Much has been written of late about “Creating Cyber Warriors” within the Navy’s Officer Corps.  In fact, three prominent and well-respected members of the Navy’s Information Dominance Corps published a very well articulated article by that very title in the October 2012 edition of Proceedings.  It is evident that the days of feeling compelled to advocate for such expertise within our wardroom are behind us.  We have gotten passed the WHY and are in the throes of debating the WHAT and HOW.  In essence, we know WHY we need cyber expertise and we know WHAT cyber expertise we need.  What we don’t seem to have agreement on is WHO should deliver such expertise and HOW do we get there.

As a proud member of both the Cryptologic Community and the Information Dominance Corps, I feel confident stating the responsibility for cultivating such expertise lies squarely on our own shoulders.  The Information Dominance Corps, and more specifically the Cryptologic and Information Professional Communities, have a shared responsibility to “Deliver Geeks to the Fleet.”  That’s right, I said “Geeks” and not “Cyber Warriors.”  We don’t need, and despite the language many are using, the Navy doesn’t truly want “Cyber Warriors.”  We need and want “Cyber Geeks.”  Rather than lobby for Unrestricted Line status, which seems to be the center of gravity for some, we should focus entirely on delivering operational expertise regardless of our officer community designation.

For far too long, many people in the Restricted Line Communities have looked at the Unrestricted Line Communities as the cool kids in school.  Some consider them the “in-crowd” and want to sit at their lunch table.  Some think wearing another community’s warfare device validates us as naval officers and is the path to acceptance, opportunity, and truly fitting in.  We feel an obligation to speak their language, understand the inner workings of their culture, and act more and more like them.  Some have grown so weary of being different or considered weird that many would say we’ve lost our identity.  Though establishment of the Information Dominance Corps has revitalized our identity, created a unity of effort amongst us in the information mission areas, and further established information as a legitimate warfare area, many continue to advocate that we are lesser because of our Restricted Line status.  We seem to think we want and need to be Unrestricted Line Officers ourselves.  Why?  Sure, we would like to have direct accessions so that we can deliberately grow and select the specialized expertise necessary to deliver cyber effects to the Fleet.  Yes, we would like a seat at the power table monopolized by Unrestricted Line Officers.  And yes, we would appreciate the opportunity to have more of our own enjoy the levels of influence VADM Mike Rogers currently does as Commander, Fleet Cyber Command and Commander, U.S. TENTH Fleet.

But there is another path; a path that celebrates, strengthens, and capitalizes on our uniqueness.

In the private sector, companies are continually racing to the middle so they can appeal to the masses.  It’s a race to the bottom that comes from a focus on cutting costs as a means of gaining market share.  There are, however, some obvious exceptions, my favorite of which is Apple.  Steve Jobs was not overly interested in addressing customers’ perceived desires.  Instead, he anticipated the needs of the marketplace, showed the world what was possible before anyone else even dreamt it, and grew a demand signal that did not previously exist.  He was not interested in appealing to the masses and he surely wasn’t focused on the acceptance of others in his industry.  He was focused on creating unique value (i.e. meaningful entrepreneurship over hollow innovation), putting “a dent in the universe,” and delivering a product about which he was personally proud.  We know how this approach evolved.  The market moved toward Apple; the music, movie, phone, and computing industries were forever changed; and the technological bar was raised with each product delivered under his leadership.  Rather than lobby for a seat at the table where other leaders were sitting, he sat alone and watched others pick up their trays to sit with him.  Even those who chose not to sit with him were looking over at his table with envy, doing their best to incrementally build on the revolutionary advances only he was able to realize.

Rather than seek legitimacy by advocating to be part of Team Unrestricted Line, we ought to focus on delivering so much value that we are considered a vital part of each and every team because of our uniqueness.  I am reminded of a book by Seth Godin titled “We Are All Weird.”  In it he refers to “masses” as the undifferentiated, “normal” as the defining characteristics of the masses, and “weird” as those who have chosen not to blindly conform to the way things have always been done.  For the sake of argument, let’s consider the Unrestricted Line Officers as the masses, those considering themselves “warfighters” as the normal, and the Information Dominance Corps as the weird.  I say the last with a sense of hope.  I hope that we care enough to maintain our weirdness and that we don’t give in to the peer pressure that could drive us to lobby for a seat at what others perceive to be “The Cool Table.”  By choosing to be weird and committing more than ever to embrace our geekiness, the table perceived to be cool will be the one at which the four Information Dominance Communities currently sit.  It won’t happen by accident, but it will happen, provided we want it to happen.  Not because we want to be perceived as “cool,” but because we are so good at what we do, and we deliver so much unique value to the Navy and Nation, that no warfighting team is considered complete without its own personal “Cyber Geek.”

I sincerely respect the opinions voiced in the article to which I referred earlier in this post.  However, I think we are better than we give ourselves credit for.  Let’s not conform, let’s create.  Let’s not generalize, let’s specialize.  Let’s not be normal, let’s be weird.  Let’s choose to be Geeks.

CDR Sean Heritage is an Information Warfare Officer who is currently transitioning from Command of NIOC Pensacola to Staff Officer at U.S. Cyber Command.  He regularly posts to his leadership-focused blog, Connecting the Dots.

Posted by Fouled Anchor in Homeland Security, Innovation, Navy, Proceedings, Soft Power, Tactics, Uncategorized | read comments (11)
Tags: Cyber, Cyber Defense, Information Dominance, Information Warfare

Claude Berube has accomplished a masterful work with the release today of his most recent novel, THE ADEN EFFECT.  Berube’s story is fast-paced, action packed, and full of wonderfully developed characters supporting a believable but creative narrative that keeps the pages turning.

The story follows Connor Stark, a former naval officer who lives anonymously in the rugged Hebrides of Scotland after having been dishonorably discharged until he is called back to service by the American Ambassador to Yemen, C.J. Sumner, to assist with countering the threat of pirates as she is embroiled in negotiations intended to gain access to oil fields off the coast of Socotra.  Stark soon discovers a greater threat to the region and the country after uncovering ties with a prominent shipping company and Yemen’s ruling family which leads to a deeper chance discovery that carries the action even further.

From drug trafficking, to Somali pirates to high stakes politics, Berube has knocked this one out of the park.  Steven Pressfield was spot on when he commented that the author “has given us the toughest, brainiest, and most interesting new hero since Tom Clancy’s Jack Ryan.  The Aden Effect is the think man’s military thriller.”

Sales of The Aden Effect start today.  I highly recommend you pick up a copy to give yourself an entertainment alternative from all of the electoral theater that’s forthcoming.  Unlike this year’s politics, this story will not disappoint.

Posted by Alexander Martin in Books, Maritime Security, Naval Institute, Navy, Piracy | read comments (0)
Tags: Alexander Martin

I had the great pleasure of attending the first day of the Navy Development Warfare Command’s Pacific Rim Innovation Symposium at SPAWAR in San Diego yesterday.  It was an invigorating afternoon of debate, discussion and lectures.  To set the tone, we heard from ADM Haney, PAC FLEET COMMANDER, who challenged us to think, question, debate, read, write and communicate.  We also had the great pleasure of hearing from RADM Terry Kraft, the Commander of NWDC, Navrina Singh, who gave a fascinating talk on innovation at Qualcomm, and Dr. Larry Schuette, who offered some incredible insight to his work supporting innovation and science as the Director of Innovation at the Office of Naval Research.

During our breakout sessions I listened as SPAWAR scientists and the Commanding Officer of the Cape St. George discussed surface warfare innovations and white fleet concerns…needless to say I was very much out of my league, but happy to he apart of the debate even as an active listener.

Today I’ll give a talk on Innovation, as it relates to what I’m calling the small unit eco-system…I’ll post my remarks tonight.

If you have time, tune in for today’s session:  https://www.nwdc.navy.mil/ncoi/pris

It’s events like this that give me great pride in our naval service and a hearty appreciation for the fact that they are leveraging their greatest strength – their people – to change the navy for the better!

On the day after the 237th birthday of the U.S. Navy, and two days after the 139th birthday of the U.S. Naval Institute, this is a wonderful thing indeed!

Posted by Alexander Martin in Innovation, Marine Corps, Maritime Security, Naval Institute, Navy | read comments (0)
Tags: Alexander Martin

Last Friday night I was walking down the 4^th corridor to my office in N81.  It had been a long week.  I was a little tired and looking forward to a cold beer when I got home… Then I heard a booming voice call out:  “SHIPMATE… ARE YOU COMING TO MY CEREMONY NEXT FRIDAY???”

I turned around to see who it was and recognized a very familiar figure. I immediately regained the spring in my step as I returned to the end of the passageway to greet him.  Kind of reminded me of a scene right out of Cold Case as LT j.g. Foggo pumped the hand of Quartermaster Second Class Ricky West and responded:  “YOU BET I AM SHIPMATE!” 

For a moment, I was back onboard my first boat, USS SEA DEVIL (SSN-664), standing watch as Officer of the Deck with my favorite Quartermaster, Rick West.  We sailed that boat all over the Mediterranean and under the Polar Ice Cap on her subsequent Northern Run, climaxing in a dramatic surfacing evolution at the geographic North Pole!  Now how cool is that? QM2 Rick West lived on the Conn of that ship.  He was the best forceful backup in the Fleet to young LT j.g.s like me.  West and the Navigator, LCDR John M. Bird were a great team and there was no obstacle they couldn’t overcome!

Our Commanding Officer, CDR Rich Mies, liked to go fast… after all, we used to call them “fast” attacks for a reason.  He constantly challenged the Navigation Team on the Maneuvering Watch to keep them on their toes.  Driving in and out of the Cooper River in Charleston, South Carolina, was a challenging Maneuvering Watch with a series of unforgiving hairpin turns—right full rudder… left full rudder—but the saving grace was lots of visual ranges ahead or astern.  CDR Mies taught his Junior Officers to Conn the ship independently from the bridge.  He wanted us to be more capable mariners so oftentimes, in good weather (no fog or reduced visibility) he would lower both periscopes and we would drive by the range.  Just another exciting day on the Captain’s Bridge and my favorite place to be as Surfaced OOD.

Below decks, it was a different story for the Navigation Team.  Without visual bearings, the team had to rely on dead reckoning off of the Ships Inertial Navigation System and electronic fixes from Omega and Loran-Charlie (neither very accurate in restricted waters).  We had no Global Positioning System, electronic charts or non-penetrating periscopes (cameras) to assist the Navigation Party.  This put considerable stress on the Navigator and his team.  LCDR John Bird and QM2 Rick West were unflappable.  On the bridge, we knew they had to be pulling their hair out in the control room but you would never know it from their voices.  West on the 27MC:  “Bridge, Quartermaster of the Watch, I have a good electronic fix, hold you on track, 200 yards to the turn, recommend SLOWING to all ahead two-thirds.”

As I looked up from my perch in the cockpit of the bridge for any direction, the typical response from the Captain was, “Steady as she goes Officer of the Deck!”  As a young JO, I wondered why he made life so difficult for the Navigation Team but as I matured into the job and my role in the wardroom, I came to realize that the Captain was training all of us for that unexpected eventuality when Murphy’s Law overtakes even the best of ships and bad things happen.  USS SEA DEVIL was no different than any other boat—Murphy appeared often—it was a dangerous business, but we were well trained and the Navigation Team overcame adversity with relative ease.

When we transitioned to our Northern Deployment, QM2 Rick West was a key member of the team.  Operating USS SEA DEVIL under ice with her state of the art navigation system, i.e. SINS, Loran, Omega, Mk19 and Mk27 gyros was challenging to say the least.  We were at least two generations ahead of USS NAUTILUS in our navigation suite, but let’s face it, the Mk27 gyro was originally used on Army battle tanks and had a tendency to tumble as did the Mk19.  Loran and Omega were useless north of 66 degrees of latitude which put SINS in the forefront of our way to and from the North Pole.  When we transitioned from the Marginal Ice Zone to solid Pack Ice overhead, the Quartermaster of the Watch was even more critical to safety of ship.  During this time period, Rick West was almost always “on watch” even when he wasn’t—if you know what I mean—because he cared so much about the ship and the welfare of the crew. Forceful backup was critical and you wanted Rick West on the Navigation Plot.  With the aid of our onboard Electronics Techs, West monitored and nursed the navigation suite through the entire deployment.  Driving SEA DEVIL around ice keels and finding polynyas (open areas in the ice) to come up for air and a periodic fix was an incredible proving ground for the submerged OOD.  Frankly, I loved it.  Finding and surfacing the boat at the geographic North Pole for a day of “Polar Liberty” was something that the crew will never forget.  West helped get us there… and back.

I could write many more paragraphs about sea stories from the mighty SEA DEVIL, but suffice it to say that it was a great boat and made even better with Sailors like Rick West.  An exceptional watchstander, it was not sufficient for him to sit back and just be the QMOW.  He sought out additional collateral duties and qualified in more senior watchstations.  Proud of his uniform and his appearance, he set the example for other sailors in the crew’s mess.   He was a man of principle then, as he is as MCPON now.  He was the epitome of the mantra: Ship, Shipmate, Self… and in that order!  Always the gentleman, his conduct at work or on the beach was beyond reproach.  His word was his bond and his work was precise.  When Rick West made a report, you didn’t have to worry about its authenticity or accuracy.   During times of high stress, even with no sleep and no endpoint in sight, his positive attitude never wavered.  I was therefore not at all surprised when he was selected to be the 12th Master Chief Petty Officer of the United States Navy.

Master Chief West schooled many more officers than me in the art of navigation and the role of the United States Navy Sailor.  On USS SEA DEVIL alone this list included Admiral Rich Mies, USN (ret), Royal Navy Exchange Officer Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope (current First Sea Lord of the United Kingdom), VADM John M. Bird, USN (ret), VADM Bill French, USN as well as countless others who rose to leadership positions Master Chief Petty Officers or Chiefs of the Boat.  The mark that he left on us and our boat was indelible.

Today, MCPON Rick West will retire and shift the mantle of enlisted leadership to Master Chief Petty Officer (AW/NAC)  Mike Stevens.  To the MCPON, I say simply thank you for your service and the sacrifice of your family.  It is now time to take that last fix, lay down a DR and set a course for new horizons.  No matter where the prevailing winds take you, we know you will find success and that you can take great pride in the impact you have made upon generations of Sailors in the United States Navy.  So one more time for MCPON West… HOOYAH Navy!

 RDML Foggo is the Director, OPNAV N81 (Assessments)

Posted by admin in Navy | read comments (9)

“…We will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.”-

Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21^st Century Defense

The strategic guidance for the Department of Defense released in January 2012 clearly emphasizes pivoting to focus on the Asia-Pacific realm.  While it notes that the Middle East is still an area of concern, the guidance largely adheres to the Obama administration efforts to shift diplomatic, economic and military strategic focus to the Far East, ending a decade of predominant focus on the Middle East.

But can the United States truly afford to refocus to the Asia-Pacific realm amidst the chaos of the Middle East?  Recent events highlight a deeply unsettling trend.  Iran is adamant that it will pursue nuclear technology; Israel is just as adamant that it will not permit this to happen.  Gulf States are warily following the Iranian progress and ramping up their own weapons acquisitions in the event that Iran acquires nuclear weapons technology.

The United States is leading a coalition of more than thirty nations in an International Mine Countermeasures exercise in the Persian Gulf right now, seeking to sharpen skills as fears of Iranian attempts to mine the Strait of Hormuz reach new highs.  Two carriers have been sent to the region to provide “95,000 tons of diplomacy” and act as a reminder of the potent strike potential the US can bring to bear.

Following the riots that led to the recent death of the US Ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens, the Commander in Chief sent Marine anti-terrorist units and two Arleigh Burke class destroyers to patrol off the coast of Libya.   Rioting spread like wildfire throughout North Africa and the Middle East- stretching to countries as widespread as Tunisia, Sudan and even staunch ally Saudi Arabia.  Intense diplomatic and military efforts took place to quell violence and halt further action against America.

Ironically, the most violent riots were in countries that received the strongest US support during the last year’s Arab Spring revolts.  Countries that were lifted from the yoke of dictatorship- under brutal regimes such as that of Muammar Qaddafi- and given billions of dollars in economic, military and diplomatic assistance have now violently turned on the US.  Far from the peaceful, democratic nations we had hoped would emerge, the region is at the brink of turmoil and chaos.  US interests may be in a worse state now than under the authoritarian regimes we helped to overthrow.

Even Afghanistan is posing serious challenges just as the ISAF prepares to draw down forces.  Taliban focus on disrupting the handover process has been all too successful, generating mistrust as infiltrated Afghan national forces are accused of killing dozens of their international trainers.  It remains questionable whether or not the Afghans will be able to emerge with a stable government or slip into chaos following America’s withdrawal.

Regardless of how one views democracy building, we must accept the governments that have formed in the region.   We must further understand what this means for US interests aboard- and how it changes our strategic outlook.  One of the most basic questions to ask when determining a national security strategy is whether or not the resources exist- or will exist- to enact such a plan.  This poses a challenge to a military facing an era of fiscal austerity, stretched by multiple demands on limited resources.

While the Obama administration announced that US strategy would entail a rebalance to Asia, the reality is far more complicated.  Though the Asia pivot has garnered immense attention, it is not an entirely new strategy.  America never left Asia.  Yet it serves to realign focus and resources towards the region on a broad front- economically, diplomatically and militarily.  Antiquated focus on the Middle East- including unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan would be shifted to a more modern outlook.

This pivot reflects the belief that Asia is the future- and rightly so.  Asia is home to five of our treaty allies and six of the ten most powerful economies in the world.    As globalization dominates international trends, our economic success is tied inexorably to that of our Asian trading partners.  Asia has emerged as the top economic region in the world, with increasing trade and global impact.  The future is in Asia and our national strategy must reflect that.

Yet we may not be able to rebalance just yet.  While Asia is clearly the region of the future, recent events have demonstrated that the US cannot leave the Middle East in its current state of turmoil without serious implications for national security.   America is quietly amassing naval forces in the 5^th Fleet Area of Responsibility (AOR).  The Pentagon announced the rapid redeployment this fall of the John C. Stennis Strike Group after it returned in March from a Middle East deployment.  Instead of the planned Western Pacific deployment, the ship will proceed four months early to Central Command.

Despite strategic focus on Asia, the Middle East is simply too tumultuous to leave.  With our current fiscal constraints and limited resources, this means that forces heading to Asia will potentially keep on transiting west to arrive on station in the Middle East.

Despite our best efforts to aid democratic movements and stabilize the region, the Middle East is rapidly approaching a crisis point.  With the Department of Defense facing tremendous budget cuts, the amount of resources available are limited.  American forces simply are not resourced to handle multiple significant crises simultaneously.   Assets from Asia must be pulled to help stabilize the Middle East in the short term.  This should serve as a poignant reminder that even though the Asia pivot is clearly in our best long term interest, ultimately fiscal limitations and rising regional tensions may prevent truly rebalancing until the Middle East has stabilized.

LCDR Rachael Gosnell is an active duty surface warfare officer.  She recently completed a Masters of Arts degree in international security studies from Georgetown University as part of the Navy’s Political-Military Masters Program.

Posted by admin in China, Foreign Policy, Maritime Security, Navy | read comments (4)

Mindless habitual behavior is the enemy of innovation… Rosabeth Moss Kanter

Innovation is back!  There is an undeniable renewal of interest and forward momentum in innovative thought in the United States Navy today.  Why is this?  What is driving the renewed attention to innovation?

Several factors influence innovation in both a positive and a negative way.  Stephen Rosen discusses many of these factors in his book, “Winning the Next War:  Innovation in the Modern Military.”  Rosen talks about “technology push,” which occurs when new and disruptive technologies are discovered and sometimes reluctantly incorporated into our warfighting platforms.  Though not immediately embraced, over time these technologies can – and often do – revolutionize how we fight.  The triumph of steam over sail in the United States Navy is a good example, but one that was hard fought to incorporate or inculcate into the minds of naval officers of that era.  Likewise, Rosen’s “demand pull” (or mission pull) stimulates innovation when there is a critical warfighting need and no platform or technology currently available to meet that need.  Brave men fought the first and second Battle of the Atlantic in diesel submarines that were cold, cramped, noisy and vulnerable.  The need to remain submerged and undetected for long periods of time created a mission pull for nuclear propulsion which contributed to our modern day fleet of highly capable nuclear powered submarines.

While we would have eventually figured out how to put an atomic pile inside a submarine, I think it is fair to say it would not have happened as fast without the contribution of a “maverick” like Admiral Hyman G. Rickover.  He drove this process relentlessly and against much opposition, eventually putting to sea the modern SSN.  Rickover was unconventional in his methods but he got results.  Nowadays, mavericks must learn to work within an even more complex rule set and hierarchy which can stifle innovation.  Today’s acquisition process is rather burdensome and although we make the best weapon systems in the world, we must be more responsive in pacing or better yet, exceeding adversary threat capabilities.  This of course puts incredible pressure on traditional timelines in research, development and acquisition.  Our ongoing efforts to introduce agility and speed into this process must continue if we are to remain a dominant power.

Beyond traditional red-tape, another factor driving – or inhibiting – innovation is money.  With competing priorities in the President’s budget, some savings have been realized through reductions in defense spending.  Budget reductions and periods of fiscal austerity invariably serve to stimulate critical thought and innovative ways of warfighting.   Admiral Jim Stavridis, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), often quotes a well-known figure in the Royal Navy, Admiral Sir Jackie Fisher who said at the beginning of the twentieth century, “Now that the money has run out we must start to think!”  SACEUR’s reference is poignant, as Fisher is primarily celebrated as an innovator, strategist and developer of the Royal Navy of the First World War era.  When appointed First Sea Lord in 1904, he recapitalized older vessels still in active service but no longer useful and set about constructing modern replacements.  Fisher is rightly credited with creating a battle fleet well prepared to fight Germany at sea during World War I.

By any account, our Navy budget is not insignificant, but we must continue to adapt to potential changes.  Following Fisher’s suggestion to “think” may provide the catalyst to innovating our way past many of the challenges we face today.  This may seem too obvious, for how else does one find an answer, except to think.  But how frequently do any of us commit to the type of thinking required to fully understand issues and then devise possible solutions?  Rear Admiral Terry Kraft, Commander of the Naval Warfare Development Center (NWDC) recently published The Innovators Guide  which dedicates a full four pages to creative thought and generation of ideas.  Thinking may not be as simple as it sounds, but we must commit to it in order to find the right solutions.

Recognizing these constraints, the CNO has challenged us to facilitate innovation across the Navy, and several organizations have taken great strides towards this end. The NWDC is a key stakeholder, and its mission is to “link tomorrow’s ideas to today’s warfighter through the rapid generation and development of innovative solutions to operational challenges.”  This is done by operating at the speed of the Fleet and maintaining a focus on non-material solutions for the future.  In this way, the NWDC serves as a “think tank” for how we fight tomorrow’s battles.

So why NWDC?  I would offer that there are many lessons we must learn from history, and one of my favorites is examined by Barry Posen in The Sources of Military Doctrine, in his study of the German doctrine.  He notes that Germany “won the battle of France and lost the Battle of Britain.  She won the battle for which she had prepared and lost the one for which she had not.  Her military doctrine had long envisioned major land campaigns on the European continent.  Operations beyond its shores had been given little thought.” The doctrine worked well, until the context of the battle changed to exceed its design.  In operating at the “speed of the Fleet”, the NWDC is positioned to look forward and adapt to the changing battlefield and its dynamic conditions.

I recently read RADM Kraft’s NWDC post entitled “Naval Innovation Reboot”,  which provides thought-provoking messages about the rapid pace of communications facilitated by social networks where ideas are transformed into reality at a very high rate.  He argues that the Navy has yet to capitalize on the benefits of these advancements, and suggests that we better empower our Sailors – already more than comfortable with this technology – to use it to our advantage.  To more directly engage these junior leaders, last summer, the NWDC hosted a “Junior Leader Innovation Symposium.” The symposium was designed to educate these leaders on the importance of innovation, empower them to contribute new ideas, facilitate connected discussion and start to harvest their ideas. In keeping with their broad-based approach, NWDC also brings together leadership from industry, military and academia to ensure an awareness and openness to innovative solutions and ideas.  In other words, Kraft knows that the water’s edge for innovation is NOT at the water’s edge.

One of the most recent efforts from NWDC examines the establishment of a Rapid Innovation Cell.  In broad terms, the cell is envisioned as a mechanism to transform disruptive ideas into solutions and as an alternative path to fielding solutions.

The Office of Naval Research (ONR) is another highly-valuable player in this endeavor.  As the Department of the Navy’s Science and Technology (S&T) provider, ONR leads the cutting edge of S&T solutions to address Navy and Marine Corps needs.    This effort is developed within and among three directorates, one of which is committed to innovation.  ONR’s Directorate of Innovation “cultivates innovative science and technology approaches that support the Department of the Navy and facilitate rapid and agile responses to our changing national security environment.”

Armed with state-of-the-art test facilities and a team of world-class scientists and engineers from a variety of fields, they are well-equipped to advance innovative solutions for the most challenging issues.  ONR supports a number of programs aimed to streamline the fielding of technology to the Fleet and Forces.  When urgent needs are identified through the Urgent Operational Needs Statement (UONS), Joint UONS (JUONS) and Joint Emergent Operational Needs (JEONs) programs, ONR experts are called upon to ensure available technologies are leveraged in solutions for the fleet.  As a complementary process ONR also manages CNO’s Speed to Fleet program, which aims to provide quick-reaction mature and new technologies to deliver working prototypes to warfighters in high-risk or high-threat areas within 12-24 months.

Also within ONR’s quick-reaction S&T portfolio, the Tech Solutions program is a transformational business process created by the Chief of Naval Research to provide Sailors and Marines with a web-based tool for bringing warfighter needs to the Naval Research Enterprise for rapid response and delivery. The program accepts recommendations and suggestions, via an on-line submission form, from Navy and Marine Corps personnel working at the ground level on ways to improve mission effectiveness through the application of technology.  It is solely focused on delivering needed technology to the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, within 12-18 months, and moving the sea services toward more effective and efficient use of personnel.  The program has a proven track record too, resulting in technology to the fleet including a Catapult Capacity Selector Valve Calculator (CSV) – a hand-held Flight Deck Ops Assistant which eliminates a laborious process of referencing paper manuals to determine catapult settings.

With NWDC and ONR working as partners, the Navy has an infrastructure which is well-postured to support innovation. Just a thought before I move on… One of our S&T scientists recently e-mailed me a link to the U.S. Coast Guard Innovation Program.  It’s a five-page document which formally establishes the Coast Guard Innovation Program.  There may be a risk of institutionalizing innovation, but we might also benefit from having a written plan which supports innovative thought. The Coast Guard has an Innovation Council not unlike the current effort undertaken by NWDC.  It also recognizes innovation in the ranks with an annual award and incentive program and sponsors an annual USCG Innovation Expo in partnership with industry.  Perhaps we should follow suit?

Innovation has been described as having several forms.  These range from technological to strategic, and I’ll give a more detailed outline of my thoughts on some of these later, but we suggest we must also contemplate the nature of innovation we aim to achieve.

In a recent Proceedings article entitled Payloads over Platforms, the CNO calls for the “decoupling of payload development from platform development (to) take advantage of a set of emerging trends in precision weapons, stealth, ship and aircraft construction, economics, and warfare.”  By tracing a timeline of successful payload shifts across the service of the USS Enterprise (CVN-65), his article illustrates some innovative success the Navy has enjoyed, but these successes were a result of coincidence, and perhaps a dose of good luck, rather than initial design.  And, even if the blueprints were drawn up to facilitate payload changes, this approach to design is not pervasive enough to support the CNO’s goals.  NWDC and ONR have both adopted or structured approaches to facilitate significant changes like this.   If we can successfully tap the ideas of our junior leaders on the deck plates, I believe we are well-suited to develop solutions to propel us in the direction the CNO is pointing.

We face difficult challenges, and innovation provides us one path to solving many of them.  I encourage all of our Sailors to discuss ideas and contribute thoughts to this blog or any others I have referenced.  We need solutions, and we must be open in our search for them.  Is the Navy, as an institution best optimized to innovate?  How can we do better?  I yield to the “wisdom of the crowd” on this matter, and I am confident that many of you have outstanding ideas that we haven’t yet heard.  Get ‘em out there!

 RDML Foggo is the Director, OPNAV N81 (Assessments)

Posted by admin in Aviation, History, Maritime Security, Navy, Proceedings | read comments (16)

Over the past few weeks, senior military leaders and intelligence officials have publicly acknowledged the growing threat from foreign military forces to the US homeland. This may seem unrealistic given the overwhelming military advantage the United States has over any other nation’s military, but there are plausible scenarios where the US homeland could be vulnerable to attack, particularly during periods of US military operations overseas.

Before examining emerging threats that may place the security of the homeland at risk, one must first consider the complex problem of escalation. According to RAND, escalation can occur in several forms: vertical, horizontal and political. Escalation can also be carried out through conventional or asymmetric means. Certainly, attacks can be executed in the future to create a more complex hybrid escalation event. The US Military has already encountered the challenges posed by escalation during Operation Desert Storm.

As Iraqi President Saddam Hussein faced the reality of an overwhelming coalition force, he decided to use his over-matched military assets to attack civilian population centers in Israel. He also ignited oil fields in Southern Iraq in order to inflict environmental damage and to restrict coalition military movement.  These are examples of horizontal and political escalation, respectively.

In discussing the new DOD Strategic Guidance, Dr. Janine Davidson recently noted that adversaries will likely go asymmetric and irregular to counter a US military advantage.  This implies the US homeland will likely be in play should military force be used in the future. US military leaders and policy makers have not had to contend with this reality since World War II.

A host of legal/policy concerns, such as the Posse Comitatus Act and the imposition of wide-spread martial law, would challenge conventional thinking given these scenarios.  An effective response would demand an unprecedented level of coordination and integration of Title 10 and Title 32 military forces with federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel.  Some scenarios would likely have local law enforcement personnel performing ad hoc para-military operations. A significant military response within the homeland would certainly stress civil-military relations and threaten the civil liberties of US citizens, particularly those of certain ethnic groups associated with the adversary.  Could this lead to increased radicalization or even threaten internal stability?

Current military capabilities that could be used to attack the US homeland include:

• Conventional attacks enabled by emerging technology
• Special Forces conducting direct action –Mumbai style attacks
• Weapons of Mass Destruction
• Improvised Explosive Devices
• Cyber Attacks
• Psychological Operations
• Economic Attacks

While these capabilities alone or in aggregate would certainly not defeat the US military, they can inflict damage to the homeland that would cause public support for military operations to either wane or force the military to take more aggressive action than would normally be prudent.  Homeland attacks would also impose a significant cost imposition on the US, which would divert scarce resources away from other military operations.

Considering the prolonged military operations over the last decade, would US popular support for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have lasted as long as they have if US citizens were being killed in the homeland?  In the future, would direct support for a critical ally, say Israel or Taiwan, withstand foreign military operations on the homeland or would US citizens demand military operations cease, as witnessed in Vietnam or Iraq?

Having to fight a two Combatant Command (COCOM) war has not been experienced by the modern US military since the National Security Act of 1947 established our current organizational structure.  This scenario would provide an enormous challenge to coordinate and integrate operations between multiple COCOMs.  An example the US could use as a precedent was having to respond to hurricane Katrina, while fighting limited wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  However during these events, leaders were not faced with command and control challenges or limited military resources. This would certainly not be the case in military operations against a near peer competitor.

The so called American way of war ensured the security of US interests over the past sixty years by taking overwhelming military force to the enemy’s doorstep. Unfortunately, the US will not be afforded that luxury in the future.  Our nation’s military and civilian leaders must incorporate defending the homeland into their decision making calculus should military action be realistically considered in the future.  The US public must also be aware that the decision to use military force will likely affect the livelihood of each American citizen in ways Americans have not witnessed during this generation.

The plausible scenarios associated with future wars will radically challenge our current perception of complex operations and will make the wars fought over the last 10 years seem like child’s play.  The results of past operations speak for themselves and future wars will be even more complex and will demand a far greater level of strategic thinking and adaptation by both military and civilian leaders.

Robert Kozloski is a program analyst with the Department of the Navy and the author of  “Rethinking Threats to The Homeland: Considerations for the Joint Force” currently under review at Joint Forces Quarterly.

Posted by admin in Foreign Policy, Hard Power, History, Homeland Security, Marine Corps, Maritime Security, Navy | read comments (11)
Tags: Robert Kozloski

Russian Torpedo Boat circa 1897.

“There is, at all events, no perplexity exceeding that with which men of former times haven’t dealt successfully.”

- CAPT Alfred Thayer Mahan

Back in 2003 Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, Barry Watts and Bob Work (now the Under Secretary of the Navy) coined the term “A2AD,” for the growing Anti-Access, Area Denial threat posed by the proliferation of long range missiles systems, precision munitions, and satellite technology that will make operations in the littorals more challenging for 21^st century naval forces.  They were right when they wrote that ignoring the threat “appears to be a huge gamble and one that neither prudence nor history could recommend with much confidence.”  The challenge of A2AD spreads from the shores of the Arabian Gulf to the South China Sea and beyond with players like Iran, China, and North Korea continuing to develop and spread the capabilities and technologies like the C-802 anti-ship missile and FAC’s like the Chinese Houbei that has come to symbolize part of the threat.

While it is cast as a threat based on rapidly modernizing, high technology weapons the A2AD threat is actually nothing new in the annals of naval history.  Despite the description of certain technologies, like the Chinese DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, as “game changing” and “revolutionary” there are still basic principles of naval strategy and tactics that apply to these weapons.  At the turn of the last century the United States and the naval powers of the world faced a similar challenge.  Modern technology was advancing weapons systems and making it harder for naval forces to get close to the enemy’s shores.  The eminent naval strategist and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan (ATM) wrote on the subject, and offered some thoughts that may be worth considering as the world once again faces A2AD challenges.

In 1911 ATM published the lectures he originally gave at the United States Naval War College in the decade leading up to the start of the 20^th century as the book Naval Strategy: Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land.  In it he discussed the A2AD threat which developed after he gave his original lectures.  “It seems appropriate here to mention, if only incidentally, certain changes in the weapons with which war is waged,” he wrote, continuing “the progress of the submarine, the immensely increased range of the automobile torpedo, and the invention of wireless telegraphy,” were significant changes to the technology of naval warfare.  According to ATM the introduction of these new weapons would have an important impact on the development of naval tactics, however, “these consequences will not change the principles of strategy,” which apply to naval warfare.

In his essay “Considerations Governing the Disposition of Navies,” published in May of 1902, ATM also discussed torpedo boats and “the added range of coast guns, which keeps scouts at a much greater distance than formerly, and the impossibility now of detecting intentions which once might be inferred from the conditions of masts and sails.”  However, ATM’s continued discussion reminds us that the technologies which make A2AD a challenge are not exclusive of one side in the fight.  He says that “on the other hand the sphere of effectiveness has been immensely increased for the scout by the power to move at will, and latterly by the wireless telegraph.”  Today there are differences of distances, stand-off ranges, and communications and ISR, but these are the same issues faced over a century ago.

ATM made some suggestions on the tactical and operational level to approach the A2AD threats of his day.  He suggested that by taking advantage of high speed and large numbers, “it should be possible to sweep the surroundings of any port so thoroughly as to make the chance of undetected escape very small, while the transmission of the essential facts – the enemy’s force and the direction taken – is even more certain than detection.”  Today ATM might call for numerous and inexpensive unmanned systems to work the near shore and scout deep inside the enemy’s coastal WEZ.

Despite the fact many strategy and history students are taught ATM only cared about big guns and battleships, in his concept of the modern fleet which would face the early 20^th century A2AD threat ATM wrote “the vessels nearest in are individually so small that the loss of one by torpedo is militarily immaterial; moreover, the chances will by no means all be with the torpedo boat.”  After calling for small combatants which can take the fight in close in search of the torpedo boats, while assuming some individual risk, ATM suggested that a group of cruisers sail further out from the enemy’s A2AD threat range.  The cruisers are able to sprint to the support of the smaller ships if needed but also able to discover other enemy concentrations, or fall back to support the main battle fleet.  ATM pointed out that the main battle fleet has great freedom to maneuver.  He said the main force of the fleet can be hundreds of miles away, connected to the scouts, small combatants, and cruisers by wireless and “in a different position every night, [it] is as safe from torpedo attack as ingenuity can place it.”  The point is as valid today as it was at the dawn of the last century.  The ocean is a large expanse and in order for the enemy to attack, he has to be able to find you.  Even satellite surveillance and broad area ISR can only cover a portion of the maritime domain.

ATM believed there was nothing about the early 20th century A2AD threat that fundamentally changed the way naval strategy was developed, or how naval wars were led.  There would be changes to tactics, and the requisite adjustments to operational planning that those changes required.  He also made the point that a properly balanced Navy, with small combatants, cruisers, and the main battle fleet was required for success in any naval conflict.  However, at its heart countering A2AD is more about applying the intellectual rigor to overcome the time, distance, speed differences than it is about fundamental changes to naval strategy;  as ATM wrote “war is a business of positions.”  In the end, naval commanders must also remember it takes two to have a fight, and the idea is to ensure the enemy is dealing with as many, or more challenges, than you are.  You threaten him too and as ATM wrote, “These probabilities, known to the enemy, affect his actions just as one’s own risks move one’s self.”

LCDR Armstrong is an active duty naval helicopter pilot.  This post is adapted and expanded from his book 21st Century Mahan: Sound Military Conclusions for a Modern Era forthcoming  from the Naval Institute Press.  The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Posted by admin in China, From our Archive, History, Maritime Security, Navy, Proceedings | read comments (0)

Join us on Sunday for Episode 142 – IA, E-2, FEF, EDU and the 21C Career Path 09/23 by Midrats

What does an officer do with the opportunistic “white space” the Navy can provide you in your career path?

What does a curious intellect and an operational mindset need to look at doing to meet both?

What are some of the demands and opportunities out there who want something a bit different in their career path?

To discuss this for the full hour as well as a bit about the last props on the carrier deck, will be Captain Herb Carmen, USN.

CAPT Carmen is Naval Aviator with over 4,000 flight hours in the E-2C Hawkeye and C-2A Greyhound, previously commanding the VAW-116 “Sun Kings.” He is an Executive MBA student at Georgetown University McDonough School of Business, and he was previously a senior military fellow at the Center for a New American Security.

His views are his own and do not represent the Department of Defense or the United States Navy.

Join us live (or listen later) here or pick it up off our iTunes page.

Posted by Eagle1 in Navy, Uncategorized | read comments (0)

Join us 09-16-12, 5pm (E U.S.) for Episode 141: “In the Shadow of Greatness” on Blog Talk Radio:

In their formative years from 10 to18 – they rose in a different world; the post-Cold War world. No 30-minutes from nuclear annihilation, no existential threat to their existence.

As they approached adulthood, they made the decision to join the military of the world’s only superpower; a superpower at peace, economically strong, culturally vibrant. They were admitted to the United States Naval Academy in 1998; the class of 2002.

Roughly nine months prior to graduation and commissioning, it all changed.

Our guest for the full hour to discus the journey, acts, and experiences of the United States Naval Academy Class of 2002 will be Graham Plaster, a member of the class of 2002 and one of the editors of the book - In the Shadow of Greatness: Voices of Leadership, Sacrifice, and Service from America’s Longest War.

Join us live (or pick it up later) here or you can listen (or download) from our iTunes page.

Posted by Eagle1 in Navy | read comments (0)
Tags: People