Every year, a small group of U.S. officers are selected to fill a seat at one of 13 organizations as a Federal Executive Fellow—or simply, a “military fellow.” These organizations range from premier academic institutions to historic and influential think tanks. And the officers that get the chance to attend these institutions come from all military services and numerous professions and designators.
I had the chance to correspond with two military fellows—Captain Chris Sharman, recently a fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, and Commander Jeremy Wheat, recently a fellow at Tufts University in Medford, Massachusetts—about their experiences, their research projects, and most importantly, what the Navy should do to improve naval education.
Commander Nelson: I want to dive right into your thoughts on how you think the Navy values education. You both are naval officers, yet you come from different communities within the Navy—each with its own culture. Tell me how your community views your fellowship. How do you think the Navy values a fellowship?
Commander Wheat: Excellent question. For context, I am an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) warfare officer and we are the smallest warfare community in the unrestricted line (URL). We make up approximately 2 percent of the URL and only 1 percent of the total officer corps of the Navy. That said, getting community support for the fellowship was difficult. On that point I don’t think my community differs from other warfare communities, especially in the URL. That is exacerbated for due course officers when you consider the follow-on utilization tour requirement of the fellowship program. There is a pipeline every warfare community prefers for developing its leaders and taking an officer off that track for up to four years (one year of fellowship plus three years utilization) is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. The Navy’s personnel policies require warfare communities to fill their discrete billets at a higher rate than the strategist subspecialty coded billets. Also, fellowships and in residence education are still considered “broadening opportunities” outside of career progression requirements for due course URL officers. Culture trumps strategy every time, and it is only time that will tell if the Education for Seapower 2020 strategy can overcome the culture of the Navy that works against education and fellowship experiences.
It is important to understand the Navy’s framework for developing naval strategists, which is the goal of the fellowship process. The Navy’s going-in assumption is that it takes the educational experience (i.e. fellowship) plus the follow-on utilization tour to create a naval strategist. I agree with that framework and have seen it work wherein I completed a follow-on tour as an operational planner after graduating from the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School (MAWS). I may have received the education in MAWS, but without applying it during my follow-on tour, I would not have learned. On top of that, I was a better Commanding Officer when I returned to the EOD force after my operational planner tour.
The follow-on utilization tour is where you get the reps and sets, so to speak, to grow from the education experience. An officer is exposed to the mentorship and guidance of Flag or General Officers to hone their strategic education through application against the right types of problems when properly placed as a strategist after fellowship. Without the utilization tour, it would be like trying to employ your tactical weapons systems by just reading the operating publications and technical manuals—all theory, no application—and that’s just not the way the Navy works for anything else. Education is a critical enabler of warfighting, and we only get better at warfighting by rigorous testing and application.
Captain Sharman: My colleague has it right. Advanced degrees, time at a War College, or in fellowships are encouraged by the Navy, but there is a tension with the time spent on these academic pursuits away from the fleet. Career timing, operational requirements, and professional wickets are factors that must be considered before pursuing higher education. These variables are unlikely to change. This suggests operational jobs will continue to be viewed as more career enhancing than fellowships. I’m encouraged, however, by the recent Navy Admin that indicates our fitness reports and selection board precepts are being changed to emphasize the importance of continuous education.
As for me, I’m an intelligence officer—part of the information warfare community (IWC). This year, about one fifth of the Navy Federal Executive Fellows (FEF) come from restricted line designators within the IWC. Unrestricted line officers (URLs) have a proscribed list of billets they consider for post fellowship assignments. Restricted line officers, such as the IWC, do not. This suggests the IWC could learn the best practices of post FEF detailing from the URL community. Permitting IWC FEFs to be detailed to the list of billets the URL community uses or expanding the list of post fellowship billets to include specific restricted line strategist billets, would enable the IWC to better leverage the unique experiences of its personnel that participate in the FEF program.
When I first applied to the FEF program, my detailer supported my interest and released me to apply. However, the Navy intelligence community faces some manning challenges at senior officer ranks. As such, my participation in the FEF program hampers the detailer’s ability to fill other critical requirements. One officer at Millington told me, “I was surprised to see the detailer released you to apply for the program.” This anecdotal comment suggests manpower issues can impact an officer’s opportunity to pursue higher education in the IWC.
Commander Nelson: What do you guys think it means to be an educated military professional today? I see the tension as I’m sure you do. We want tactically proficient operators and eventually, we want (more) strategic and creative thinkers—all in a nice timeline of, say, a full career, or about twenty years. What are your thoughts?
Commander Wheat: I am immediately reminded of the Qualifications of a Naval Officer from John Paul Jones that all midshipmen at the U.S. Naval Academy must commit to memory: “It is by no means enough that an officer of the Navy should be a capable mariner. He must be that, of course, but also a great deal more. He should be as well a gentleman of liberal education.” What Jones is saying is tactical competency is merely the price of entry. What we want are liberally educated, creative, strategic thinkers whose tactical proficiency is a given, not a competing interest. I think we have the paradigm wrong and that is what creates the friction you identified. The great power competition of today is a strategic fight, not a tactical one. The Navy will always produce great tactical leaders but we must ask ourselves how we can consistently produce quality strategic thinkers and leaders.
Only a portion of educating today’s military professionals should be accomplished through professional military education (PME). The majority of PME only expands the “capable mariner” to account for the increased scope of responsibility that comes with continued promotion. An equal portion of time must be spent in the liberal arts learning how to read broadly, form an argument, and write concisely and coherently. A well-educated military professional should also step outside the uniform for a period of time and purposely expose themselves to a learning environment that challenges their underlying assumptions, biases, and world view.
The resource competition is, of course, time, as you identified. If I assume the Navy’s various warfare communities have their tactical development process correctly mapped throughout a due course career, what we are really talking about is the time an officer spends outside the operating formations. How is that time best utilized to educate and develop the strategic thought, creativity, and innovation we desire? Here we see another interesting tension between education and personal development juxtaposed against service Title 10 requirements. What is more important, to facilitate and encourage an officer’s liberal education or staff the type commanders, resources sponsors, and program management offices who bear the burden of manning, training, and equipping the force? Again, I think we have the paradigm wrong here.
Captain Sharman: Listen, we want it all. I get it. Managed correctly, we can have it all. Effective tacticians have years of experience at different levels of responsibility managing their warfare discipline. We need our warfighters to be the best combat fighting force in the world. They are. At some point, however, tactics must be fused with injecting strategic concepts that enhance innovation and can influence an officer’s approach to warfighting. By the time an officer is senior, he/she should be both a master tactician and budding strategist. This suggests education should not only be encouraged but required throughout a career.
The best piece of advice I received when I entered the Navy was, “If the Navy offers you education, take it. It enhances your own intellectual growth and also makes you more valuable to the Navy.” I took that advice to heart and have pursued education whenever my career allowed for it. As a result, I’ve developed my tactical operational intelligence expertise, but I have a much better understanding of how intelligence supports achieving strategic objectives.
Commander Nelson: So, a thought experiment if we can. If money, the number of billets, or the fear of not getting promoted wasn’t an issue, what would you change about a military fellowship? Is it more fellows and younger officers exposed earlier in their careers? What does “right” look like and how does it nest within the larger naval education strategy?
Commander Wheat: My biggest concern is we adopt a one-size-fits-all policy prescription to education. For example, at the Fletcher School now is a lieutenant from the Navy’s politico-military masters degree program working towards the standard two year master’s program at Fletcher. That lieutenant has been in the Navy for five years. The experience he is going to take away from here is going to be vastly different than mine, having been in the Navy now for 20 years. Not better, not worse, just different. I hope, for sake of the lieutenant and the Navy, we don’t say: “He received an advanced degree on behalf of the Navy once in his career, he’s good.” The test will be if that lieutenant goes to a senior War College later in his career.
A second issue I would address is talent management. I alluded to this earlier in that the warfare communities of the URL have too much power in the detailing process. I now have three core skill sets all of which are valuable to the Navy: EOD warfare officer (a designator), joint operations planner (an additional qualifications designation—AQD), and naval strategist (a subspecialty). Why does one, the designator, dominate my detailing more so than the others? In the rubric of your thought experiment I would allow officers to detail more fluidly across all their acquired skills not just their primary warfare qualification.
Captain Sharman: I’m going to orient my comments specifically toward the FEF program as one could take your question several directions.
The Air Force, Marine Corps, Army, and Coast Guard all stringently screen their candidates for fellowships. While the Navy uses a selection board, the pool of applicants for Navy FEFs is much smaller compared to the other services. Both the Air Force and Army select their fellowship candidates from all officers eligible to attend their senior service school (War College). The Navy, however, only has the number of candidates that apply to the FEF program. As a result, fellows from the other services tend to be the top officers from their respective service, while the Navy is left assigning fellows from a smaller subset of personnel that applied to and were accepted into the FEF program. The Navy would do well to learn from the methodology the other services use to select their fellowship candidates.
The right FEF is someone who is senior enough to represent Navy interests to an institution or organization and to the local community, but who is junior enough for the navy to capitalize on its investment. In my mind, the minimum rank of a fellow is at the commander level. Rank is important. At Hoover, all military fellows are at least an O-5—several are O-6s or selected for O-6. The Navy needs to mirror the ranks of the other services, lest it be perceived as not valuing the fellowship.
Commander Nelson: What surprised you the most about your fellowship?
Commander Wheat: The quality of the students at the Fletcher School, without a doubt. I am surrounded by incredibly talented people from across the globe and all walks of life. I was expecting a younger, more idealistic or even entitled, student population. The student body at the Fletcher School is anything but that. I am enriched daily through my interaction with them. I hope to take their experiences and diverse perspectives forward in my thinking and approach to problem solving.
Captain Sharman: The freedom. Many fellowships are highly structured. Hoover’s program, by design, is not. Hoover’s philosophy is that the year belongs to the fellow and it is up to the fellow to make the most of it and to tailor the experience to our own interests. Hoover expects and encourages each National Security Affairs Fellow to design the year in ways that best serve his or her professional goals and personal interests.
Adapting to this freedom can be uncomfortable, but it allowed me to find my passion. I’ve found I enjoy teaching others how the Navy contributes to advancing our national interests in Asia. Through my operational and diplomatic assignments in the region, I’ve developed a rich understanding of security dynamics at hand. Yet, many Americans are unfamiliar with geostrategic challenges we face in Asia. This year has given me an opportunity to translate my own experiences through regular publications in national journals to educate Americans about why the Navy needs to remain engaged in the region. It also enables me to provide my recommendations for how the United States should address the China threat. I’ve also served as a regular contributor to podcasts where I discuss national security issues related to my research and publications. Through my work, I have been able to convey the important role of theNavy in preserving our national interests in Asia.
Commander Nelson: How much writing and reading did you do? Did any of you conduct some academic research on topics that pertain to military or national defense challenges? How did it turn out?
Commander Wheat: I’m in graduate school, of course I did a lot of reading! What I found more interesting though was the freedom in my reading selection as opposed to when I was at the Naval War College. Maybe it comes with age and maturity, but because I audited courses, I am more selective about what I read and when I read it. Some classes I read ahead because of the way the professor structures the interaction during class. For some, I’ve found it better to read in retrospect after the lecture. At times, I’ve skipped assigned reading from sections of a syllabus to read deeper into other sections. I would not have that flexibility in a degree-granting situation, which is a strength of the fellowship process.
Captain Sharman: I have used this year to hone my communication skills. In addition to the Navy requirement to research and write a 10000-word research paper, I have written several articles published in national media outlets such as the Washington Times, War on the Rocks, The Diplomat, RealClearPolitics, Proceedings, and RealClearDefense. I’ve published online and in print editions that land on every Congressman and Senator’s desk. My philosophy is that I have two options to influence U.S. defense policy. I can write staff memos on issues that are chopped through multiple layers of review before reaching someone who can influence policy—or I can write an op-ed that reaches the top policy makers almost instantaneously. I chose the latter option.
Commander Nelson: To close, you’re all senior officers. You have your biases and a world-view. Can you tell me a short anecdote or story about how someone or something you were exposed to challenged something you believe?
Captain Sharman: My limited understanding of economics was that when the stock market rises and the economy is doing well, the nation’s deficit should go down. The U.S. deficit, however, has continued to grow despite the positive economic conditions before coronavirus. One economist explained to me that the deficit is like having access to a credit card that does not need to be paid off at the end of the month. The government can continue to run the deficit up without worrying about paying the bill. This is what has happened over the last several years. At some point, however, the bill will arrive—when it does, Washington will have to make dramatic decisions about what it chooses to fund. Nobody knows, however, when the bill will arrive. As a result, the deficit will continue to rise.
Commander Wheat: The whole experience has challenged me to realize how small our defense issues are on the global scale. I’m reminded of Rosa Brooks’ book How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything. Don’t get me wrong, I appreciated the re-focus on Great Power Competition in the 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy provided. However, as a result of this fellowship, I’m beginning to grasp how these aren’t the only hard strategic problems the United States faces. Do China and Russia present challenges to our preferred system of international relations? Sure. Will China or Russia fundamentally alter our way of life in the United States? No. But there are other strategic problems that could. I’ll give you two examples:
Energy. The world is headed toward a transition away from fossil fuels in our global energy supply and demand in the 2040–50 timeframe. Several European energy companies, formerly in the fossil fuels industry, are global leaders in this transition and have been investing heavily for the past decade toward that end. Conservative estimates say the United States needs sustained investment in the tens of billions of dollars, maybe even a hundred billion dollars, annually for 20 years just to get our national infrastructure ready for that energy transition. For fractions of the Defense budget we could be preparing the entire nation for what will fundamentally alter the way we resource the energy needs of the United States but we’re not doing it. To quickly draw this to a tangible Defense application, 2040 is well within the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan timeline. How is the Navy buying capital ships for the state without an understanding of what the mix of technologies in our energy portfolio will be? Will our ships and aircraft still be so dependent on fossil fuels that we are actually more vulnerable to the influence of oil producing states? Yes, the U.S. is now a net exporter of fossil fuels. As a result our dependency, and by extension influence and vulnerability, has been somewhat mitigated but that was last decade’s problem. What does that problem look like in two decades?
Popular Nationalism, or Populism, if you will. Frankly, this one really scares me. Popular nationalist movements are on the rise globally, we know that. How is the United States going to face this challenge domestically? As the saying goes, we are really a salad bowl, not a melting pot, of nationalities in the United States. What is American nationalism? There’s no shortage of literature on the topic but the overwhelming majority of it points to the relationship between the individual and the state—not religious, ideological, ethnic, familial, linguistic or socio-cultural relationships. It is structural, not anthropological. What happens when the historic nationalist identity of a few groups, fueled by technology and global connectivity, begins to challenge the state? We don’t have a good track record of structural violence. It could fundamentally alter the social contract between the United States and our citizens and I don’t think we’re prepared to deal with it.
Commander Nelson: This was great. Thank you. Best of luck to you both.
Commander Christopher Nelson is a career naval intelligence officer. He is the deputy senior naval intelligence manager for East Asia at the Office of Naval Intelligence. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval War College and the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School in Newport, RI. He is also the creator and cartoonist behind Vulture’s Row. His opinions do not represent those of the U.S. government, Department of Defense, or U.S. Navy.
Captain Christopher Sharman is a career Naval Intelligence Officer. He previously served as a Naval Attaché in both Vietnam and in China and aboard several Japan-based ships with the Forward Deployed Naval Forces (FDNF). He has published numerous articles in national media outlets and is a regular contributor to The John Batchelor Show Podcast. The views here are his own and do not represent those of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, or the Hoover Institute.
Commander Jeremy Wheat is a career Explosive Ordnance Disposal Warfare Officer and most recently the U.S. Navy Federal Executive Fellow at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval War College’s Maritime Advanced Warfighting School and was the Commanding Officer of Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit ONE. His opinions do not represent those of the U.S. government, Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, or Tufts University.
