Over the past two decades, Russia has steadily risen as a threat to worldwide stability and the West is increasingly unable to counter this threat militarily. Regardless of Western perceptions, Russia has seen itself as a great power since the 1990s and has effectively asserted itself as one, politically and militarily. As its capabilities have grown, Russia has become increasingly forceful on the world stage. This trend toward aggression has moved from within, to its neighbors and to the West. Since 2014, Russia has undergone a military revival to back up its ambitions and U.S. American ambitions in the Arctic, Pacific, and Middle East. Without sufficient response, Russia will solidify its position as a world power and a dominant, enduring force. The use of force must always remain a last resort, but it is the duty of countries’ militaries to ensure they are ready to take on potential adversaries. U.S. policymakers must acknowledge the challenge presented and act resolutely to ensure it remains capable of handling the Russian threat.
Nature of the Russian Threat
Restoring Western military preeminence with respect to Russia requires an evaluation of Russian and capabilities and an adjustment of our own. Russian military planners have created an asymmetric menace using multifaceted approach. While some may dismiss individual elements of it as inferior, their aggregate strength and threat is consequential. First, Russian planning has focused on countering U.S. strength for more than a decade, rather than matching it. While this has prevented Russia from becoming a serious offensive threat to Europe and the United States, it means potential U.S. forays into Russia’s sphere of influence—such as retaking occupied territories—have become increasingly difficult and may \ become unrealistic. Russian tactics reflect the asymmetric nature of the Russia–U.S. rivalry. Highly maneuverable regular and special operations Russian forces could impose unique challenges on U.S. forces. Second, Russian cyber warfare abilities remain sophisticated and, while unlikely to end a war alone, they could play a decisive role in the battlespace. Russia’s cyberattacks have destabilized countries since 2007 and could play the same role against Western military forces.[1] Finally, the Russian acquisition process has worked intelligently and cost-effectively to reach these goals. Russian procurement has spent its smaller budget at countering the core tenets of U.S. strategy, chiefly through new missile systems.[2]
Countering U.S. Strength
Rather than attempt to directly match U.S. military strength as the USSR once did, Russia has learned to simply counter U.S. capabilities. Oft cited U.S. strengths over Russia, such as a direct comparison of carrier strength, generally have a Russian asymmetric counterpart aimed at eliminating said advantage, such as hypersonic antiship missiles. This strategy of counteracting U.S. strengths and targeting its weaknesses has been publicly embraced by Russian military leaders. For instance, the Ministry of Defense has countered U.S. carriers through new hypersonic missiles, rather than equal platforms. Even assuming U.S. carriers can contribute to ground operations, less-expensive Russian layered defense elements pose a credible threat to U.S. air forces.
As U.S. forces often fight with the benefit of air superiority, Russian layered defense—analogous to defense-in-depth—challenges the status quo. Multiple layers of antiair missile batteries could parry U.S. penetration attempts and leave ground forces subject to precise targeting from Russian air forces.[3] The maneuverability and training regime of these units only increases their combat-effectiveness against opposing forces. Appreciating Iraqi failures in Desert Storm, mobile missile batteries—for instance the SS-26 Stone or SA-21 Growler—swiftly reposition after striking enemy forces, making them harder to find and destroy. This diminishes the ability to counterstrike using warships and attack aircraft. In addition, because of the nature of layered defense, the risk to U.S. pilots only increases the farther they penetrate into Russian-defended airspace.
Off the coast, groups of warships remain vulnerable to the same multimission weapon systems. Just as Russian doctrine calls for concentrating fire support on single ground elements, the same can be done to ships offshore. Systems—such as the SS-C-5 Stooge—may be individually dispersed far along a coastline, thus more difficult to detect and track, but still concentrate fire on a single ship or group.[4] The minimal defensive armament carried by amphibious platforms may be inadequate to counter these advanced systems. Thee mass production and fielding of these missiles may force carriers from the battlespace as their escorts deplete their defensive armament repelling antiship missile barrages.
When not reliant on simple fire superiority, Russian ground forces have trained to be a maneuverable, almost guerilla, force.[5] Military exercises have seen special operations forces practice hit-and-run, guerilla, and sabotage attacks. While the precise nature of these tactics have not been revealed publicly, similar use in recent combat has been incredibly effective. The proficient application of these tactics by Azerbaijan in the recent Nagorno-Karabakh conflict dramatically changed the balance of power, and serves as a case study. Covert forces entered targeted areas before the offensive operation, sabotaged lines of communication, served as forward observers, provided reconnaissance and BDAs. The covert efforts “[forced] the enemy to surrender cities without major clashes,” which would accomplish the principle Russian goal of avoiding symmetric engagements.[6] These tactics could prevent prolonged campaigns by Western forces as logistic operations would be severely strained by layered defense and harassing attacks at key chokepoints.[7]
Cyber Warfare
Russian cyber capabilities are not able to end a war, but they could play a large role in any future conflict. The cyber rules of engagement are yet to be agreed on, and Russia has shown a willingness to strike resolutely in the past. [8] Russian cyber warfare has destabilized countries since 2007 and could play the same role in sowing disorder and chaos among the enemy.[9] Russian doctrine aims for maneuver warfare at its height and thus aims at disrupting and overwhelming the decision making process of their enemies.[10] The electronic targeting of command-and-control and communication systems could break down their adversary’s decision-making ability.[11] The ability to coordinate complex military operations enables U.S. military dominance of the battlespace, and thus is significantly threatened. While the U.S. emphasis on decentralized decision making would mitigate the effects of such an attack, it would still leave many units at a significant disadvantage. Joint terminal attack controllers may be unable to summon close-in air support, or warships may be left in the dark without the ability to coordinate using Aegis. Perhaps most frighteningly, the United States could be subject to the first foreign attacks on U.S. soil since 1812. Experts have long warned that U.S. infrastructure remains vulnerable to cyber attack, and Russia has already used its cyber capabilities to temporarily cripple electric grids—as in Ukraine.[12]
Acquisitions
Lastly, while U.S. defense acquisitions continually invite controversy and criticism, Russia’s has emphasized cost-effectiveness and quality over new, expensive platforms.[13] The current Minister of Defense, Sergei Shoigu, stated recently that “does Russia need five to ten aircraft carrier groups [?] We need funds which can potentially be used against such enemy aircraft carriers. . . . And this is incomparably cheaper and more efficient.”[14] While the emphasis on missile technology has been discussed, drone technology perhaps is the most promising emerging counter effort. Nagorno-Karabakh revealed the dynamic role these unmanned vehicles can play in modern warfare. Azerbijani drones enabled “the destruction of Armenian tanks, artillery, ground fortifications and even a Russian built S-300 antiaircraft missile system.”[15] The lack of “adequate sensors, electronic warfare cover, or counterdrone weaponry” spelt disaster for an unprepared Armenian force.[16] Russian land and maritime exercises frequently use drones for the same deadly purposes as Azerbaijan, namely forward observing and reconnaissance.[17] The liberal use of drones in the C4ISR process radically shaped the balance of power in Nagorno-Karabakh, and similar effects should be expected in engagements with Russia.
Path Ahead
The Russian threat remains significant and U.S. strategy must act to counter Russian capabilities, as Russia has done to America. In just 20 years, U.S. thinking has shifted dramatically on Russia, from a weak nuisance that could be easily defeated if necessary, to once again a legitimate threat to the stability of Europe and democracy. Given the rhetoric and action taken by Russia in the past decade, combined with the knowledge that President Vladimir Putin may still have 15 years in office, there is no reason to expect the Russian threat to diminish. The U.S. military has already made adjustments to its training and operations, but must continue to adapt to the challenge ahead.
The most realistic and immediately effectual changes are to training policies. Russian cyber capabilities pose a genuine threat to C4ISR networks. The instruction of non-electronic communication remains vital to officer development. Fluency in visual communications must be the standard. Similarly, analogue navigational skills must be continually practiced in the fleet. The potential for Electronic Chart Display and Information System-Navy (ECDIS-N) decertification has prevented any practical application of simple paper chart navigation. Because of potential GPS denial and the possibility of cyberattacks against navigational systems, Navy policy must permit captains to authorize the use of paper charts without risking ECDIS-N decertification. While senior officers retain their skills, junior officers and midshipmen are less-able analogue navigators, which could spell disaster in conflict.
Tactically, aviation assets must be able to penetrate Russia’s layered defense to support land and maritime forces. Aviators must be ready to counteract air-defense systems through an integration of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, electronic decoys, and kinetic and electronic attacks. Without the elimination of layered defense systems, U.S. air supremacy will be impossible and amphibious invasions a costly endeavor. In addition, since the Russian threat largely exists as an aggregate of individual strengths, the elimination of command-and-control centers is key to preventing their coordination.
In the future, senior military leaders must promote cost-effective projects to Congress which counter the threat posed by Russian drones, either electronically or kinetically. They also should consider ensuring platoons procure or retain their own ISR assets, such as quadcopter drones. Political leaders also must invest in civilian and military cyber infrastructures to ensure greater protection from future attacks and to develop offensive capabilities.
The threat Russia poses remains comprehensive, acute, and inadequately challenged. Overconfident commentators often assert that the U.S. military would easily outmatch any Russian force in a symmetric great power conflict. The assertion, while true, fails to recognize the nature of the Russian threat. Strategic thinkers in Russia have long acknowledged the superiority of Western forces and Russia’s inability to face them head on. As a result, Russia has embraced a deadly strategy of asymmetry, which avoids a direct conflict in which the United States would easily triumph, in favor of brief, chaotic conflicts which thwart the strengths of Western forces. This strategy means Russia may not be able to conquer the West, but aims to ensure that the West cannot conquer Russia or its military gains. Without adjusting the U.S. strategy to counter this asymmetric threat, Russia remains a viable military threat. Without a resolute response, the United States risks being unable to militarily coerce Russia if necessary. The United States must holistically evaluate and recognize the threat and adjust its policies to ensure it is ready for any potential conflict to come.
Endnotes
[1] While American cyber capabilities have improved dramatically, as evidenced in the recent indictment of six Russian GRU agents, Russia certainly possessed the cyber advantage for the majority of the past decade, if not the entire decade.
[2] Some commentators rightfully doubt Russian claims surrounding the capabilities of newly tested missiles, but an accurate assessment of their potential cannot be made here in an unclassified paper. Nonetheless, the strength of the Russian threat is not a result of missiles alone, but the combination of multiple elements into a joint strategy.
[3] Boston, Scott and Dara Massicot. “The Russian Way of Warfare.” RAND Corporation, 10.
[4]“Пуск крылатой ракеты «Оникс» расчетом БРК «Бастион» военной базы «Арктический трилистник».” Russian Ministry of Defense, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OQoI714ElFM&feature=emb_title.
[5] Boston, Scott and Dara Massicot. 2.
[6] Boston, Scott and Dara Massicot. 2.
[7] Boston, Scott and Dara Massicot. 11.
[8] Fry, Samantha and Rebo, Samuel. “Summary: Justice Department Charges Six Russian GRU Officers.” Lawfare, 20 October 2020; Jensen, Benjamin; Brandon, Valeriano; Maness, Ryan. “Fancy bears and digital trolls: Cyber strategy with a Russian twist.” 42, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 2019, 226.
[9] McGuinness, Damien. “How a cyber attack transformed Estonia.” BBC News, 27 April 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/39655415; Jensen, Benjamin; Brandon, Valeriano; Maness, Ryan. 227.
[10] Boston, Scott and Dara Massicot. 5.
[11] Boston, Scott and Dara Massicot. 2.
[12 Kamensky, Dmitriy and Sullivan, Julia. “How cyber-attacks in Ukraine show the vulnerability of the U.S. power grid.” 30, 3, The Electricity Journal, April 2017.
[13] “The Russian Navy: A Historic Transition.” Office of Naval Intelligence, 2015, 15.
[14]“Сергей Шойгу рассказал, как спасали российскую армию.” MKRU, 22 August 2020, https://www.mk.ru/politics/2019/09/22/sergey-shoygu-rasskazal-kak-spasali-rossiyskuyu-armiyu.html
[15] Synovitz, Ron.
[16] Synovitz, Ron.
[17]“На Камчатке расчеты береговых ракетных комплексов «Бал» и «Бастион» выполнили электронные пуски по отряду кораблей условного противника” Russian Ministry of Defense. https://structure.mil.ru/structure/okruga/east/news/more.htm?id=12317210@egNews; “Разведчики ВВО готовятся к участию в масштабных тактических учениях в Бурятии” Russian Ministry of Defense. https://structure.mil.ru/structure/okruga/east/news/more.htm?id=12313604@egNews.
