As the spouse of a member onboard the USS Port Royal, I have to say that both my husband and I have the utmost respect for Capt. Carroll. He is an experienced officer and a fine man. Disregard any negative comments you hear about him, as my husband says, he’s the “kind of CO you dream of”. He is a fine Captain and good with the crew. We both wish him well and hope the investigation settles his mind and clears his name.

While the incident is regrettable and painful to everyone’s professional pride, most of the speculation so far is premature.

I hold a current Master Oceans Any Tonnage (DECK) Merchant Marine ticket and have served as XO AS, Navigator AS, Nav SSBN, and qualified in Submarines on a Pearl Harbor home ported SS. Qualified for command in submarines and qualified SWO, plus numerous voyages on MSC contract USNS vessels as Second Mate. I know that channel and I know navigation. I’m not interested in gossip.

I will say this. First sea trials after any significant time in the shipyard, with a new skipper on board, is the most dangerous time. Usually all of the teams have been shuffled and have had precious little time to practice or train together. Flag officers would be wise to require some dedicated time for sorting things out through very basic and elementary drill and practice of fundamental skills by the ship by itself (what boomer sailors call “fast cruise”). The sea trials schedule should be very slow and easy to start, since the fumble factor will be high and unpredictable and that will eat time (… ask me for anything but time).

You will spend plenty of time to pull the ship off the reef, but it’s better to invest it beforehand (uh, like be forehanded(?)) and skip the salvage fees and publicity. My opinion.

The rest will come out with the investigation. Matt Hayball

I see that someone (Matt Hayball) has picked up on (or simply noted on his own) my comment above that there is perhaps a lesson learned here about preparation in a case like this. New CO, long time since he (really long time for him) and his crew have been to sea – bad combination. Above I noted that perhaps observer rides on other CG’s would have been appropriate for the CO and his key people. As in Matt Hayball’s comments above – planning and preparation time is key. And cheap compared to what this is going to cost.

What really surprises me (well, not really. . .) is that it is a pair of Merchant Masters who are also submarine veterans that make this point. Lost in all of the anti-nuclear power (still I don’t understand that rant) and aviator vs. SWO comments and debate above is the basic point – in all likelihood we have a case of poor seamanship that most likely was contributed to by a lack of solid navigation team dynamic (no experience together) and no recent experience at sea by the key team members.

Why, my dear interested friends, doesn’t this seem to matter to the rest of you? The CO has a fine record – until this incident – but it has been four years since he went to sea in command. That is an eternity. Could it possibly be that any CO in a highly competitive environment who admits his lack of recent sea experience would be labeled as somehow “weak” or “defective” if he wanted an observer ride on another CG before taking his own ship out for the first time? Anybody who thinks that shipdriving is “like riding a bicycle” and “it comes right back to you” ignores the importance of recent experience and the whole concept of proficiency.

Rather than arguing about whose community is better than another’s community wouldn’t it be a more useful, more powerful use of this great blog tool to honestly talk about how – especially given all fo the near misses we have all witnessed/experienced ourselves (you don’t get here without stubbing your toes a few times. . .) we could make some institutional changes to help prevent this kind of tragedy from recurring? Pay the price once, it hurts. Pay the price twice, it makes you wonder. . .

Way to go MM/Subvet. Thanks for bringing us back to the basics. No idea if this was a factor in this case but you are absolutely right about proficiency. We are suffering a similar dynamic in the aviation business and have had recent mishaps to prove it. It is easy in the Navy to get sucked into all of the other (admittedly important) duties we need to do for a successful career and lose the tactical edge we enjoyed as JOs who almost exclusively applied the skill sets of our warfare specialty. Though the experience of a career gives us better judgment and broader perspective on how to apply naval force to the mission, the basics of seamanship or airmanship can only be kept honed to a sharp edge through routine and recent practice.

Captain Carroll was a great CO for the short time he was with us. The crew is really upset with the loss of him and we hope that the investigation will show that he is not at fault. There are so many variables that occured that night and will definately be investigated to the fullest. Many people should be relieved of duty over this. Unfortunately when you assume command you assume the responsibility of things like this. It’s just ashame that a brand new Ensign and an undermanned operations division has the power to wreck a Stellar CO’s career.

Please keep Captain Carroll and the crew in your thoughts as we are going through a tough time right now.

Does anyone recall the story of Colin Powell losing his service pistol during a road march early in his career? I believe he talks about it in his book “My American Journey” I don’t recall all the details, but the point of the story is that there are times when the “unforgivable” should be forgiven. There could be several reasons for doing this, but a long history of exemplary service should be high among them. I know that I am whistling in the wind, that he has already been relieved, and this is a tragedy for one of the finest men I have ever known. One thing I am sure of though, Captain John Carroll will have a legacy that will far outweigh this accident. His character and work ethic will have touched and influenced hundreds of people, people who will be far better off for having known him.

I am a former Marine who served in Iraq in 1991 and Somalia in 1993. After leaving the Corps I joined the United States Border Patrol and became a member of their National Special Response Team. Much of my life’s course was influenced by John, and I haven’t seen or talked to him since he was a teenager. But even then I could see a man of integrity and grit, and from a very early age I knew I wanted to be like him. I hope that in this darkest of times he can somehow see that the world is a far better place because of people like him.

My name is Chuck Smith, and I am Capt. Carroll’s cousin.

Subj: Hobson, proposed interim change 1…

I do not believe the best interests of the Navy, the officer commanding at the time of the incident or the ship are likely to be served by summarily relieving the skipper before the ship is off the reef or the board of inquiry convened.

I’m not saying he shouldn’t stand at the wrong end of the long green table looking at the point of his sword. I’m saying he’s entitled to a measure of due process. Else why convene the board?

Indeed, since nobody died, it might (rarely) be more productive to suspend his sword over his head by a single hair and send him back to work, if mercy seems to possibly warranted by the findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations of the Board of Inquiry? Could a belief that the Navy takes care of it’s own, after careful consideration, be a boost to the morale of the sea dogs who risk life, limb and divorce on those gray things defending life, liberty and practicing the pursuit of those who threaten them (or anyway straining to be let off the leash like the good ratters they are?).

There are certain forms that should be observed. Fire, ready, aim might not be performing all steps in the correct order.

Such a thing might take a measure of daring on the part of the 3-5 flag officers in sequence supervising any given ship, since they would risk the fire of higher and higher higher. Is that all that bad for junior Flag Officer development?

What would Arleigh Burke do? Or Halsey? Or Chester Nimitz? Or George Dewey. Or David Porter? Or his ward, uh, oh right, David Farragut. Or Preble?!

Just a modest suggestion from a modest old retiree who takes modest pride in a modestly successful career, long long ago.

My John Hancock, gentlemen… Matt Hayball.

I am a past PRL JO and have done the exact same evolution out of dry dock. A naval cruiser with a history of excellence, and I mean excellence, like CG73 is a high pressure atmosphere. It is one of the proving grounds for a SWO CO to prove he is Admiral worthy. With the Admiral present, the CO would have tread a fine line in trying to present a well exectued, nigh on perfect evolution and may have taken risks accordingly.
Without a fathometer, they probably just drifted in too close and the tide may have pulled them into danger without them knowing.
Unfortunately, SWO’s do eat their own and this is obviously no exception. In the Surface Navy, you are held to account. No exceptions. I know it is hard, I was present for the Ehime Maru incident. I had met the sub CO and he was also a great guy who was relieved of command. They say the Captains of ships are the last kings left on earth. They hold ultimate power and also ultimate responsibility.
On a side note, cruisers will never go Nuke. There is no way the Navy can get enough Nuclear engineers to man that many reactors.

Anon:
Your rumor is tough to believe unless the damage was much greater than what’s been publicly announced. After all, the fleet is struggling to maintain numbers while virtually all new construction crashes and burns… Getting rid of an asset that everyone knows will be called upon to perform well past its anticipated decom date just doesn’t compute unless the ship is in really bad shape.

FWIW, an 02Mar Navy Times article claims the damage to CG-73 is a lot worse than original thought (although some blog commenters seem to have anticipated this possibility, including damage to components well above the waterline).

Another Navy Times article published the same day reports on the intention of the state of Hawaii to ask the Navy to pay for fixing the damage to the reef.

Fun times.

A few points.

I?m saddened that the quality of training and due diligence appears to have declined precipitously. Yes, I can make the assertion, even without reading any more ?facts?. The USS Oklahoma is another recent example of failed training and discipline.

As an officer aboard destroyers and as the OOD (officer of the deck) for special sea detail, e.g.; entering and leaving port, the navigator, the senior quartermaster and I would always review the planned track in great detail including speed, direction, turns, navigation aids, hazards (fixed and mobile, e.g.: ferries). Everyone knew their assignments and responsibilities. If we were anchoring out, going alongside the pier or taking a position is a nest of ships, the ship?s 1st lieutenant was updated as to the plans.

Thus we were all entirely familiar with our transit plans.

Let me mention that the Combat Information Center team was also briefed and the crew in CIC marinated our track in parallel with the bridge navigation team. Two teams, sets of many eyes, but always working as a true combined team with one purpose: safe transit at all times. The CIC team could and would announce if we were heading towards a hazard.

Our navigator was so anal that he had a dozen #2 pencils sharpened to a dart?s point so that he could plot precise points; about the size of a period at the end of this sentence.

Today with GPS and electronic navigation systems, some of the ?old school? stuff has fallen by the way side.

And, did I tell you that we would practice gyro casualties and navigate the real old fashioned way, by magnetic compass.

Sometimes in broad daylight we would cover the windows of the bridge with paper to simulate heavy fog.

So we had trained teams, we had disciplined teams, we had cohesive teams, but it didn?t mean that we would abandon mirth or a quip, if it seemed appropriate, from seaman to captain — we were a team

A story broadcast on Friday (13MAR) on local Honolulu TV (KGMB-9) discusses possibly extensive reef damage from CG-73′s grounding. Story with video (2:50) here. This originated with a couple locals who say they fish and dive in those waters, and who took UW video of the affected reef just outside of restricted waters. Neither USN nor the state is talking, so I reckon there will continue to be a market for this sort of independent reporting on the part of the always hungry media.

[For whatever it's worth, Patgb, I for one appreciate your input. The idea that a CO wouldn't know such a basic thing as the draft of his own ship seems quite improbable. Anything's possible, I suppose, but on a list of possible explanations arranged in order of decreasing probability, this scenario would be very near the bottom.]

The honolulu advertiser today has a summary of the Safety Investigation Board’s findings. It is difficult not to fault seamanship, training and leadership in view of the findings and the number of Article 15′s handed out to senior members of the crew.

Re the problems of the USS Port Royal, which could happen to other ships too, my understanding of what happened and why is as follows. Please correct me should my understanding be wrong.

For some reason or cause, the ships electronic navigation system had become inoperative. Additionally, the ship lacked basic tools for celestial navigation, sextant(s) and charts. Also, watch standers had not been trained in the use of such, reliance having been placed entirely on the ships electronic systems.

Story ends with the ship running aground on a reef, the location of which was charted. One would think that this information would have allowed the ship to avoid the reef, had celestial navigation equipment, sextants and charts been available, along with people trained in the use thereof.

One can obtain extremely accurate lat and long coordinates via GPS equipment, much more accurate that that obtained from sextant shots, and the coordinates can be obtained much more quickly too, however absent the electronic data, even a relatively sloppy sextant fix might have saved the day, by enabling the ship to avoid the reef. It seems that sextants weren’t available, nor where there people who know how to use them. Curious.

Mr Schultz:

“Please correct me should my understanding be wrong”

Your understanding is wrong.

The failure was one of training, supervision, and the misassignment of qualified people. While the electronic navigation systems had significant problems, including no working navigation radar display on the bridge, one functional pelorus driven by an accurate compass,a bearing circle or alidade, two functional sound powered headphones on the JL (lookout) circuit, two 45/90 triangles or a one armed protractor, or one set of parallel rulers, a sharpened #2 pencil and a spare, and an artist’s gum eraser – combined with the harbor entrance chart – and a trained plotting party under the supervision of a Navigator with a modicum of experience and a trained “seaman’s eye” would have been more than enough. Distraction and overconfidence by the command element combined with inattention to mantaining fundamental skills by whatever means necessary while in the shipyard, lead to the condition known as failure to navigate. Overwork, undermanning, and not knowing the ship,or the crew, combined with a eagerness to please the ISIC and shipyard commander, as well as an on board training team unrelated to navigation,to lead the CO ship and bridge crew to waltz down the primrose path and into a tender trap. Too many things got informally delegated below the level of knowing what to do.

Celestial navigation, while doubtless absent, had nothing to do with the actual grounding error chain, except as a footnote.

Situational awareness by an alert, able, proactive OOD would have saved the day.

One was on the way to the bridge (likely at a flat run with a nonfunctional handheld transceiver in his hand) from a small boat, but too late.

There but for the grace of God go we all.