“The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue.”
—Mao Zedong, 1930
Long before the era of Mao Zedong, Sun Tzu discussed how “the difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain” in The Art of War.1 With clear parallels to the critical vulnerabilities and centers of gravity of Marine Corps maneuver doctrine, it seems apparent that Sun Tzu was something of an ancient “manueverist” himself. Was this manueverist mindset solely Sun Tzu’s, though? Or was Sun Tzu simply writing about the Chinese way of war? And, if so, how do these methods differ from our own?
Over thousands of years of Chinese history, from the legendary Xia Dynasty to the present, Chinese warfare has developed along vastly different lines from what was seen in classical, medieval, and modern Europe. This is not to say the U.S. and Chinese warfighting methods are wholly distinct; obviously, the two share characteristics. Ultimately, however, while the warfighting history of the West resulted largely in head-to-head, attrition-style warfighting (historically speaking), Chinese experiences and studies resulted in a form of maneuver warfare that persists to the modern day. Given China’s rise to near-peer status on the international scene, its competitors—most notably, the United States and its Navy-Marine Corps team—must work to understand the underlying culture and history that permeate the warfighting philosophies of the PLA’s leadership even today.
Chinese Dynastic Militaries
While wars occurred even in ancient Chinese kingdoms, China’s Spring and Autumn periods saw the warfighting innovations that led to an early equivalent of maneuver warfare. Ancient Chinese generals encouraged innovation as they competed for well-paid command positions; perhaps the most notable of these was Sun Tzu, who seems to have developed a maneuver warfare concept in The Art of War. The early beginnings of Chinese maneuver warfare can be seen in his writings.
Following the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, Chinese warfare from the Qin to the Yuan would be dominated by conflicts with outlying states and various northern nomadic tribes. A deemphasis on military innovation and maneuver would seemingly occur toward the end of each successive dynasty, perhaps signaling failing leadership or governance. Eventually, China would succumb to nomads during the Mongol invasions in the 1200s, when Mongol forces were able to decisively outmaneuver the remaining forces loyal to the declining Song Dynasty.2 Genghis Khan, leader of the Mongols, developed “a military system that focused on rapid, decisive maneuver, utilizing the skill and endurance of the Mongol horsemen” against which conventional forces could not effectively defend. The result was a Mongol Empire spanning from the Korean Peninsula to eastern Europe. However, this empire would eventually decline and be replaced by the Ming Dynasty, ruled by the native Han Chinese.
During the rule of the Ming, a famous instance of Chinese maneuver warfare development occurred under Ming general Li Chengliang. Despite not actually commanding any forces until nearly his 40s, Li quickly proved his wit and tactical prowess when countering raids by the western Mongols under Altan Khan in the mid-to-late 1500s, around Liaodong (present-day Liaoning province). Li was then promoted to the rank of vice commander over Ming forces stationed around the city of Liaoyang. He would go on to replace the commander of Liaodong after his death in battle, eventually defeating Altan Khan’s expeditionary forces and forcing a truce by exploiting the western Mongol’s inferior and outdated firepower.
This would not be the last of the Mongol raids against Liaodong, however; despite the truce, the Tumet Mongols—a subgroup of the western Mongol tribes—continued the raids. In 1571, a force under Chengliang carried out a pincer attack against a large band of Mongol cavalry. In this attack, Chengliang combined the use of fire carts, guns, and other then-innovative technologies to disorient Mongol troops, while at the same time surrounding and cutting off the Mongol forces. Several hundred Mongols were killed and their horses captured. Li’s subsequent battles with the Tumet Mongols were comparable; at every opportunity, he exploited the fog of war and uncertainty using aggressive speed, surprise, and superior technology.
Turning the tides somewhat, Chengliang led forced marches in less-than-ideal conditions to carry out several raids on Mongol camps, pushing Ming border forces beyond their previously defensive stance and into a strategic offense. Chengliang would continue to outmaneuver his nomadic foes until his eighties, by which point he had earned earldom for himself and positions as generals for his sons (who he trained). His legacy would be as both a great Ming general and an expert in maneuver warfare.3
Mao’s Mobile Warfare
The Ming Dynasty eventually would succumb to state corruption and social degradation, collapsing under the pressure of renewed nomadic invasions. One such nomadic group, the Manchus, would come to rule China as the Qing Dynasty in the mid 17th century. This dynasty would last for a few hundred years, notable for both its massive geographical size and its repeated failed resistance to European imperialism. Following the disastrous Boxer rebellion and a collapsing monarchy, the Qing would fall apart and China would enter into an era of turmoil. Coming out of a drawn-out civil war and Japanese invasion, the People’s Republic of China—led by Mao Zedong’s Communist Party of China (CPC)—emerged victorious, ruling from 1949 to the present day.4
During both its period of resistance against Japanese invasion and its turbulent civil wars, one of China’s most notable tactical and strategic innovators was the insurgent, political philosopher, and eventual leader Mao Zedong. His then-unique style of warfighting was what he called “mobile warfare” (a strikingly similar name to maneuver warfare) and consisted of “quick-decision, offensive campaigns and battles on exterior lines along extensive fronts and over big areas of operations.” Such innovation was necessary given the nature of both the Sino-Japanese War and the communist insurgency.
An example of Mao’s mobile warfare occurred in 1937, during the Second Sino-Japanese War: The Japanese 5th Division was ordered to march south from Japan’s strongholds in northern China to capture Shanghai, China’s foremost economic powerhouse. While on the move, however, the 5th Division’s marching columns had poor front and flank security, which permitted the Chinese Red Army’s 115th Division to catch them in a trap. The Japanese were soundly defeated by the fast-moving 115th Division, despite the former’s superior equipment and training. The victory was then used by Mao as support for his theory of mobile warfare, and similar strategies would be used during the later Chinese civil war, with the CPC ultimately emerging victorious against nationalist forces.
The People’s Republic to the Present
Following Mao’s victory over mainland China, a period of social reconstruction began that would not truly end until after Mao’s reign. A few conflicts occurred during this period, from periodic clashes with the Republic of China or India over territorial issues, to the month-long Sino-Vietnamese War and the bloody Chinese intervention in the Korean War. With a few exceptions, this period of the PLA’s tactical and strategic development was perhaps not quite as focused on maneuver as on modernization attempts, with the PLA often adapting seemingly Soviet or Japanese warfighting methods to its own situation. China’s last war—not long after Mao’s death and the rise of Deng Xiaoping to Chinese leadership—was the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979. Despite a lack of actual combat experience, China—and by extension, the PLA—has since developed significantly.
In the years of Xi Jinping’s presidency, the PLA has had both notable internal changes and considerable successes in modernization. China aims to rebuke its “century of humiliation” at the hands of the West, and one part of doing so is developing a formidable fighting force. With modernized equipment and a restructured organization, the PLA also has updated and adapted its warfighting doctrine, with at least one publicly known update occurring in 2014. Within this update, the PLA’s operational concept became what was called “winning informatized local wars,” which, although somewhat vague, was yet another element in a growing attempt to reform and improve the PLA. This concept remains dominant within the PLA, and it emphasizes modernization to meet the highly informatized conditions (i.e., cyber and information warfare) that steer contemporary conflicts, with the goal being the growth of PLA information maneuver capabilities. Another element of this concept is the PLA’s desire for deeply integrated joint operations as well as—and perhaps most notably—a shift from “near-seas defense” to “far-seas protection”; the “offensive defense” of ancient dynasties against nomadic enemies has seemingly returned as a sort of strategic maneuver.5 A desire exists for a “world-class” Chinese military by 2050, spearheaded by Xi Jinping himself, and these changes play a major part.
Beyond organizational and doctrinal changes, China has worked to develop its own maneuver-centered “expeditionary force in readiness”: the PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC). Within the past decade, the PLANMC has shifted its course to one comparable to that of the U.S. Marine Corps, constructing its own equivalents to the U.S. Navy’s Wasp-class LHDs called Type 075s, building a PLAN-PLANMC team, conducting training in variable and uncertain environments, and carrying out large-scale amphibious exercises that demonstrate a growing ability to project power far beyond China’s shore. Strategic, operational, and tactical maneuver all seem to be serious considerations in the PLA’s naval communities.
Looking to the Future
From Sun Tzu to Xi Jinping, maneuver warfare seems to have a long and varied history in Chinese warfighting. While reading Sun Tzu’s Art of War quickly proves this, the maneuver-oriented qualities of Chinese warfare throughout much (though not all) of China’s warfighting history is noteworthy. These characteristics undoubtedly still play a role in Chinese defense philosophy, despite the changes that have come with modernization and globalization. Owing to both the growth of the PLA and China’s outward facing offensive defense, China’s neighbors and competitors have become wary, the most notable being the United States and its allies. Discussions, research, and intelligence-gathering on Chinese organization, goals, and capabilities are productive, but understanding the underlying philosophies governing the implementation of these goals and capabilities is equally vital. With a growing threat looming over Taiwan in particular, the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps team—alongside allied forces—must work to understand the PLA before any form of effective deterrence can take place.
- Sun Tzu, The Art of War (New York: Ixia Press, 2019).
- Charles O. Hucker, China to 1850: A Short History (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978).
- Kenneth Swope, “A Few Good Men: The Li Family and China’s Northern Frontier in the Late Ming,” in Warfare in China since 1600 (United Kingdom: Ashgate, 2005), 7–16.
- David A. Graff, Robin Higham, Edward L. Dreyer, David C. Wright, et al., A Military History of China (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2012).
- M. Taylor Fravel, Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy since 1949 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020).
