepare themselves) to embark on such a quest so they do not feel overwhelmed and turned off by learning at the outset.
This emphasis on knowledge instead of judgment also manifests itself in a fundamental misunderstanding of the difference between risk and uncertainty. MCDP 7 states, “Combat is inherently dangerous and risky.”[7] However, this connotes that all variables of war are known and winning is a matter of calculating a simple math problem. Initiative and learning from mistakes, pace MCDP 7, should not be informed by risk management, but rather by judgment. FMFM 1 reminds us, “Boldness must be tempered with judgment lest it border on recklessness.”[8] Identifying gaps, creating mismatches and asymmetries, and seizing opportunities points to the need for teaching thinking and judgment—maneuver warfare for the mind. This recognition of ambiguity and judgment was central to the original maneuver warfare movement. In his guidance concerning professional military education (PME) when he was Commandant, General Al Gray explicitly directed teaching judgment and thinking, not (just) analysis and knowledge, while also linking the “what” of teaching (judgment) to the “how” (active learning).[9]
Intrinsic Motivation and the Logic of Identity
MCDP 7 describes intrinsic motivation as being driven by internal rewards and engaging in behavior because it is satisfying.[10] This narrow definition, however, neglects some of the Marine Corps’ greatest strengths. The Corps prides itself on being an elite organization and “the most ready when the nation is least ready.” The famous “We don’t promise you a rose garden” poster featuring drill instructor Sergeant Charles A. Taliano underscores that to be a Marine is a challenge and a vocation that requires commiting to a demanding warrior ethos and becoming part of something larger than themselves. In emphasizing Marines’ unique bond as riflemen first and foremost, the Corps has always stressed the importance of the individual Marine over technology. Thus, extending this warrior identity and the readiness of the force to include a lifetime of learning presents another way to nurture the intrinsic motivation of our Marines.
Similarly, the principle of we-leadership, which emphasizes the group over the individual, enhances an individual’s commitment to and identification with the organization.[11] Leaders need not simply attempt to foster and encourage learning directly. Rather, by forging connections with their Marines, their Marines’ values will begin to more closely align with the organization’s, and their Marines will be less prone to the careerist, “ticket punching” mentalities that have permeated PME in the past.
Learning Organizations
MCDP 7 uses the terms “learning organization” and “organizational learning” a total of six times, but it never once attempts to define the terms or explain how learning at the individual level might lead to learning at an organizational level and vice versa. Instead, it leaves readers with the distinct impression that a learning organization is simply a collection of individuals that learn, which is not the case. MCDP 7 captures some organizational mechanisms useful to organizational learning, such as tolerating mistakes and challenging established ideas (even of those more senior in rank), after-action reviews (AARs), open discussions, and force-on-force exercises.[12] However, it makes no attempt to explain the process by which the experiences of individual Marines are externalized during informal meetings and “hot washes,” developed conceptually in professional journals and more formal AARs, captured in doctrinal publications and regulations at the institutional level, and then systematically taught so as to change actual behavior on the battlefield. Given the publication’s proclivity to focus on knowledge, it would have been well-served to distinguish between tacit and explicit knowledge and explain how the “continual dialogue” between the two “drives the creation of new ideas and concepts.”[13] The four functional areas of responsibility for the culture of learning is a useful start,[14] but the publication falls short of describing how they contribute to a learning organization. Military organizations, especially during long-term strategic competition, also need to be agile and capable of quickly and effectively cycling through the observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA) loop just as MCDP 7 recognizes individual Marines must be.
We applaud MCDP 7 as a useful step in developing a learning philosophy that prepares our Marines to exercise judgment as they confront an unpredictable future. In subsequent articles, we hope to discuss some ideas for developing judgment, as well as the institutional and intellectual history behind MCDP 7 so that it is more readily understood as an outgrowth of the maneuver philosophy.
Endnotes
[1] U.S. Marine Corps, FMFM 1 Warfighting (Washington, DC: 1989), 15.
[2] U.S. Marine Corps, MCDP 7 Learning (Washington, DC: 2020), 1-5.
[3] MCDP 7, 3-12, 4-7.
[4] MCDP 7, 1-16, 1-17.
[5] MCDP 7, 1-19.
[6] MCDP 7, 2-12.
[7] MCDP 7, 2-6.
[8] FMFM 1, 34.
[9] Commandant of the Marine Corps to Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, “Training and Education,” October 10, 1988, located in the Alfred M. Gray Collection, Box List Part 2, Box 6, Folder 12, Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons Center for Marine Corps History, Quantico, VA.
[10] MCDP 7, 2-12, 2-13.
[11] Al Gray and Paul Otte, The Conflicted Leader and Vantage Leadership (Columbus, OH: Franklin University Press, 2006).
[12] MCDP 7, 2-5—2-6, 3-7—3-9
[13] Ikujiro Nonaka, “A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation,” Organization Science 5, no. 1 (Feb. 1994): 15.
[14] MCDP 7, 2-9.
