The “Ten-Year Challenge,” which trended on social media at the beginning of 2020, invites participants to synopsize the changes they’ve undergone the past decade. Applying this challenge to the Navy is daunting, but nevertheless highlights changes and enduring questions from one of the military’s most dynamic technological and sociological decades. The intention of the Navy Ten-Year Challenge is not to pessimistically parse out failures of the naval service. In the spirit of Captain Michael O’Hara’s 1977 essay on “The Challenge of Moral Leadership,” written amid the 1970s moral revolution that echoes the societal shock of the social media age, “Perhaps it is the most traditional, the most dearly held beliefs that need be examined first, then reaffirmed, modified, or even rejected if it is discovered that they have lost their currency;” this endeavor will hopefully draw the best minds to evaluate the most controversial questions. To this end, this piece proposes ten questions in three main sections—warfighting capability, personnel management, and new frontiers—to facilitate reflection on the Navy’s shortcomings, successes, and new undertakings during the 2010s.
Warfighting Capability
The first set of questions focuses on the current ability of the Navy to field a fleet for combat. At its core, a Navy requires seaborne vessels and, most important, proficient operators for these platforms. The past decade demanded tough self-reflection on the state of readiness for both sailors and their ships.
- Are sailors masters of the fundamentals of seamanship? The 2010s tragically claimed the deadliest naval episodes in four decades. On 17 June 2017, the $1.8 billion destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) collided with a cargo ship. Seven sailors drowned. Just nine weeks later, ten more perished when the USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) turned in front of an oil tanker. The problems that contributed to these collisions—undermanning with extended workweeks, as well as exhaustion and insufficient training for these sailors—were not written off as exclusively Seventh Fleet issues. Former Chief of Naval Operation (CNO) Vern Clark’s “optimal manning” initiative from the mid-2000s diminished the average destroyer crew from 317 sailors to 254 by 2017, with enlisted leadership at 60 percent manning. As early as February 2010, retired Vice Admiral Phillip Balisle reported that 4,500 additional sailors would be needed to man the Navy’s 283 surface ships to their appropriate levels. In the words of Vice Admiral Thomas Copeman, who was asked to retire early after remarks on readiness issues during the January 2013 Surface Navy Association Symposium, “If we continue to invest in the latest and greatest equipment and the most capable weapon systems without making an equivalent investment in our workforce, we will move further away from being a ready force.”
To prevent future tragedies, the question of seamanship became one of the most existential topics of the decade. The Navy has revamped early-stage ship-driving training for new surface warfare officers (SWOs) and aims to “triple the number of ship-driving training hours when compared with the amount of training SWOs were required to receive prior to the collisions.” Graduates of the new Junior Officer of the Deck (OOD) Course in 2019 showed a modest five percent increase in performance from a 2018 fleet “spot check,” and the Navy can enhance its self-assessment of SWOs in the future by solidifying a routine of competency “spot checks,” standardizing criteria to qualify OODs, and establishing a formal process to collect and analyze the data from the new ship-handling logbooks. There is much room for improvement, as the events of 2017 proved that seamanship is a matter of life or death—both in peacetime and undoubtedly in war.
- Are the Navy’s ships and submarines combat ready? To complement the personnel question, a question of material readiness is needed. In early 2016, Navy Undersecretary Janine Davidson used her first months in office to suggest that too many resources were devoted to purchasing new ships and weapon systems, while severely neglecting readiness. This notion contrasted with Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus’ vision that “quantity has a quality all of its own,” as he aspired to set up the Navy with 308 ships by 2021. Amid China’s naval expansion and routine patrols in the South China Sea’s contested waters, Russia’s aggressive maneuvers in the Arctic and “buzzing” of American warships, and North Korea’s missile buildup, Mabus believed in the strategic buildup and deterrent force of Navy presence. He signed contracts for 86 ships during his eight-year tenure, twice the total of the previous seven years.
The issue up for debate, however, is if an acceptable balance exists between new vessels and maintenance on operational platforms. In the past five years, Navy vessels have spent the equivalent of 90 years, or an unplanned 33,700 days, docked at shipyards for maintenance. These unexpected delays, taking place in 75 percent of cases in the last five years and costing the equivalent of 19 service ships in 2019, ultimately place greater stress on at-sea units. While the Navy has a $21-billion, 20-year shipyard modernization plan, Captain Dale Rielage’s iconic 2017 essay “How We Lost the Great Pacific War” calls out that the optimized fleet response plan’s (OFRP) metric of “deployable” assets may not meet the “combat ready” standard for wartime tactics. For now, President Donald Trump’s 350-ship campaign promise remains a fantasy, as newer programs face setbacks like zero deployments for the littoral combat ship during fiscal year 2018 and quality control mishaps with the Virginia-class SSN and Columbia-class SSBN programs.
- How will the Navy’s next great power conflict be different? The 2010s marked a paradigm shift in great power conflict, solidifying its “hybrid” character. In the biggest East-West military confrontation since the Soviet era, unmarked Russian troops seized control of the Crimean Peninsula and eastern Ukraine in February 2014. On 16 March, a heavily disputed Crimean referendum on joining Russia received 97 percent backing, allowing Putin to sign a bill of annexation. The United States and Europe responded only with sanctions and accusations of Russia instigating separatism in eastern Ukraine, urging Moscow to “move back its troops.” As the Crimean campaign underscored, the United States must expect a mix of military and nonmilitary tactics in future conflict, whether Sun Tzu’s age-old information use or more modern disinformation, subversion, psychological operations, cyber-attacks, and energy policies. Cold War analogies explain little about how to address the buildup of artificial islands in the South China Sea; the cyber vulnerabilities of the fleet; the speed, stealth, and range of hypersonic glide vehicles and unmanned platforms; or the competing interests of arms control in an increasingly multipolar world, especially in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal form the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty in August 2019. A diversity of thought will be needed to tackle these myriad issues, and thus, diversity must be reflected in the Navy’s sailors.
Personnel Management
The 2010s marked one of the most socially progressive decades in Navy history, including strides in gender integration and LGBT inclusion. Since the rapid mobilization of millions of men during World War I and II and consequent, necessary integration of African Americans and immigrants in the Armed Forces, the military has served as a vehicle for societal progress for minorities. The effect of these measures is twofold: to create a force that more perfectly resembles the society it serves and to heighten the diversity of thought in overcoming new frontiers.
- What is the status of gender integration in the military? While 30 November 2018 commemorated the 25th anniversary of the Defense Authorization Act that permitted women to serve on board surface combat vessels, one of the Navy’s greatest successes of the past decade was the addition of women into the submarine force. Starting in 2011, female officers began going to sea in submarines. As of July 2019, there were roughly 85 commissioned officers serving on 19 crews and 200 enlisted females on 8 crews, with plans to increase integration to 21 crews and 14 crews, respectively. There have been setbacks, however, that highlight an ongoing struggle to permeate the lessons of Command Managed Equal Opportunity and Sexual Assault Prevention and Response programs throughout the fleet. A dozen male sailors filmed female crew members in showers on board the USS Wyoming (SSBN-742) in 2014 and, in August 2018, the Navy relieved Captain Gregory Kercher of command of Florida GOLD after failing to address a list of sexual ratings of his female sailors.
Another groundbreaking decision came in January 2013, when Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced the overturning a 1994 rule that restricted women from infantry, artillery, armor, and other combat roles—despite the reality that women such as Senior Chief Shannon Kent had already encountered combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. Defense Secretary Ash Carter formally opened all military occupations to women in December 2015, after the military services completed their internal reviews. While the Navy mostly is removed from infantry, a female officer candidate became the first to complete the two-week Navy SEAL Officer Assessment and Selection process in September 2019, which qualified her for a SEAL contract (for which she ultimately was not selected). The Marine Corps originally requested a waiver from Secretary Carter, and in the wake of damning studies that showed all-male groups outperforming gender-integrated ones, there still are 92 women serving in Marine combat arms billets, with only 11 in infantry roles. Despite the cultural scandal of the 2017 “Marines United” group, the first female Marine graduated in September 2017 from the Infantry Officer Course, and the first gender-integrated class at the Marine Combat Training Course graduated in April 2018. A question for the coming decade, however, is if the separation of male and female Marines during basic training, a practice solely maintained by the Corps today, leads to disadvantages in attitude and training.
- Is the Navy doing enough to combat discrimination? President Barack Obama’s repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” on 20 September 2011 set off a domino effect of knocking down barriers in the military, including the aforementioned bans on women in combat. In 2015, the Military Equal Opportunity policy was expanded to include “sexual orientation,” formally protecting gay service members from discrimination. While the celebration of Navy LGBT Pride Month the past few years encapsulates a near-certain future of inclusion for gay and lesbian personnel, the fate of transgender service members remains an unanswered question for the 2020s. While the military ended its ban on transgender service in June 2016—a move that impacted approximately 15,500 active duty personnel—President Trump’s March 2018 memorandum reinstated bans that prevented some transgender-identifying personnel from joining the service or formally pursuing gender changes.
The end of the 2010s also demanded reevaluation of the issue of race. The September 2019 arrest of Coast Guard Lieutenant Christopher Hasson, who was plotting mass murder of political and media figures, reinvigorated the search for white nationalist and racist ideology in the military. A fall 2018 survey by Military Times found that 22 percent of participants have seen signs of these extremist ideologies within the armed forces, and nonwhite service members saw an increase in incidents of racism from 42 percent in 2017 to more than 50 percent in 2018. Amid the larger societal wave of white nationalism demonstrated by the August 2017 Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, the military must serve as the standard bearer on racial inclusion and continue to navigate debates like the renaming of Confederate monuments at the Naval Academy,
- Is the Navy upholding the accountability of leaders for their personnel? While the previous two questions have focused on integration at all ranks, this last personnel question focuses exclusively on leadership, given the explosive end of the 2010s in regards to accountability. The Navy will have to navigate cooperation with an impeached Commander in Chief who showed unprecedented involvement in barring removal of Special Warfare Operator Chief Edward Gallagher’s rank and Trident. The showdown between President Trump and Rear Admiral Collin Green (the Naval Special Warfare Commander), as well as now-resigned Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer, could have resounding impact on civil-military affairs. Of note, Admiral John Harvey of Fleet Forces Command controversially opened the decade in November 2010 by court-martialing Lieutenant Commander Sean Kearns, executive officer of the USS San Antonio (LPD-17) when a sailor drowned in the Gulf of Aden. Admiral Harvey cited a fear that junior sailors would feel that high-ranking people have immunity from being held accountable. From 2013 and onward, the Fat Leonard scandal assuaged this fear but shook the Navy’s ability to fill senior leadership roles, resulting in 33 federal indictments, 22 guilty pleas, and Leonard Francis’ admission that he overbilled the Navy $35 million. At the end of this decade, however—where even the cases of the 2017 surface collisions were mired by unlawful command influence and improper actions by the convening authority—the Navy is drifting into uncharted waters on accountability. As the Navy also breaks into new frontiers of warfare in the coming decades, Admiral Harvey’s premonition rings true: “If you don’t have the trust of those you lead, you don’t have anything.”
New Frontiers
While the Navy is working to improve material and personnel readiness for war, global competitors are forging into new frontiers, and the American military must also prioritize keeping pace with them. A combination of manmade and natural phenomena have forced the Navy to delve more deeply into the Arctic, space, and the cyber domain. While the Navy has adopted many positive initiatives in these arenas, the next decade will offer unimaginable challenges and opportunities.
- Is the Navy prepared for climate changes in the Arctic? The Arctic arena is metaphorically and physically heating up. Navigation across the Northern Sea Route (the 3,000-plus nautical miles from the Barents Sea to the Bering Straits) is only possible for four months of the year, with temperatures as low as minus 40 Fahrenheit in the winter months that necessitate ice-breaking vessels. Various studies, however, propose that climate change may add several weeks to the ice-free navigation period in the coming decades, making the route commercially viable for shipping. Forty-three years after the commissioning of the sole operational USCGC Polar Star (WAGB-10), the Navy and Coast Guard awarded VT Halter Marine a $746-million contract in April 2019 to build three new polar security cutters. While this effort marks a step in the right direction for U.S. involvement in the Arctic, Russia has built 14 ice-breakers since 2013 to supplement the dozens already in service, and China is now working on a 30,000-ton displacement nuclear-powered design. As Moscow shifts military assets to new bases in the Arctic-like Alexandra Land and discovers new islands revealed by glacial melt (such as the five off the Novaya Zemlya archipelago), the Navy must account for the possibility of novel operating patterns for adversarial surface and subsurface vessels, as well as enhanced A2/AD capabilities.
- How does the future of space impact the Navy? With the signing of the 2020 defense authorization bill, President Trump created the Space Force on 20 December 2019. As tradition claims, the Army equips soldiers while the Navy mans equipment. Consequently, the Navy will have to serve as the example to the Space Force, which similarly has technology as its main mission. While current legislation predominantly allows for the transfer of Air Force personnel to the Space Force, Rear Admiral Christian Becker, the head of Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, envisions that Navy and Marine Corps personnel can contribute their community-specific knowledge to space acquisition. This collaboration will be essential, as the Navy depends on space technology for mission areas like communications, navigation, positioning, and ISR.
- What challenges does the Navy face in the cyber domain? The Tenth Fleet was founded in May 1943 to spearhead intelligence efforts against the German U-boat campaign, and the contemporary Tenth Fleet, reestablished in January 2010, is developing technologies to confront cyberspace challenges under and above the sea. While creating entirely autonomous surface and subsurface vessels remains a distant reality for the Navy, “analytical and decision support systems are displacing some crew members in data-driven areas such as sensor employment, target detection, classification, and the generation of accurate fire-control solutions.” When integrating new cyber technologies on American platforms, the Navy must fortify vulnerabilities against foreign exploitation and train personnel to employ innovative strengths, to include Lieutenant Commander Jared Wilhelm’s proposition to use the new tools of social media for naval communications and training. In response to various breaches into Navy and defense contractor networks in 2018, the Navy created a new Chief Information Officer position for Aaron Wise in September 2019 in the hopes of “improving the Navy’s cybersecurity, data, information management, digital strategy, and business systems” while marching into the 2020s.
Self-Improvement
While the questions posed above are by no means inclusive of all the changes the Navy has undergone in the past decade, they facilitate a discussion of past and future on preparedness for war, social progress and accountability, and new domains for exploration. In the wake of the Fat Leonard scandal, 2017 collisions, and 2018 cyber scandals, it is easy to explain why Admiral Mike Gilday, the former commander of U.S. Fleet Cyber Command, bypassed several four-star admirals to become the current Chief of Naval Operations. His December 2019 Fragmentary Order distills Design 2.0 into three categories that perfectly correlate with the Ten-Year Challenge’s subsections—Warfighting, Warfighter, and Future Navy. In posing these daunting questions for the Navy and charting a path forward for sailors, a final, tenth question deserves consideration:
- How can an individual sailor prepare for the 2020s? Then Under Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly wrote in his introduction letter for the February 2019 E4S action memo, “continuous learning—and sharing hard-won knowledge—represents a combat-proven key to victory for our naval services…every assumption of roles, responsibilities, and interconnections while pursuing the highest fidelity of learning technology.” CNO Gilday has thrown his support behind the new Chief Learning Officer position and warfighting development directorate OPNAV N7, as well as aggressor squadrons across the surface, subsurface, and air warfare communities to practice tactics. For the individual sailor, the answer is to use these tools to push the confines of traditional knowledge and to improve upon her shortcomings and successes to facilitate a new Decade of Dominance.
