Navy

The Strategic Implications of ExMCM during Phase Zero Operations

The weapon that waits; a cheap and effective tool, used, produced, and exported by numerous countries around the globe, the naval mine remains one of the most feared and deadly weapons that no one cares about. There have bee countless studies on the potential effects of naval mining operations, and yet, the U.S. Navy still dedicates limited resources to improving the aging mine countermeasures (MCM) triad. It has been known for many years that the legacy mine hunting surface fleet and heavy-lift air assets would be twilighted in the near future, leaving a significant gap in MCM capacity and capability, specifically in the ability to sweep for mines. With strong backing in recent years, the underwater MCM force (explosive ordnance disposal [EOD] MCM platoons) is the last standing leg of the legacy triad. 

The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) developed expeditionary mine countermeasures (ExMCM) companies comprised of one EOD MCM platoon, one unmanned systems (UMS) platoon, and one post mission analysis (PMA) cell, to act as the standalone MCM capability for the Navy. Additional MCM assets, such as the littoral combat ship (LCS), with its consortium of modular and unmanned systems, are slated to contribute to a modernized MCM triad in the near future

ExMCM companies are small, agile, self-contained, detect-to-engage units boasting myriad mobile capacity and mine hunting capabilities. However, these capabilities are being floundered through repeated missed opportunities. Tactically misguided employment is reducing the strategic effect these units can have to protect naval ships, submarines, sailors, and Marines. This article looks to examine the use of ExMCM Companies in current phase zero operations and the implications for major combat operations (MCO). 

Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPOE) 

IPOE should be the primary mission of ExMCM while conducting phase zero operations. This is a tactical-level mission-set with strategic level outcomes. As a whole, the ExMCM force conducts countless exercises and engagements with numerous key partners around the globe and are uniquely equipped to gather significant amounts of data through the use of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV). Depending on the length of these engagements, unmanned MK18 MOD 1 and MOD 2’s are conducting hundreds of hours of bottom searches collecting vital data for MCM operations. The hundreds of hours of UMS run-time equate to huge areas of the sea bottom that have been mapped by ExMCM companies. This data is key to IPOE and is valuable in many ways; hydrographic survey data used in mine-hunting calculations, bottom change comparison to identify new hazards in previously covered areas, and information sharing with partner nations to inform them of the undersea operating environment in their backyardswhile strengthening relationships. Every single minute of UMS run-time during phase zero operations should be going towards data collection. Unfortunately, none of the data collected is being stored, shared, or used in future exercise planning or, even worse, actual MCO preparation.  

According to international law, a country can lay protective minefields within its territorial waters. This becomes a major problem when China, for example, has made claims to large swaths of the South China Sea to include strategically placed man-made militarized islands and island chains. Though not recognized by international court, and challenged by the Philippines and other Indo-Pacific countries, the sovereignty of the Spratly Islands is a good example of the strategic necessity of IPOE. Because of China’s blatant disregard for international sovereignty rulings, it can only be assumed that protective minefields already exist off the coast of the Spratlys. To this end, ExMCM companies should be integrating with their Filipino counterparts to run UMS sorties within the waters of the Spratlys. Not only will this provide critical data for MCO, it will also provide EOD with a unique opportunity to capture and exploit Chinese mine technology. According to the 2009 Naval War College Study on Chinese mine warfare, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) not only possess and manufacture a large number of sea mines (approximately 100,000 in stockpile and over 30 different variants), but Chinese sea mines are technologically advanced and extremely lethal to U.S. naval assets. By capturing and exploiting these mines, the United States would have a better chance of defeating them by closing the intelligence loop, speeding up the MCM process, and reducing potential harm to U.S. assets during MCO. There is a crucial need to develop a central mine warfare (MIW) data repository that can be integrated with future surface MCM and aerial MCM assets along with ally MIW databases.  

ExMCM Integration 

Another key to strategic MCM outcomes is the integration of ExMCM with two key components; international partners and the U.S. Marine Corps. First and foremost, there needs to be a focus on how the United States integrate with its allies. Currently, ExMCM companies have proven themselves able to work from a variety of platforms including British afloat forward staging bases (AFSB) in the Central Command area of operations and on board Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) ships during JA series exercises, to name a few. The scalable and mobile nature of the ExMCM company is what makes it so effective, but there are still limitations. Organic ExMCM rigid hull inflatable boats (RHIBs) do not always have the necessary range to reach the MCM problem. Though these companies can load up on air assets and move rapidly around the globe, a majority of their utility will be blue water, more specifically where a C-130 or C-40 cannot land. To this end, ExMCM should be focusing on embarked partnerships with U.S. allies. Almost all ExMCM companies are within a military cargo flight to an ally country with a capable Navy and competent MCM force. By flying ahead of U.S. ships, it would be prudent to be able to embark on allies’ vessels to begin hunting operations before the fleet ever arrived. This scenario should be practiced more frequently during phase zero exercises in preparation of MCO.  

The Marine Corps also poses a great opportunity for integration, and a great capability gap for ExMCM. As the Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF), the Marine Corps owns the littorals with amphibious ships capable of bringing thousands of Marines across oceans to the shores of our adversaries. It only makes sense to integrate the NECC with the NEF, a current top priority within the Indo-Pacific theater and across the fleet. Fortunately, this is not a new concept. Historically, EOD platoons were attached to the amphibious readiness groups (ARGs), responsible for supporting amphibious operations both afloat and ashore. This is very important for one specific mission set that will be critical in MCO; MCM within very shallow water (VSW). The VSW zone is defined as 10–40 feet of seawater and a critical zone for amphibious landings. Currently, this is a capability that the Navy claims to possess but has neglected for years. The Navy EOD community has focused primarily on, and developed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for, outside the VSW zone (40–300 feet of seawater) and it can be argued that a VSW MCM operation would produce mediocre results at best. The Marines do not possess an organic MCM capability thus leaving assault lanes littered with unknown hazards. Equipping Marines with UMS platforms to search ahead of the assault could be a cheap and rapid solution to avoid a mining catastrophe. However, the integration of ExMCM companies with ARGs during phase zero exercises is the best solution to close the capability gap and build the neglected VSW MCM skillset. 

Unmanned Systems Susceptibility and EOD Skillsets 

The growing sophistication of naval mines and the reliance of unmanned systems pose an interesting question within EOD circles; will the MK18 family of systems survive an encounter with a naval mine? The MK18 Mod 2 Kingfish is roughly 12-foot-long, 600-pound (sometimes larger depending on configuration) torpedo-shaped computer, “flying” approximately three meters above the sea floor hunting for mines. This becomes problematic when enemy mines are specifically looking for large, metal-filled objects whizzing by. Without appropriate exploitation of current mine threats, we do not know at what sensitivity these enemy mines will detonate. Also, susceptibility data for the MK18s has not been released to the operators using these unmanned tools so that TTPs can be adjusted and developed to increase the survivability of our data collectors. With all that said, are we putting all of our eggs into a proverbial sacrificial basket?  

Let’s briefly examine the mining of the Arabian Gulf during the Gulf War as if it happened yesterday. Unbeknownst to us, Iraq has just laid approximately 1,100 mines. During the 1990’s, these were primarily moored contact mines (Erikson, Goldstein, & Murray, 2009). Now assume that with modern naval mine technological innovation, these 1,100 mines were the most lethal bottom influence mines. We currently have two ExMCM companies in the CENTCOM AOR that would respond to this mining event, each possessing a limited number of MK18 UUVs. Current TTPs would have the UMS platoons deploy the MK18s first to locate the mines. Without current and relevant mine order of battle based on captured and exploited enemy mines, and without susceptibility data for the MK18s, it is possible that each MK18 that encountered a mine would detonate it, leaving just under 1,100 mines to be cleared by EOD technicians. This scenario shows a somewhat limited mining event compared to the mining capabilities of U.S. near-peer adversaries. Imagine if this was China with 100,000 mines strewn across the South China Sea, or Russia with its approximated 250,000 mines laid around the Arctic. Is the United States prepared to assume the risk of putting EOD technicians back into the minefield? 

What this highlights is that there are fundamental EOD skillsets that need to be maintained despite the promise of taking the man out of the minefield. As a force, the Navy cannot rely solely on remote capabilities to solve the complex problems it is bound to encounter during MCO. UUVs bring an incredible capability to the MIW fight, but nothing will replace the EOD operator behind the machine. Unlike VSW MCM, the service cannot neglect the fundamental skillset that separates Navy EOD technicians from all other EOD technicians, because at the end of the day, and when the UUVs do not return to the operators, there will still be mines to clear. 

What Right Looks Like 

In the end, the Navy needs to use UUVs within the current operating environment to generate the largest strategic advantage possible. As tactical extensions of its strategic endstates, the EOD community, with the assistance of unmanned vehicles, could be supplying combatant commanders with the necessary information to appropriately prepare for MCO during steady-state, phase zero exercise engagements and sustainment training. Increased meaningful integration with global partners and brown-water naval assets is the key to gain the access and placement needed to gather IPOE and sharpen stated MCM skillsets from deep water to the surf zone. An overall dedication to data collection, storage, and sharing is what will generate the largest strategic impact for ExMCM.   

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